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                                                           ABSTRACT 
Nigeria’s federal system of government is grossly problematic. It is characterized by an 
inordinate concentration of powers and fiscal resources in the central government. Not 
only is this centralist division of powers antithetical to the idea of federalism, it also 
fosters the dictatorship of the central government vis a vis the other levels of government. 
Furthermore, it indirectly entrenches the domination of the minority ethnic groups by the 
larger ones. So centralized is Nigeria’s ‘federal’ arrangement that it is, perhaps, better 
described as a unitary contraption designed to perpetually establish the hegemony of the 
central government.  
As we shall later see in this thesis, the existing division of powers among the levels of 
government in Nigeria has been the source of protracted acrimony, conflict, and rancour 
threatening to tear the federation apart. 
Through theoretical analysis, this thesis examines the suitability of the existing power 
allocation structure for a country like Nigeria. The thesis argues that the ethnically 
diverse character of the Nigerian federation and the age-long clamour for autonomy by 
the constituent units of the federation make the existing division of powers absolutely 
untenable and unsuitable for Nigeria.   
This thesis thus proposes a complete abrogation of the existing constitutional framework 
for the division of powers among the levels of government in Nigeria, and its 
replacement with a restructured federal framework that is popularly designed by the 
Nigerian people and cognizant of the country’s diversity. Further to this, the thesis 
advocates a division of powers that entrenches state and local government autonomy 
without compromising the unity of the Nigerian federation. It is argued that only a 
framework such as this will conduce to the federation’s peace and stability, and help to 
stem the secessionist tide currently rocking the country. 
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                                                                         CHAPTER 1 
                                                        INTRODUCTION 
1.0 BACKGROUND 
Nigeria’s “federal” political system is in deep crisis. Forged in the crucible of colonialism 
and nurtured on the wings of military dictatorship, the country’s “federal” experience 
since inception has been disconcertingly chaotic and problematic. Such is the dysfunction 
and discontent occasioned by the existing “federal” constitutional arrangement that 
except the slide is quickly arrested, the Nigerian state itself may unravel in the 
foreseeable future. 
At the heart of Nigeria’s federal crisis, is the highly centripetal division of powers and 
fiscal resources among the levels of government in the federation. In spite of the 
country’s evident ethnic diversity,1and the age-long clamour for autonomy by the  
constituent units of the federation, constitutional division of powers and fiscal resources 
have, for several decades, remained overwhelmingly and inordinately skewed in favour 
of the central government,
2
 a condition that has entrenched the dictatorship and 
hegemony of the central government, and concomitantly subjugated the state and local 
governments.
3
  
So discredited is Nigeria’s extant federal arrangement that the country has, at various 
times, been derided “as a unitary state in federal disguise,”4 or as a “hollow, embattled, 
                                                          
1
 According to the most recent population figures for Nigeria, the country has a population of 140,431,790 
(one hundred and forty million, four hundred and thirty one thousand, seven hundred and ninety). This 
population is spread among more than two hundred and fifty territorially concentrated ethnic nationalities 
domiciled in thirty six (36) states and seven hundred and seventy four (774) local governments of the 
federation, with more than four hundred different languages. See National Bureau of Statistics, ‘Annual 
Abstract of Statistics 2011 & 2016, Federal Republic of Nigeria’ 
<http://nigerianstat.gov.ng/elibrary?page=25&offset=240> (accessed 8/8/2017).  
2
 This is discussed in greater detail in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. 
3
 Rotimi Suberu, ‘Nigeria: Dilemmas of Federalism,’ in Ugo M. Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo eds., 
Federalism and Territorial Cleavages (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2004) pp.334-335. 
4
 Ibid,  p.328. 
16 
 
subverted, or failed federation.”5 The dictatorial and undemocratic character of Nigeria’s 
centralized power distribution architecture has fuelled ethnic conflicts as well as 
separatist and secessionist agitations across the federation throughout its over five 
decades history.
6
  
This thesis advocates a complete abrogation of Nigeria’s centralist ‘federal’ arrangement 
and its replacement with a truly federal constitutional framework that truly recognizes the 
country’s diversity and conduces to genuine democratic governance without jeopardizing 
the unity and stability of the federation. It is, essentially, an advocacy of state and local 
government autonomy within the framework of a united federation.  
Like many other African states, Nigeria is a political entity formed through the 
compulsive and indiscriminate colonial amalgamation of several hitherto independent 
and distinct ethnic kingdoms, empires, city-states, townships and villages, many of which 
had already attained some significant degree of political sophistication by the time the 
first set of colonialists arrived on the shores of Africa.
7
 Most of these ethnic nationalities 
are culturally, religiously, economically, and linguistically different.
8
 In fact, Nigeria, 
Africa’s most populous country, is widely known for its pronounced ethnic diversity and 
heterogeneity. It stands to reason therefore that any constitutional arrangement for 
Nigeria must sufficiently take into consideration the fact of its diversity and 
heterogeneity. 
                                                          
5Ibid. See also, Uchenna Ezeh, ‘Nigeria is a Unitary State, Says Agbakoba’ The Guardian (3 October 2016) 
<https://guardian.ng/news/nigeria-is-a-unitary-state-says-agbakoba/> (accessed 19/6/2017). 
6
 Indeed, public disenchantment with Nigeria’s centralist power distribution paradigm contributed to the ill 
fated secession of Eastern Nigeria from the rest of the federation to form the sovereign state of Biafra in 
1967. The secession subsequently led to a brutal thirty months civil war from 1967 to 1970. An account of 
the Biafran secession and civil war as well as the remote and immediate causes of this can be found in 
A.H.M Kirk Greene, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria vol.2. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971) pp 1-
145. See also C.Odumegwu Ojukwu, Biafra vol.2 (New York: Harper & Row, 1969) pp 7-9; Richard A. 
Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987) pp 
184-185; Bayo Oluwasanmi, ‘Nigeria Breakup Imminent, Oduduwa Republic Inevitable’ Sahara Reporters 
(22 February 2017) <http://saharareporters.com/2017/02/22/nigeria-break-imminent-oduduwa-republic-
inevitable-bayo-oluwasanmi> (accessed 6/6/2017); Stella Iyayi, ‘Biafra: The Story of another Call for 
Nigeria’s Breakup’ Daily Trust  (4 June 2017) <https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/general/biafra-the-
story-of-another-call-for-nigeria-s-break-up/200424.html> (accessed 18/7/2017).    
7
 AG of the Federation v. AG of Abia State and 35 Ors, [2002] Vol.16 WRN 1-132 at p.68. See also S.A. 
Akintoye, Emergent African States:Topics in Twentieth Century African History, (London: London Group 
Ltd, 1976) pp.3; 15. 
8
 Obafemi Awolowo, Thoughts on the Nigerian Constitution (Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1966) 
p.162. 
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In the last five decades however, Nigeria has been governed and administered like a 
homogeneous unitary state. The political system has remained highly centralist in 
character, with successive constitutions allocating to the central government, virtually all 
the significant powers of the federation. Buoyed by this warped constitutional 
architecture, the central government has consistently arrogated to itself, the sole power to 
dictate how the federal system should be administered. Such is the centralization of 
powers that has hallmarked Nigeria’s federal system during this period that the state and 
local governments are, in reality, no more than slavish appendages of the central 
government. 
This thesis is principally concerned with the division of powers and fiscal resources 
entrenched in the extant 1999 constitution of Nigeria which has, for more than a decade, 
been the subject of intense and acrimonious controversy. Since its undemocratic 
formulation and promulgation by military fiat on the eve of Nigeria’s transition to civil 
rule in 1999, the 1999 constitution has faced a barrage of criticisms from several scholars, 
political leaders, and ethnic organizations who decry its illegitimacy, and its 
entrenchment of a centripetal allocation of powers and resources in favour of the central 
government.
9
   
In this thesis, I argue that the division of powers and fiscal resources entrenched in the 
1999 constitution is absolutely unsuitable for an ethnically diverse federation like 
Nigeria. It significantly undermines democratic governance, impinges on the autonomy 
of the state and local governments, fosters the domination of minority ethnic groups by 
the larger ones, and completely negates the very essence of federalism. It is, in short, the 
very antithesis of federalism. 
Suggestions on the appropriate approach that should be adopted to address Nigeria’s 
problematic federal structure have been varied and wide ranging. They range from the 
                                                          
9
 See for instance, Ben Nwabueze, Constitutional Democracy in Africa (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 
2003) p.64; pp.79-89. See also Rotimi Suberu, ‘Managing Constitutional Change in the Nigerian 
Federation’ (2015) 45(4) Publius 552; Abayomi Ojo, ‘Bisi Akande: Blame Recession on 1999 
Constitution’ Independent (22 May 2017) <http://independent.ng/bisi-akande-blame-recession-1999-
constitution> (accessed 6/6/2017). 
18 
 
potentially dangerous argument for confederation
10
 to the anarchist solution being 
canvassed by those who prefer the outright dissolution and dismemberment of the 
federation.
11
 In short, there is, at present, a cacophony of approaches most of which fail 
to fundamentally, realistically, comprehensively, coherently or accurately address the 
problems associated with the existing centralist division of powers and resources among 
the levels of government in Nigeria. This, precisely, is the gap which this thesis intends to 
fill.        
My major argument in this thesis is that the solution to Nigeria’s problematic federal 
arrangement is neither confederation nor a break-up of the country as being suggested in 
some quarters. What is required to correct the country’s defective power distribution 
structure is the abrogation of the existing constitutional division of powers and the 
adoption of a federal division of powers that genuinely prioritizes the diversity of Nigeria 
but nevertheless safeguards her unity. Such an arrangement is only to be found in a truly 
democratic federation, the kind proposed in this thesis.  
Further to the above, I advocate a symbio-democratic federal constitutional framework 
that peremptorily rests on covenant, cooperation, and non-centralization of powers as its 
animating principles. I argue that in an ethnically diverse federation like Nigeria, the 
constitutional division of powers and fiscal resources among the levels of government 
must be covenanted by the people(s) that make up the component parts of the federation, 
in order to guarantee its legitimacy. In essence, the federal arrangement must be 
overwhelmingly subscribed by the people and bear their joint imprimatur. The federal 
constitution, in which the division of powers and resources is entrenched, must be a 
people’s constitution, drawn up, adopted and overwhelmingly ratified by the people 
through a genuinely inclusive and democratic constitution making process. 
                                                          
10Henry Umoru, ‘We Need Confederation or Loose Federation- Tunji Braithwaite’ Vanguard (16 April 
2014) <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/04/need-confederalism-loose-federation-tunji-braithwaite/> 
(accessed 19/7/2017); Semiu Salami, ‘Agbakoba Advocates Confederalism as Solution to Nigeria’s 
Problems’ Newmail (10 January 2015) <http://newmail-ng.com/agbakoba-advocates-confederalism-
solution-nigerias-problems/> (accessed 19/6/2017).    
11
 Bayo Oluwasanmi ‘Nigeria Break-up Imminent, Oduduwa Republic Inevitable.’ Sahara Reporters (22 
February 2017) <http://saharareporters.com/2017/02/22/nigeria-break-imminent-oduduwa-republic-
inevitable-bayo-oluwasanmi> (accessed 6/6/2017). 
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Considering that the 1999 constitution of Nigeria was unilaterally formulated by the 
military and autocratically foisted on the Nigerian people, it stands to reason that the 
division of powers and fiscal resources entrenched in it does not reflect the will of the 
people. It is not an expression of their covenant. And, as such, it is illegitimate. This 
illegitimacy cannot be remedied by piecemeal legislative amendment of the 1999 
constitution as one scholar has suggested.
12
 To adopt a mere “legislative amendment” 
approach in resolving the problematic power distribution paradigm entrenched in the 
1999 constitution is to indirectly endorse the fraud perpetrated by the military framers of 
the constitution when they unilaterally formulated it.  
The 1999 constitution rests on a grossly faulty foundation. And as Lord Denning 
famously averred in a celebrated English case
13
 “you cannot put something on nothing 
and expect it to stay there. It will collapse.”14 The 1999 constitution and the division of 
powers and fiscal resources entrenched in it suffer from a fundamental legitimacy deficit 
that is only remedied by an outright abrogation of this constitution and its replacement 
with a truly democratic constitution birthed through a genuinely inclusive constitution 
making process and containing a division of powers and resources that genuinely reflects 
what the peoples of Nigeria have jointly and overwhelmingly covenanted. This must 
form the starting point in any attempt to address the existing centralist division of powers 
and resources among the levels of government in the Nigerian federation.     
But it is not enough for the division of powers and fiscal resources to reflect the will of 
the people. It must also reflect their diversity and enhance their ability to actively 
participate in their own governance. For a federation of peoples with different economic 
needs, different political and cultural orientations, and different worldviews, the division 
of powers and resources must be so structured as to guarantee to the federating units, 
genuine autonomy over their internal affairs. This requires that the division of powers 
should be non-centralized. It should be guided by the need to, as far as is practicable, 
clearly guarantee to the state and local governments, powers over matters of local interest 
                                                          
12
 Professor Suberu argues for a gradualist and piecemeal legislative amendment of the 1999 constitution 
until the defects associated with the constitution are rectified. See Rotimi Suberu, (note 9 supra) pp 566-
568. 
13
 McFroy v. UAC Ltd [1962] A.C 152. 
14
 Ibid. 
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while limiting the powers of the central government to matters that transcend regional 
boundaries and those that affect the entire federation generally. 
For Nigeria, the foregoing would require a re-assignment of most of the powers currently 
allocated to the central government, under the existing constitutional arrangement, to the 
state and local governments under a new democratic constitution. I advocate a non-
centralized arrangement that is more genuine and more reflective of Nigeria’s diversity 
than those suggested by other scholars in that in addition to the autonomy proposed for 
the constituent states of the federation, I also advocate the constitutional assignment of 
certain powers accompanied by appropriate autonomy to the local governments as a third 
tier of government. Not only would this greatly help to bring government as close to the 
people as possible, it would also help to stem the tide of inter-ethnic and inter-tribal 
political rivalry and conflict that have plagued Nigeria for several decades.  
In addition to the foregoing I also advocate a clearer delineation of the powers assigned 
to each level of government by canvassing a change in the existing constitutional 
technique of power sharing to allow for separate and distinct legislative lists for each 
level of government. The technique of power sharing entrenched in the 1999 constitution 
allocates powers and fiscal resources to the levels of government through the “exclusive” 
and “concurrent” legislative lists. The exclusive legislative list is a catalogue of matters in 
respect of which the central government alone may exercise legislative powers.
15
 The 
concurrent legislative list, on the other hand, itemizes matters over which the central and 
state governments may concurrently exercise legislative powers.
16
 However, where a 
state legislation is inconsistent with a legislation of the central government on the same 
matter, the central government’s legislation prevails17 regardless of whether or not it 
addresses the peculiar needs of the hapless state.  
In addition, the concurrent legislative list often engenders confusion as to which level of 
government ought to exercise which powers, a problem that is often exploited by the 
central government to unilaterally arrogate more powers than necessary to itself. The 
                                                          
15
 Part I Second Schedule, 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
16
 Part II Second Schedule, 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
17
 Section 4(5), 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
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technique of power sharing advocated in this thesis seeks to obviate these problems by 
clearly and unambiguously allocating powers to the levels of government through three 
distinct and separate legislative lists, namely federal, state, and local government 
legislative lists. This will help to remove doubts as to which level of government ought to 
exercise legislative or executive power in respect of any particular matter. Residual 
powers, that is, powers in respect of matters not itemized under any of the three 
legislative lists, are assigned to the state governments under the proposed arrangement. 
Finally, although under the federal framework advocated in this thesis, each level of 
government is expected to operate autonomously, this does not prevent cooperation 
among the levels of government. Cooperation is very important for the effective 
functioning of modern federations. Under the proposed federal framework, the levels of 
government are expected to work together through common institutions and mutual 
arrangements to promote their own individual interests and those of the federation. An 
example of such cooperative arrangements is the proposed joint management of the 
National Fiscal Commission by the levels of government. A further example is seen in 
the proposed fiscal equalization arrangement that will see the levels of government 
assisting each other to meet individual financial needs while maintaining the federation’s 
financial equilibrium and stability. 
What I advocate in this thesis is thus a non-centralized, covenant driven federal 
framework in which covenant, cooperation and non-centralization of powers are 
peremptory principles from which there should be no derogation. I argue that to derogate 
from these principles in the context of Nigeria is to rob the federalism of its very essence, 
a condition that portends grave dangers for the peace, sustenance and stability of the 
Nigerian federation.           
1.1. A BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The 1999 constitution of Nigeria, which is the existing grundnorm of the country’s legal 
order, is widely defined by its centralist character. In fact, it has been derisively referred 
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to as “a blueprint of unitarism.”18 The centralist nature of the constitution is most 
noticeable in the intergovernmental division of powers set out in it. Under this 
arrangement, executive and legislative powers are inordinately and overwhelmingly 
concentrated in the central government. Even in matters over which the federal and state 
governments may concurrently exercise executive and legislative powers, the central 
government is constitutionally empowered to override state legislation that do not 
conform with central government legislation on the same matter(s).
19
  
The position of local governments is even more precarious under the constitution, for 
even though the constitution recognizes local government as a third tier of government, 
certain provisions of the constitution seem to tie their existence, sustenance and 
functionality to the federal and state governments,
20
 a situation that often undermines the 
ability of the local governments to function effectively, and one which often creates 
enormous inter-ethnic and inter-tribal crisis in Nigeria’s multi-ethnic and multi-tribal 
society.   
Further evidence of the constitution’s centralization of powers is seen in the nature and 
character of the Fiscal Commission established to, among other things, allocate centrally 
collected revenue among the levels of government in the federation. Not only is this 
Commission constitutionally empowered to exclusively and centrally determine the 
criteria and formula for revenue allocation among the levels of government without any 
genuine participation of the state and local governments in its decision making processes, 
its membership is discretionally determined by the President of Nigeria,
21
 thus making 
the Commission itself prone to the political influence and manipulation of the central 
government, for, as Dicey warns us, “wherever there is discretion, there is room for 
arbitrariness.”22  
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Considering the very sensitive nature of the work of this Fiscal Commission and the fact 
that every part of Nigeria is affected by its decisions, one would have expected a more 
democratic approach to the appointment of its membership and the discharge of its 
functions. The reverse is however the case under the 1999 constitution. The implication 
of this is that the Commission can unilaterally take fundamental and far-reaching policy 
decisions that are favourable to the central government but detrimental to the interests 
and aspirations of the state and local governments. 
Perhaps the most problematic indicator of the highly centralized nature of Nigeria’s 
federalism is the fact that the division of powers and fiscal resources entrenched in the 
country’s 1999 constitution was centrally conceived, centrally designed and unilaterally 
imposed on the entire federation by military authorities on the eve of the country’s 
transition to civil rule in 1999.
23
 The 1999 constitution was unilaterally framed and 
promulgated into law by the military establishment and its tiny clique of civilian 
collaborators. Despite the fact of the country’s diversity, Nigerians were not genuinely 
consulted, neither were their opinions genuinely sought on the nature and character of the 
constitution. Contrary to the impression created by the framers of the constitution in the 
decree promulgating it and in its preamble therefore, the 1999 constitution is not an act of 
the Nigerian people. It is not a people’s constitution. And since this constitution is not a 
genuine articulation of the will of the peoples of Nigeria, the division of powers and 
fiscal resources entrenched in it cannot and should not be regarded as a reflection of the 
collective will and aspiration of the peoples of Nigeria. 
The three problems identified above are the major markers of the centralist character of 
the power distribution arrangement set out in the 1999 constitution. They form the main 
focus of this thesis. As we shall see in chapter four of the thesis, apart from the fact that it 
stifles the democratic right of the constituent units of the federation to determine their 
own destinies and manage their own affairs, the division of powers and fiscal resources 
entrenched in the 1999 constitution promotes the domination and subjugation of minority 
ethnic groups by the larger ethnic groups. And it undermines the efficient provision of 
public services and welfare in the state and local governments.  
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When it is considered that the undemocratic and insensitive nature of the existing federal 
framework has been the cause of so much inter-ethnic conflict and agitations for 
secession in the last five decades, the urgent need for a radical overhaul of this 
framework becomes very clear indeed. 
1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research work is aimed at addressing two principal questions: 
(a) To what extent is the existing constitutional framework for the division of powers 
and fiscal resources among the levels of government in Nigeria consistent with 
the idea of federalism? 
 
(b) How can this constitutional framework be restructured to align it with the idea of 
federalism, and enable the constituent units of the Nigerian federation to manage 
their own internal affairs without jeopardizing the unity and stability of the 
federation? 
 
1.3. OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY 
 The main objective of this research is to proffer cogent and practical solutions to 
Nigeria’s problematic division of powers and fiscal resources by devising a counter-
hegemonic federal framework that is covenant driven and non-centralized; one that 
genuinely acknowledges Nigeria’s ethnic diversity and caters to the imperative of 
regional autonomy without undermining the unity of the federation.  
In devising this framework, I will commence with a theoretical and historical discussion 
that is aimed at identifying and establishing the fundamental attributes that have clearly 
underpinned the idea of federalism from the earliest times till now. Establishing these 
fundamental attributes would enable me to later identify gaps in Nigeria’s extant federal 
system when I discuss that federal system in chapters 4 and 5.  
To identify the fundamental attributes that have underpinned the idea of federalism from 
time immemorial, I will examine and discuss classical and contemporary scholarship on 
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the subject. I will also discuss and compare the evolution, growth and character of federal 
practice in the older and contemporary federal systems. Apart from the Achaean League, 
the United Dutch Provinces, and the Swiss confederation, all of which shall be included 
for their obvious historical significance as forerunners of federalism in the modern sense, 
the comparative discussion will also focus on established federal systems like Canada, 
and Germany, as well as federal systems that have similar histories or similar political 
trajectories with Nigeria, such as Ethiopia, South Africa and the United States.  
For instance, the Nigerian presidential and federal system of government is supposedly 
modeled on that of the United States of America (USA), yet, very important elements of 
the federal idea that are found in the American federal system are conspicuously missing 
in the Nigerian version. This makes the USA very important in any comparative 
discussion relating to Nigeria. Canada’s ethnically diverse federal system and Germany’s 
unique system of cooperative federalism provide deep insight into federalism’s dynamic 
character.  A discussion of federal constitutional practices and paradigms in South Africa 
and Ethiopia will be included in view of the fact that these two countries are ethnically 
diverse African federations like Nigeria. And, like Nigeria, the two countries have a 
troubling history of centralization. But both have been democratized and have adopted 
federal-type political systems that are specially designed to cater to their political and 
socio-cultural diversities. The allocation of powers in both countries provides instructive 
perspectives on how to strike a balance between unity and diversity in heterogeneous 
African societies. 
Having identified the fundamental attributes of federalism from the theoretical, historical, 
and comparative discussion described above, I will then carry out a detailed and critical 
analysis of the nature and implications of the power distribution framework set out in the 
1999 constitution of Nigeria with a view to establishing whether the extant federal 
framework in Nigeria reflects these fundamental attributes. The framework entrenched in 
previous constitutions of Nigeria will also be analyzed and discussed to reinforce the 
argument that Nigeria has had a most troubling history of centralized government 
occasioned by colonialism and military rule, and the current “federal” arrangement is in 
fact a continuation of the old order. In essence, the existing “federal” arrangement in 
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Nigeria is, in fact, a centralist colonial and military legacy foisted on the country by 
force. And it has been sustained by coercion. Not only will this analysis help to 
comprehensively establish the defective character of the existing division of powers and 
fiscal resources in Nigeria, it will also highlight the urgent need for its abrogation and 
replacement with a new federal framework. 
I will then propose a federal framework anchored on the three fundamental attributes of 
federalism identified in this thesis, to wit, covenant, cooperation and non-centralization of 
power. In designing this framework, I will take into consideration the peculiarities of the 
Nigerian State, incuding its heterogeneity. 
In the course of the work relevant policy reports, legal texts, constitutions, newspaper 
articles and newspaper interviews, journal articles and the case law of the Nigerian courts 
will be analyzed and discussed to strengthen the arguments made in this thesis and enrich 
the federal framework proposed in  the thesis. In the discussion of the Nigerian federal 
system, much reliance is particularly placed on newspaper reports, articles and 
interviews, because the debate on the country’s federalism is still ongoing and there is, as 
yet, no detailed or comprehensive scholarly work on federal restructuring in Nigeria. In 
fact, this is a gap which this thesis is set to fill. 
1.4. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
This research comes at a most auspicious time when the clamour for a change in the 
extant constitutional division of powers and fiscal resources among the levels of 
government in Nigeria appears to have reached a tension-inducing crescendo. However, 
as explained earlier in this chapter,
24
 many of the alternatives already proffered by 
scholars, political leaders, ethnic groups, and political commentators fail to 
comprehensively, realistically, or articulately address the real problems associated with 
the existing power distribution paradigm in Nigeria. These alternative suggestions range 
from an advocacy of confederation to a preachment of complete dissolution of the 
federation and a break up of Nigeria into smaller independent countries. 
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This thesis argues that the solution to the problematic division of powers and fiscal 
resources entrenched in the highly controversial 1999 constitution of Nigeria is not 
confederation or a dismemberment of the federation, as being suggested by some scholars 
and ethnic organizations. The solution is to reconstruct Nigeria’s federal arrangement by 
adopting the symbio-democratic federal framework advocated in this thesis. This is a 
counter-hegemonic federal framework that peremptorily rests on covenant, cooperation 
and non-centralization of powers as its defining principles. It is a federal constitutional 
framework that will facilitate state and local government autonomy within the ambit of a 
united federation. This framework provides the best guarantee of unity in diversity for 
Nigeria. 
The thesis thus makes a significant contribution to the ongoing federal debate in Nigeria. 
It provides future constitution makers with a viable alternative to the existing monolithic, 
conservative, and fundamentally flawed “federal” arrangement. 
       
1.5. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS 
I begin by surveying and discussing the classical and contemporary literature on the 
subject of federalism especially as it relates to the division of powers and fiscal resources 
among levels of government. Discussions on federalism cannot and should not be 
restricted to the division of powers among levels of government alone. Such discussions 
must also embrace and capture the financial arrangements and resources that support the 
exercise of power in a federal polity, for as Hamilton put it in The Federalist, “money is, 
with propriety, considered as the vital principle of the body politic; as that which sustains 
its life and motion, and enables it to perform its most essential functions. A complete 
power, therefore, to procure a regular and adequate supply of it, as far as the resources of 
the community will permit, may be regarded as an indispensable ingredient in every 
constitution.”25  
A discussion on the division of powers in a federation without a simultaneous 
consideration of the fiscal arrangements and resources that support and sustain the 
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exercise of power is, in my view, sterile and pointless indeed. What is power without 
money? Indeed, power without finance is, in reality, no power. The Americans 
demonstrated this in the course of framing the 1789 federal constitution of the United 
States (US). So important and so fundamental was the subject of finance to the 
constitution’s framers that six chapters of “The Federalist” were specially devoted to a 
consideration of it.
26
 The discussion of federalism in this thesis thus embraces both the 
division of powers, and the financial arrangements that support the exercise of power.   
In the course of examining the literature on the subject of federalism, I discuss the history 
and nature of the subject as well as what scholars have written on it. This is the focus of 
chapter two. My aim in chapter two is to attempt a clarification of the concept of 
federalism, identify gaps and misconceptions in the existing literature and perspectives on 
Nigerian federalism, and set the background for subsequent discussion of the subject 
matter of this thesis.  
My main argument in chapter two is that although there is no generally accepted 
definition of federalism, a deductive analysis of the literature, and an examination of the 
history of federal practice and arrangements indicate that there is indeed an ‘idea of 
federalism’ which furnishes the ‘irreducible minimum’ principles that are very vital to a 
federal system of government. These principles are covenant, cooperation, and non-
centralization of powers. I argue that the division of powers and fiscal resources in a 
federal system ought to conform to the idea of federalism as articulated above. In 
essence, such division of powers and fiscal resources should be covenanted, it should 
engender cooperation, and it should facilitate and sustain non-centralization of powers.      
Next I extensively analyse the history and evolution of federalism in Nigeria. This is the 
subject matter of chapter three. The historical analysis will commence with the 1914 
amalgamation of several ethnic nations to form the Nigerian State. It will examine the 
nature of power distribution under successive constitutions during the colonial period and 
the subsequent thirty year military era, and end with a discussion of the constitutional 
division of powers and fiscal resources in the period immediately preceding the framing 
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and promulgation of the 1999 constitution. My main argument in this chapter is that 
considering the formation of the Nigerian federation from previously existing 
independent, distinct, and dissimilar political entities, the diversity of the federation ought 
to be recognized and protected in the constitution through a democratic division of 
powers and fiscal resources among the levels of government. However, as the analysis in 
the chapter shows, Nigeria has a highly problematic history of centralization. 
Nothing particularly shows the disregard for Nigeria’s diversity like the centripetal 
division of powers and fiscal resources entrenched in the extant 1999 constitution of the 
country. An examination of this problematic power distribution arrangement forms the 
subject matter of chapter four. Here I critically examine the division of powers and fiscal 
resources among the levels of government in the Nigerian federation with a view to 
assessing its suitability for an ethnically diverse federation like Nigeria and its 
consistency with the idea of federalism. I argue that not only is this division of powers 
unsuitable for an ethnically diverse federation like Nigeria, it is absolutely inconsistent 
with the idea of federalism, and thus unacceptable. It fosters dictatorship and undermines 
democratic governance. And unless this imbalance is urgently addressed, it will 
invariably tear the federation apart and set the West African sub region on a path of 
irreversible chaos. 
Next I strongly argue for a complete departure from the existing federal arrangement, and 
its replacement with a symbio-democratic federal framework that peremptorily prioritizes 
covenant, cooperation and non-centralization of powers as the animating principles of the 
Nigerian federal system of government. As already explained in section 1.0 above, 
covenant in this context indicates “agreement” of the component parts of the federation to 
the organizing principles of the federal polity. It presupposes an inclusive and democratic 
process of determining and ratifying the principles which should guide the operation of 
the federal system. Without this, the political system cannot be realistically federal in the 
true sense of the word. In addition to covenant, the division of powers in an ethnically 
diverse federal system should, as much as possible, be guided by the need to guarantee to 
the component parts of the federation, autonomy and control over their internal affairs, 
especially matters that most closely concern them. Non-centralization of powers must be 
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emphatically and unequivocally entrenched as an overarching policy in the constitution 
of an ethnically diverse federation. Not only will it foster democratic governance, it will 
also help to protect the rights of minority ethnic groups, and drastically stem the inter-
ethnic tensions that are often latent in ethnically diverse societies.  
Finally, in addition to covenant and non-centralization of powers, cooperation should be 
institutionalized as a way of promoting and protecting the unity of the federation. As the 
constituent units of the ethnically diverse federation cooperate to foster their joint and 
individual interests, the unity and stability of the federal system is enhanced and 
preserved. The federal constitution must therefore establish and encourage common and 
inclusive institutions of governance that will engender cooperation among the component 
parts of an ethnically diverse federation. 
I argue that these three principles – covenant, cooperation and non-centralization of 
powers- are peremptory principles of federalism. In essence, not only do they constitute 
‘irreducible minimum’ attributes of genuine federalism, there should be no derogation 
from them, for such derogation will corrupt and defeat the very essence of federalism. 
This perspective, that is, the peremptoriness of covenant, cooperation and non-
centralization of powers, has not been sufficiently or coherently explored and articulated 
in the Nigerian federalism literature before now. It is therefore a significant contribution 
to the ongoing debate on federalism in Nigeria and if adopted, it will help to protect the 
democratic rights and public welfare of the component parts of the Nigerian federation 
while contributing greatly to her unity and stability. 
Further to the federal framework proposed and articulated in this thesis, I make specific 
proposals for constitutional and policy changes in Nigeria. This is the focus of chapter six 
which is also the concluding chapter of the thesis. First, I argue for a complete abrogation 
of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria, in which is contained the problematic division of 
powers and fiscal resources discussed in this thesis. I propose the replacement of this 
problematic constitution by a truly democratic constitution. I argue that a democratic 
constitution is identified not only by its democratic content but also by the democratic 
nature of the process that births it. Thus, I propose a democratic constitution making 
process that consists of three different but mutually reinforcing stages. The first is the 
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setting up of a constitution drafting committee that will collate public opinion on the new 
constitution and then prepare a draft constitution on the basis of this public opinion. The 
second stage is the rigorous and thorough discussion and adoption of the draft 
constitution by a specially elected constituent assembly representing every part of 
Nigeria. The last stage of the constitution making process is the conduction of a 
referendum for a public endorsement and ratification of the new constitution. I argue that 
only an inclusive and thorough process like the one just outlined will suffice in the 
production of a democratic constitution for Nigeria.
27
 Only such a process will guarantee 
that the division of powers and fiscal resources entrenched in the constitution is a 
reflection of the joint covenant of the Nigerian people. Previous constitution making 
processes in Nigeria have been solely and exclusively managed by the central 
government and its allies, and are thus undemocratic. The constitution making process 
recommended in this thesis will thus be a complete departure from the existing practice.        
Apart from birthing the constitution through a democratic process, the division of powers 
and fiscal resources in the constitution must also be structured in a way that ensures that 
the levels of government in the federation are imbued with autonomy in respect of their 
internal affairs. Thus under the division of powers and fiscal resources proposed in this 
thesis, most of the matters currently itemized under the exclusive legislative list of the 
central government are re-assigned to the state and local governments.  
I also propose a change in the technique for sharing powers among the levels of 
government in order to prevent the federal (central) government’s dictatorial interference 
in the affairs of the state and local governments. In this connection I propose that powers 
should be clearly shared among the levels of government through three distinct legislative 
lists, namely federal list, state list and local government list. This will help to prevent 
unnecessary interference in the affairs of the state and local governments. It will also 
prevent the central government’s incessant encroachment on the powers of the state and 
local governments. This mode of sharing power will reduce the tensions and conflicts that 
have characterized intergovernmental relations in Nigeria thus far and will promote true 
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democratic governance. In addition, the arrangement outlined above will help to entrench 
non-centralization of powers as a prime policy of the Nigerian federal system. 
Finally, I also advocate that legislative/executive autonomy should, as far as is 
practicable, be concomitantly accompanied by significant fiscal autonomy. 
Legislative/executive autonomy will be worthless unless it is accompanied by sufficient 
fiscal autonomy to ensure that state and local governments are, as far as possible, self-
sustaining, and not obsequiously dependent on the federal government for their 
sustenance. Not only will this help to ensure that the state and local governments are able 
to effectively manage their internal affairs, it will also help to enhance accountability, 
experimentation, and innovation in individual state and local governments. In addition, it 
will encourage healthy competition among them. In chapter six, I advocate a division of 
fiscal powers and resources that will conduce to the autonomy of the state and local 
governments without jeopardizing the overall fiscal stability and equilibrium of the 
federation.    
In concluding the introduction, I should mention that unlike the ad-hoc and piecemeal 
treatment of the subject in much of the literature on Nigerian federalism, the division of 
powers and fiscal resources proposed and advocated in this thesis, offers a clear and 
comprehensive solution to Nigeria’s ‘federal problem’ and has the potential to rectify the 
‘power imbalance’ that has threatened the corporate existence of the Nigerian state for 
several years. It is expected that the adoption of and adherence to the federal framework 
proposed in this thesis will help to stem the tide of conflict, especially the inter-ethnic 
rivalry as well as the separatist and secessionist agitations that have plagued the Nigerian 
federation over the last few decades. It will also help to facilitate and achieve the “unity 
in diversity” goal of the federation. 
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                                                             CHAPTER 2 
                             FEDERALISM: HISTORY AND SCHOLARSHIP 
  
INTRODUCTION 
Federalism has had a long and checkered history.
1
 As an institutional arrangement for 
government, the practice of federalism dates back to the remotest antiquity.
2
 As a theory, 
federalism’s many aspects have been the subject of rigorous scholarship since the 
medieval period.
3
 Yet its contemporary relevance is not in doubt.
4
 The topicality of 
federalism is today evidenced by the vast collection of contemporary literature 
specifically devoted to the subject.  
One possible explanation for this deluge of academic interest in federal theory is the 
renowned utility of federalism as a tool of social engineering in ethnically diverse 
societies where inter-regional and intergovernmental tensions often threaten to rupture 
the very fabric of the State.
5
 A direct result of the surge in contemporary federalism 
scholarship however, is the noticeable proliferation of federal perspectives amid an 
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elusive universally accepted definition of the subject. Indeed, as we shall later see in this 
work, there are currently as many conceptualizations of federalism as there are scholars 
and theorists.  
In this chapter, I trace the history and evolution of federalism as a form of government, 
and attempt a critical discussion and analysis of major classical and contemporary 
writings on the subject. Leading philosophers, scholars and political thinkers have 
commented and written extensively on the subject. And, as we shall see, federalism has 
existed in various forms at different times in world history. For instance, the formation of 
the Achaean League, the Swiss Confederation, the United Dutch Provinces and the 
United States of America represent major epochs in the historical evolution of federalism. 
These above mentioned instances of federal-type arrangements are included in the 
following discussion for their historical significance as forerunners of federalism in the 
modern sense. The discussion also includes the Canadian, Ethiopian and South African 
federal systems each of which is ethnically diverse like Nigeria and thus worthy of 
comparative study. Additionally, like Nigeria, Ethiopia and South Africa have a troubling 
history of centralization but both countries have transformed into federal democratic 
systems. They offer instructive perspectives on federalism in heterogenous African 
societies. The German federal system occupies a special place in the pantheon of well 
established federations, and is included in the discussion below for its unique cooperative 
approach to federal government. Cooperation, as explained in this chapter, is an 
indispensable attribute of federal government.  The defining characteristics of each of the 
above mentioned historical and contemporary instances of federal union are examined 
and discussed in this chapter. 
This chapter reveals that although scholars do not agree on a universal definition of 
federalism, there are nevertheless certain elements of the idea of federalism that are 
implicit in classical and contemporary conceptualizations of federalism. Three of these 
elements- covenant, cooperation and non-centralization of powers- are particularly 
fundamental to federalism in ethnically diverse societies like Nigeria. And as I later argue 
in chapter five of this thesis, so intrinsically basic are these three elements to the idea of 
federalism in ethnically diverse societies that derogation from them will detract from the 
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very essence of federalism. Succinctly put therefore, they are peremptory principles of 
federalism from which there should be no derogation. A major argument of this thesis is 
that the ‘federal validity’ or ‘federalness’ of governance and institutional arrangements in 
ethnically-diverse federal states should be peremptorily contingent on their anchorage in 
“covenant,” “cooperation” and “non-centralization of powers.” 
2.1 History and Evolution of Federalism. 
A convenient starting point for any discussion on federal evolution is the formation, in 
the Hellenistic era, of the Achaean confederation comprising the Greek city states of 
ancient Peloponnesus. In his detailed account of the two phases of this union, classical 
Greek Historian, Polybius describes the ‘voluntary’ nature of membership in the first 
Achaean League and the ‘equality’ and ‘liberty’ which characterized relations among 
member city-states in the first and second existences of the League.
6
  
In particular, Polybius effusively extols the ‘democratic’ spirit that hallmarked 
government in the second Achaean League and argues that this was a major attraction 
that lured other Greek city states to subsequently join or remain within the League. While 
the paramount goal of the League was the security of the member city-states from 
Macedonian invasion and oppression, an objective to which all members were resolutely 
pledged, the formation of the League was also aimed at stemming the tide of inter-city 
violence commonplace in ancient Greece.
7
 One scholar, in fact, describes the Achaean 
project as the Hellenic era’s “attempt to protect the Poleis (city-state) from empires and 
tyrant hegemony.”8 
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Giving a succinct summary of the League’s structure, Rufus Davis writes that its 
principal features included “common citizenship, division of competences between the 
League and the constituent cities, a central legislature and full time executive, central 
control of war and peace as well as foreign affairs, autonomy of the constituent cities in 
all matters but war and peace, equal representation of each city in the central assembly, 
and the permanence of the treaty which created the league.”9 The autonomy of each of 
the cities making up the League over local matters within its own territory is buttressed 
by Freeman who in his own detailed portraiture of the League, avers that the Achaean 
cities were indeed not mere municipalities. They were commonwealths in their own right 
with full local powers while the government of the League tended to matters regarding 
external diplomatic relations and such other issues of general importance to the League.
10
 
A more recent account of Achaean federalism strongly supports the narrative that 
members of the league retained their autonomy while conceding powers in respect of 
common interests to the League’s central authority.11    
Regarding fiscal matters and fiscal relations within the league, Ehrenberg writes that the 
League government “had the supreme right of coinage, but in addition there was often 
coinage by member states, though always of one and the same standard.”12 And “the 
league seldom relied on fixed quotas from the member states, but rather on taxes levied 
directly on the citizens, whether regular or called for at special occasions.”13 On the other 
hand, member poleis of the League “retained the right to collect local taxes and to 
administer their own markets…”14 And their ability to borrow funds to finance local 
initiatives was largely unfettered.
15
 Essentially therefore, the Achaean League was 
organized in a way that fostered the unity of the cities (poleis) but nevertheless preserved 
their individual integrity and autonomy. The political, organizational and fiscal structure 
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of the League must have influenced what became obtainable in the American federal 
system established later in the 18
th
 century.  
We see from the description given above of the League that some of the same values that 
influenced the American founders- democracy, equality, liberty- were manifestly present 
in the Achaean League. And just like the American federal system was originally 
founded to secure the liberty of its members, the Achaean League was similarly 
established to secure and protect its member city-states. The members committed 
themselves to jointly secure their borders against enemy invasion and protect their 
common economic interests while preserving the right of each member to superintend its 
own internal affairs.    
Just like the Achaean League, a desire to secure the freedom and protection of member 
cities was the driving force behind the alliance of the three Swiss cantons, “Uri, Schwyz 
and Nidwalden” in August 1291.16 The alliance later grew to include Lucerne, Zurich, 
Glarus, Zug and Bern in the mid thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. The Swiss 
alliance progressively expanded with more members joining until 1848 when the 
(con)federal constitution of Switzerland was drawn up.
17
 The aim of the (con)federation 
according to the Constitution was “to insure the independence of the country against 
foreign power; to maintain tranquility and order in the interior; to protect the liberty and 
rights of the confederates and to protect the common welfare.”18 
Again, like the Achaean League, an elaborate scheme of division of competences was 
outlined in the 1848 Constitution of the Swiss Confederation which sought to ensure that 
the balance of power between the federation and the cantons was in line with the aims 
and aspirations of the cantons. Thus while the central government retained powers 
necessary to preserve the aims of the federation, the constitution guaranteed to the 
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Cantons, power in respect all other matters.
19
 Although, the Swiss Constitution has 
undergone a number of revisions over the years, it has retained the basic federal structure 
established by the 1848 constitution.
20
   
Features of the Achaean and old Swiss alliances described above were also manifest in 
the union founded by the Dutch provinces, and that founded by the American colonies 
under the Articles of Confederation in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries respectively. 
Both unions were essentially established as defense mechanisms aimed at confronting 
and obliterating imperialism.
21
 And similarity between the two unions is most marked by 
the degree of autonomy enjoyed by their federating units.
22
  
Unlike the arrangements established by the Achaean League and the 1848 Swiss 
constitution however, the central governments established by the Union of Utrecht and 
the Articles of Confederation were much less powerful than the federating units.
23
 In fact, 
save for the common defense of the unions, their central bodies were not empowered to 
do much else.
24
 Boogman describes the United Dutch Provinces after 1650 as a 
“confederation of states” whose central government existed as an agency of the 
confederating states.
25
 In the case of the American colonies, such was the near impotence 
of the Continental Congress, the central body established by the Articles of 
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confederation, that it had no independent source of revenue. Its revenue was sourced 
from the federating colonies many of which treated the obligation to provide such 
funding as discretionary.
26
 Ultimately, the weak central governments created by the 
Union of Utrecht and the American Articles of Confederation, as highlighted above, 
proved to be the undoing of both unions and ultimately led to their premature demise.
27
 
The ‘unworkability’ of the American Articles of Confederation led to its replacement 
with a constitution that gave significant and meaningful autonomy to the American states 
but also guaranteed to the central government, powers sufficient for its effective 
functioning. This new constitution, which came into force in 1789 contains a list of 
functions exercisable by the central government but empowers the state governments to 
perform all other governmental responsibilities.
28
 In addition, under this constitution, 
funding for the central government is, unlike what obtained under the 1781 Articles of 
confederation, not dependent on the magnanimity of the state governments, but on taxes 
directly levied on individual citizens and corporate bodies in the United States.
29
 The 
1789 constitution, in effect, embodies a federal arrangement “articulated in a single 
constitutional system, of two distinct governments, national and state, each acting in its 
own right, each acting directly on individuals, and each a qualified master of a limited 
domain of action.”30 The political arrangement created by the 1789 constitution has been 
described as the first manifestation of “federalism in the modern sense.”31  
Not only did the founding fathers of America create a unique political arrangement, 
unparalleled in history, they also set down a political paradigm that would be copied by 
other federal states in future. For instance, unlike most of the previous alliances and 
leagues that existed prior to the modern federal arrangement founded by the Americans in 
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1787, the federating parties and the central government were set up to exist side by side 
as distinct entities within the same national space. The new US federal arrangement was 
not structured like that of the United Dutch Provinces which was essentially a security 
alliance under which the participating Provinces merely ceded enough power to the 
central body they created for the purposes of their joint security but retained their 
separate status as independent states.       
By the political arrangement set out under the 1789 constitution of the US, America 
effectively created a new conception of the word ‘federal.’ The term had been used 
loosely before then to refer to most forms of alliances or leagues. With the new US 
constitution however, the old conception of ‘federal’ as loose ‘alliances or leagues’ 
gradually faded into oblivion. Such alliances or leagues came to be regarded as 
‘confederation’ while the word ‘federal’ also gradually became associated with the new 
political arrangement set out in the 1789 constitution of the United States.
32
 Federalism in 
the modern sense can therefore be rightly said to have originated from the 1789 
constitution of the United States.
33
  
The quality of the 1789 constitution of America is marked by the values of democracy, 
equality, and liberty embedded in it. A particular indicator of this is the division of 
powers set out in the constitution. The constitution assigns power over matters common 
to the union to the central government while all other matters are left for the state 
governments.
34
 This was a compromise arrangement between those who wanted a much 
stronger central government for America and those who wanted the absolute 
independence enjoyed by the states under the previous Articles of Confederation.
35
 The 
compromise arrangements were worked out and sealed during several days of lengthy 
debates and negotiations by the American people at the Philadelphia constitutional 
convention and the subsequent ratifying conventions in the various State Assemblies.
36
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In Canada, the federal arrangement dates back to 1867 when, by the British North 
American Act (BNA) of that year, Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick formed “a 
union of four provinces,”37Ontario, Quebec , Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick.38 
Importantly, the Act’s preamble expresses the “desire” of the provinces to be “federally 
united” into one country. Subsequent additions to the union have now made Canada a 
federation of ten provinces.
39
 From relatively humble beginnings, theCanadian federal 
system has evolved to become one of the most decentralized federations in the world, 
with the Provinces having broad authority in a significant number of policy fields. For 
instance, the provinces have broad powers of taxation, they have significant borrowing 
powers, they own and manage public lands within their domains, and they have extensive 
management powers in the exploration, conservation, exploitation and development of 
non-renewable natural resources found within their territories.
40
  
Indeed, section 92A(4) of the Canadian constitution empowers the legislature in each 
province “to make laws in relation to the raising of money by any mode or system of 
taxation in respect of non renewable natural resources and forestry resources in the 
province…” However, it must be pointed out that the decentralist character of Canadian 
federalism is balanced by the federal government’s exclusive legislative competence in 
fields such as the regulation of trade and commerce, currency and coinage, taxation for 
the purposes of the federation, and borrowing of money for the purposes of the 
federation.
41
 Canadian decentralization is also balanced by the country’s well developed 
system of inter-governmental cooperation and coordination which is evident in a number 
of policy fields. For instance, although provinces have broad authority in the area of 
revenue generation, there is often an imbalance between the revenue available to most 
provinces and the quantum of social services and other projects they are constitutionally 
required to provide for their constituents. To address this problem, federal spending 
power is often used to provide funding in policy fields that are ordinarily under the 
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jurisdiction of the provinces. This is of course done with the consent and cooperation of 
the concerned province(s).
42
 In addition, Canada’s federal system is characterized by a 
well developed fiscal equalization system which is designed to “reconcile equality with 
autonomy” by ensuring that fiscal decentralization does not exacerbate fiscal inequality 
among the provinces.
43
 
Intergovernmental cooperation and coordination is more pronounced in Germany and 
Austria. In Germany for instance, although the federal government exercises broad 
legislative competence in a wide array of policy fields, implementation or execution of 
federal legislation is largely the responsibility of the Lander (regional or state 
governments).
44
 This is not to say that the Lander are without any form of legislative 
competence of their own. In fact, the German Basic Law outlines a number of policy 
fields in which both federal and Land governments may exercise concurrent legislative 
authority. Among these are the public ownership of land and natural resources, 
agriculture, labour matters, maritime and coastal shipping, public welfare, mining, 
banking, industry, trade and commerce etcetera.
45
   
The German constitution also encourages cooperation between the federal and Land 
governments in the field of “educational planning,…promotion of research institutions 
….research projects of supra-regional importance, criminal police work, protection of 
free democratic basic order, security of the federation or of a Land…”46  
In the area of finance, the German federal government is exclusively empowered to 
legislate in respect of “custom duties and fiscal monopolies,”47 while the Lander is 
empowered to exercise legislative jurisdiction over “local taxes on consumption and 
                                                          
42
 See Richard Simeon and Martin Papillon (note 38 supra) at p.105. See also, George Anderson, (note 1 
supra) p.39. 
43
 Section 36 of the Constitution Act 1982. 
44
 See Article 83 of the Basic Law 1949. See also Ronald L. Watts (note 2 supra) p.35. A similar 
arrangement is also seen in the Austrian federal system where legislation is considerably centralized, but 
the nine Lander play a role in the administration and implementation of federal legislation. See Ronald L. 
Watts (supra) p.34. As in Germany, the Federal Government’s predominant lead role in the Austrian 
federal system is perhaps explained by the homogenous character of the country. For more on this 
perspective, see Jan Erk,  “A Federation without Federalism” 2004 34(1) Publius 1-20. 
45
 Basic Law 1949, Article 74. 
46
Ibid,  Articles 91b and 73(10). 
47
 Ibid, Article 105(1). 
43 
 
expenditures” as long as similar taxes have not been imposed by a federal legislation.48 In 
effect, while revenues from “customs duties, highway freight tax, tax on capital 
transactions,” as well as “income and corporation surtaxes” accrue to the federal 
government,
49
 other taxes like the “property tax, inheritance tax, motor vehicle tax, beer 
tax, tax on gambling establishments, and such other taxes as do not accrue to the 
federation” accrue to the Lander.50 Revenue generated from “income taxes, corporation 
taxes, and turnover taxes” are expected to “accrue jointly to the federation and the 
Lander”51 The intergovernmental allocation of revenue outlined above is designed to 
ensure that both levels of government are armed with significant revenue to carry out 
their constitutional responsibilities. 
Tax administration is mostly within the jurisdiction of the Lander.
52
 However the federal 
government is exclusively empowered to administer custom duties, fiscal monopolies and 
taxes on consumption regulated by federal law.
53
  
To bridge fiscal disparities that may result from differences in the fiscal capacities or 
revenue raising abilities of the Lander, the German constitution, like its Canadian 
counterpart, establishes a system of fiscal equalization to ensure that “financially weak 
Lander” are able to meet “their general financial needs”54 
One further point must be made with respect to German federalism, as discussed above. 
While it may be correct to argue that the German federal system is not as non-centralized 
as those of the United States or Canada, it is nevertheless true that the regional 
governments (Lander) in Germany are not mere appendages of the German federal 
government. The Land governments in Germany are, in fact, key actors in the German 
federal system. Apart from their key role in the implementation of federal legislation, 
they also play a very influential role in federal legislation through their membership of 
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the Bundesraat.
55
 But, the most remarkable and enduring legacy of German federalism is 
its implicit and explicit preachment of cooperation as a cardinal cornersone of federalism, 
a lesson which the South Africans seems to have imbibed, as demonstrated by the explicit 
entrenchment of inter-governmental cooperation in the extant constitution of South 
Africa.
56
 
Like Germany, although the South African constitution establishes a strong national 
government, the provincial governments are not mere appendages of the national 
government. This is evident in the sheer quantum of matters which are within the 
legislative competence of the provinces.
57
 Among other things, the broad authority of the 
provinces allows them to legislate in respect of agriculture, education, health services, 
housing, policing, public transport, welfare services, provincial planning, provincial 
amenities, as well as provincial roads and traffic.
58
  In the area of finance, although the 
constitution clearly gives the national government a lead role in the raising of revenue, 
and associated legislation,
59
 the constitution nevertheless establishes broad principles for 
the sharing of national revenue. Among other things, the legislation for the sharing of 
national revenue can only be enacted after due consultation with the provincial 
governments and the Fiscal Commission established by the constitution.
60
 And such 
legislation must take into consideration “the need to ensure that the provinces and 
municipalities are able to provide basic services and perform the functions allocated to 
them.”61 It must also take into consideration the “fiscal capacity and efficiency of the 
provinces and municipalities,”62 and the need to bridge “economic disparities within and 
among the provinces.”63 The implication of the above is that even though the National 
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Government is sadled with the role of fiscal coordination, the South African constitution 
does not envisage fiscally subservient provincial governments. The constitution makes 
adequate financial empowerment of the provinces and municipalities, a cardinal principle 
of the system of government in South Africa. 
In Ethiopia, another multi-ethnic African country, the regional governments (state 
governments) are even more powerful than the South African provinces. The constitution 
itself makes this very clear in its allocation to each State Government, the power to “ 
establish an administration that best advances self-government,”64 and the authority to 
exercise “all powers not given expressly to the Federal Government alone or concurrently 
to the Federal Government and the States.”65 The implication of this is that while the 
Federal Government exercises legislative authority in the broad areas of defence, foreign 
policy, monetary policy, inter-state trade and commerce, and the formulation of basic 
national standards for education, health and sundry services,
66
 the State Governments 
possess broad legislative authority in all other matters, a condition that makes the States, 
major wielders of power in the Ethiopian federal system. 
In fiscal matters, the Federal and State Governments both have access to significant tax 
revenue. For instance, while the Federal Government is understandably empowered to 
collect and administer “custom duties, taxes and other charges on imports and exports”67 
as well as “federal stamp duties”68 and “taxes on monopolies”69 among other taxes. The 
State Goverments are constitutionally empowered to levy and collect “income taxes on 
employees of the State and of private enterprises.”70 In addition to a range of other 
taxes,
71
 the constitution also assigns, to the States, “profit and sale taxes on trading 
activities within their territory.”72 Most importantly, the States are empowered to levy 
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and collect taxes, royalties and land charges on mining activities within their territories.
73
 
The latter is potentially a huge source of revenue for the States. The federal arrangement 
in Ethiopia is, in essence, designed to create strong and fiscally empowered regional 
governments that are able to cater to the needs of their constitutents without surrendering 
their authority to the federal government.            
The foregoing discussion succinctly highlights some of the most salient features of the 
earliest ‘federal’ arrangements from the Achaean League of the Greek city-states of 
ancient Peloponnesus to the Union of Utrecht consisting of the United Dutch Provinces. 
It also describes the alliances of the Swiss cantons which eventually culminated in the 
1848 Swiss Confederation. Similarly, the discussion examines the evolution of federal 
government in the United States from its very uncertain beginnings in the 1781 Articles 
of Confederation to the more closely knit and stronger federal political arrangement 
under the 1789 constitution. The discussion also examined important features of the 
Canadian, German, Austrian, South African, and Ethiopian federal systems.  
Our discussion thus far reveals certain fundamental elements or attributes of federalism. 
The first is that in none of the  instances of federalism discussed above was the federal 
union formed with the principal aim of obliterating or undermining the autonomy or 
relevance of the federating parties or constituent units. While, in each case, power was 
shared among at least two levels of government, the central government and the regional 
governments, the regional governments either retained significant powers of self 
government or played major roles in the federal arrangement. In none of the instances of 
federalism examined above was the regional government obsequiously subservient   to 
the central administration or inconsequential in the federal arrangement. Even when the 
Americans took a decision, at the Philadelphia constitutional convention, to review the 
structure of the political arrangement established by the 1781 Articles of Confederation, 
the new federal arrangement devised by them did not deleteriously detract from the 
autonomy of the States. Rather, it clarified and protected this autonomy. And in Germany 
and South Africa where the Federal or National Government plays a dominant role in 
public governance, the Lander or Provincial Governments are not mere appendages of the 
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federal government. In fact the latter play very significant roles in the cooperative federal 
arrangement in those two countries.  
In essence, what is implied by the foregoing is that implicit inthese federal arrangements 
is the idea that the federating parties or constituent units may not be deprived of their 
autonomy or participation in matters that most closely concern them, that is, their internal 
affairs. Non-centralization of powers accompanied by appropriate autonomy largely 
underlined each of these federal arrangements. 
The second is that in  most of the federal arrangements discussed above, the union or 
alliance was established by covenant or agreement. For instance, ancient Greek tradition 
regarded treaties or covenants as sacred. Alliances or leagues were formed and 
established in ancient Greece through the instrumentality of sacred treaties between the 
alliance or league partners.
74
 The Union of Utrecht that founded the United Dutch 
Provinces was similarly a treaty or covenant signed by the confederating parties. The 
three Swiss Cantons that formed the earliest Swiss confederation in 1291 established their 
union on “a pact of mutual assistance, a covenant….solemnly sworn by thirty three 
representatives..”75 The federal arrangements in Ethiopia and South Africa were products 
of covenantal pacts made by the federating parties after extensive negotiations in the 
1990s.
76
 And both the American Articles of Confederation and the subsequent federal 
constitution of 1789 were ‘expressions’ of the Americans’ covenant77 with each other on 
how they wished to be governed.   
Daniel Elazar, in his compelling quartet on the history and character of “the covenant 
tradition in politics” has explained the covenantal origin of the American federation,78 
and the significance of the American constitution as an expression of the American 
people’s covenant. According to Elazar, the founding fathers of America “saw 
constitution making as a way of...covenanting or compacting together in order to create 
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civil instruments designed to carry out the promises”79 or principles of the American 
Declaration of Independence. For Elazar, “a constitution involves the implementation of 
a prior covenant- an actual effectuation or translation of a prior covenant into an actual 
frame or structure of government.”80 
“Covenant” according to Elazar “delineates the system’s moral foundations, offers 
mechanisms for constructing the institutional system’s frame of government, and 
suggests a behavioural dynamic to shape the system’s socio-economic basis.”81 
Expatiating on this point, he writes that “the moral basis of the constitution refers to the 
generally accepted ideas about how people in a particular polity should live. It includes 
the conception of justice that is held to be the guiding standard of the polity, the picture 
of the good quality in the minds of the citizens, plus other opinions about what kinds of 
political and social actions are right and good. The socio-economic basis of the 
constitution refers to the ways people actually live. It includes such things as class 
structure, ethnic composition, type of economy, and the actual distribution of 
power…The frame of government refers to the institutions and structures of government 
itself, including the document (or collection of documents) that sets out the institutions of 
government, establishes their powers and limits those powers, and indicates who shall 
govern and how the governors shall be chosen.”82 
The import of the foregoing is that the organizing principles of government, the society’s 
preferred socio-economic model, and the moral foundation of the polity should be 
determined through a covenantal “process of constitution making” that “involves a 
convention of the partners to the pact, or their representatives…There has to be a formal 
consenting among the partners whether individuals or polities.”83 In essence, the 
federating parties or confederates must consent to their union and the principles and ideas 
underpinning it via an inclusive constitution making process. This consent must be 
expressly, unreservedly and unambiguously given. It cannot be given otherwise.  
                                                          
79
Ibid pp 28-29. 
80
 Ibid. 
81
 Ibid, p 30. 
82
Ibid, p.29.  
83
 Ibid (vol.4) pp 227-228. 
49 
 
Implicit in the term “federalism” itself, is the idea of covenant, for the word federal “is 
derived from the latin foedus which means covenant.”84 Covenant is implicit in all the 
historical examples of federal polities examined and discussed above. From the Achaean 
federal system to the Union of Utrecht, and the Swiss and American federations, 
covenant, as expressed in the agreement of the federating parties or confederates to form 
a union and be guided by certain principles, was evident. Elazar, particularly singles out 
the American and Swiss federations as “the best examples of constitution as covenant.”85  
A third attribute of the federal systems discussed above is ‘cooperation’. In each of them 
cooperation was indeed implicit. And in Germany and South Africa, cooperation was, in 
fact, explicitly written into the constitution. The very act of union itself is cooperative in 
nature and entails all that cooperation implies. The Achaean League was a cooperative 
arrangement instituted principally for defence, so were the United Dutch Provinces, the 
original confederation of the Swiss Cantons, and the initial American confederation. Of 
course the degree of cooperation differed from polity to polity, but cooperation was 
nonetheless a fundamental part of these unions for none of them could have existed 
without some form of cooperation or the other. In fact, although the 1789 constitution of 
America is often described as instituting a system of dual federalism which perhaps does 
not entail or encourage cooperation, this notion has been disproved as fallacious. In his 
detailed and extensive assessment of the actual working of the constitution since 
inception, Daniel Elazar has shown that the American federal system has indeed always 
been cooperative right from the time of the founding fathers.
86
      
In summary therefore, three main characteristics discernible in the federal political 
systems examined above, and relevant to this thesis, include (i) non-centralization of 
powers (ii) covenant and (iii) cooperation. As we shall see below, although other 
elements of the federal idea have featured in the writings of scholars, theorists and jurists, 
these three characteristics have remained predominantly implicit in the array of extant 
federal theories, thus making them important and fundamental attributes of federal 
government.     
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2.2 Federalism Scholarship: Voices from the North and South 
The literature on federalism is vast and extensive. Its fundamental principles and 
principal tenets have been the subject of intense commentary and inquiry from time 
immemorial. In fact, as far back as the sixteenth century, German Jurist and scholar 
Johannes Althusius had published his famous Politica Methodice Digesta, which, among 
other things, articulated the philosophy that subsequently earned him fame as “the father 
of modern federalist thought.”87 Apparently influenced by 16th century Calvinist 
advocacy of “association” among Republics as well as religious bodies for the purposes 
of defense and other common concerns, Althusius formulated and developed a “doctrine 
of symbiotic association..in response to Jean Bodin’s centralizing philosophy of 
sovereignty.”88  
Bodin, in his famous magnum opus, La Republique,
89
 espouses a statist conception of 
political organization characterized by a marked centralization of political power. Put 
succinctly, Bodin’s theory suggests that society’s order and stability are better secured by 
an absolute monarchy which is also the undisputed repository of state sovereignty.
90
 
Althusius proffers a counter-perspective. For Althusius, sovereignty ultimately belongs to 
the people and only they can alienate or delegate the exercise of it.
91
 In other words, 
sovereignty truly resides with the people and the state only exercised power on behalf of 
the people. This in fact is a central point in Althusius’ treatise. 
Defining his concept of political organization, Althusius declares that “politics is the art 
of associating men for the purpose of establishing, cultivating, and conserving social life 
among them, whence it is called ‘symbiotics.’”92 For him, “the subject matter of politics 
is… association, in which the symbiotes pledge themselves each to the other, by explicit 
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or tacit agreement, to mutual communication of whatever is useful and necessary for the 
harmonious exercise of social life.”93  
Carl Friedrich describes Althusius’ ‘symbiotic association’ as “the community of men 
living together and united by real bonds which a contract of union, expressed or implied, 
institutionalized.”94 “What Althusius undertook to do,” writes Friedrich “was to interpret 
all political life in terms of the pactum, the bond of contractual union. Beginning with the 
family as such a natural and co-organic entity, he suggested that on successive levels of 
political community those who live together in order and harmony and whom he called 
‘symbiotes’ are united by a pact, expressed or implied, to share things in pursuit of 
common interests and utility. The village was thus, for Althusius, a federal union of 
families, as was the guild; the town a union of guilds; the province a union of towns and 
villages; the kingdom or state a union of such provinces……The key to this concept of 
federalism is that on all levels the union is composed of the preceding lower level.”95 
In Althusius’ political society, when cities, provinces, and regions come together, they 
form a universal symbiotic association, the bond of which is “consensus” and “trust” 
among the “members of the commonwealth.”96 With regard to ‘trust,’ Althusius’ echoed 
Plato’s counsel that “trust is the foundation of society and the bond of concord among the 
different members of a commonwealth, while lack of trust is its plague.”97 Trust among 
the members of this commonwealth is thus essential for its survival.
98
  
Althusius described his commonwealth as a confederation. And for him, confederation 
can be partial or complete. When it is partial, the federating parties reserve their 
respective sovereign rights but delegate some powers of administration to a central body 
which oversees certain matters of mutual concern on their behalf.
99
 On the other hand, 
when it is complete, the federating parties integrate under a single state entity and invest 
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this entity with sovereignty to exercise it on their behalf but the federating units are the 
actual owners of that sovereignty.
100
 
In modern parlance, Althusius’ description of ‘partial confederation’ typifies what is 
obtainable in a confederation while his characterization of ‘complete confederation’ 
supposedly indicates federation. At the heart of Althusius’ idea of political society is 
‘association.’ It is this idea of ‘association’ that forms the nucleus of his ‘symbiotics’- a 
corporatist theory that emphasizes the benefits of synergy born of union. 
Very clearly, Althusius conception of political society which is apparently federal in 
character contains the three attributes of the federalism earlier highlighted in this chapter. 
The predication of his commonwealth on the “pactum” which Carl Friedrich describes as 
a “ bond of contractual union”101 in which “the symbiotes pledge themselves each to the 
other, by explicit or tacit agreement, to mutual communication of whatever is useful and 
necessary for the harmonious exercise of social life,”102 is indicative of covenant as 
discussed earlier in this chapter. The federating or uniting parties in Althusius 
commonwealth largely retain their integrity and autonomy, thus the commonwealth is 
non-centralizing. And the very fact of “association” which is very central to Althusius’ 
theory of politics connotes cooperation. Without doubt then, Althusius’ symbiotics 
corroborates the assertion made earlier in this chapter that covenant, cooperation and 
non-centralization of powers, are fundamental attributes implicit and inherent in the idea 
of federalism. 
A major problem with Althusius’ conception of political society, though, is its 
predominant predication on corporatism. The exercise of rights and the enjoyment of 
benefits in Althusius’ commonwealth is the preserve of the primary associations 
themselves and not the individuals that make up these primary associations. Sovereignty, 
for instance, belongs to the primary associations that form Althusius’ commonwealth in 
their capacity as corporate entities. It is thus not ‘popular sovereignty’ as we know it. 
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This was what compelled Patrick Riley to impugn Althuisius’ federalist credentials, 
categorizing him as a mere medieval constitutionalist instead.
103
  
Applied to a modern federation, Althuisius’ conception of political society can create 
problems of exclusion by de-emphasizing the political relevance of individual members 
of the state. The modern federation is not simply a relationship between the central and 
regional governments, but an arrangement that includes and recognizes the political 
participation and contribution of individual citizens as well. In other words, the political 
actors in the modern federal state include ‘individual citizens’ in addition to the ‘levels of 
government.’  
The 1789 constitution of the United States which, as we saw above, blazed the trail of 
federalism in the modern sense, commences with “we the people”, and not “we the 
states.” This is a pattern now replicated in the constitutions of most modern federations. It 
is the “people,” jointly and severally, and not just the federating states as corporate 
entities, that are the repository of the sovereignty of the modern federation.  
I will consider other implications of Althusius’ theory of political society in chapter five. 
For now, it is pertinent to turn to the postulations of other scholars on the subject of 
federalism, especially its central tenets.  
In his Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu, an original advocate of small republics,
104
 urges 
small republics to form political alliances in order to secure their individual and 
collective interests. Montesquieu’s original preference for small independent republics 
was premised on his belief that the rights of individual citizens were better protected in 
small territories where their interests were not adversely jeopardized by the tyranny of the 
majority.
105
 According to him, “in a large republic there are large fortunes, and 
consequently little moderation in spirits……the common good is sacrificed to a thousand 
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considerations, it is subordinated to exceptions; it depends upon accidents. In a small one, 
the public good is better felt, better known, lies nearer to each citizen; abuses are less 
extensive there and consequently less protected.”106  But Montesquieu soon realizes the 
inherent limitations and inadequacies of small republics. “If a Republic is small,” he 
writes, “it is destroyed by a foreign force…”107 He cites the interesting example of the 
biblical “Canaanites” who, according to him, “were destroyed because they were small 
monarchies that had not confederated and did not have a common defense.”108 A small 
republic, argues Montesquieu, is unlikely to possess sufficient military sophistication to 
protect it from external aggression. As such, he advocates the aggregation of small 
Republics under a confederation large enough to protect each of the federating parties.
109
  
These small territories, according to him, can associate with each other, without 
surrendering their individual sovereignty, to form larger political entities capable of 
securing their individual borders and harnessing their joint potentials.
110
 Federalism, 
according to Montesquieu is thus “an agreement by which many political bodies consent 
to become citizens of the larger state that they want to form.”111 For him, the federal state 
is a “society of societies” which “enjoys the goodness of the internal government of each 
of the federating units; and with regard to the exterior, has, by force of the association, all 
the advantages of large monarchies.”112 
Montesquieu’s use of the word ‘federal’ for what would, in modern parlance, be called 
‘confederal’ was in keeping with the predominant tradition of the medieval period. I 
pointed out earlier that until the word ‘federal’ came to be colloquially associated with 
the system of government established by the 1789 constitution of the United States, that 
word was used to describe any political arrangement that involved the coming together of 
two or more different political entities in furtherance of their joint interests. Much of the 
classical federalism literature thus tended to use ‘federal’ and ‘confederal’ 
interchangeably.   
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An integral aspect of Montesquieu’s political philosophy is his separation of powers 
theory which prohibits the concentration of executive, legislative and judicial powers in 
the same hands in order to prevent tyranny.
113
  The concept of checks and balances which 
is a direct offshoot of this theory is now considered indispensable in federal political 
arrangements. The doctrine of separation of powers, as well as other political ideas 
espoused by Montesquieu, no doubt, made significant impression on the framers of the 
1789 constitution of America and significantly influenced the nature of the federal 
arrangement instituted under that constitution.
114
 
As with Althusisus’, Montesquieu’s federal theory affirms the summation I made earlier 
in this chapter that covenant, cooperation and non-centralization of powers are inherent in 
and essential to the idea of federalism. By encouraging union among small republics, 
Montesquieu implicitly recognizes cooperation as crucial to any federal arrangement, and 
by alluding to the retention of autonomy by the federating parties,
115
 Montesquieu 
confirms that his federal polity is a non-centralized one.    
The pantheon of classical thinkers in the mould of Althusius and Montesquieu includes 
J.J Rousseau who is widely known for his contractarian idea of society as enunciated in 
his 1762 classic, Contrat Social.
116
 Rousseau employs this contractarian philosophy in his 
argument for a “confederative” Europe which, according to him, was the solution to the 
wars and conflicts ravaging the continent in the 17
th
 century. Rousseau’s thoughts on the 
“confederative form of government” are most aptly captured in “A Project for Perpetual 
Peace,”117 his abridgement of St. Pierre’s scheme of peace for Europe. In it, Rousseau 
passionately urges on the leaders of Europe, the need to adopt confederation as a means 
of securing the defense and economic interests of the continent.
118
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This confederation, according to Rousseau, would be established by a contract endorsed 
by the various States of Europe who would all retain their respective sovereignties while 
delegating the task of securing the continent to a central government. The contract would 
be subjected to periodic reviews with the consent and participation of all the federating 
parties. Like Montesquieu, Rosseau argues that this confederation at once confers the 
advantage of both small and large states.
119
  
Rousseau enunciates a number of attributes which his proposed confederation of Europe 
must possess. First, the contracting parties must “establish among themselves a perpetual 
and irrevocable alliance,”120 from which no contracting party may be able to “detach” 
itself at will.
121
 Second, the form of government and the procedure for running the 
confederation should be clearly outlined and instituted. Third, the confederation shall 
‘guaranty’ to each contracting party its sovereignty in matters which are not expressly 
delegated to the confederation. Fourth, the confederation must possess coercive and 
enforcement powers to quash any rebellion, and fifth, the confederation shall have the 
power to review the alliance periodically with the consent and in the interest of its 
members.
122
 
The five guidelines outlined above form the framework of Rousseau’s confederative 
European government. The scheme of government proposed by Rousseau above partially 
resembles the scheme of government now established by the European Union. Rosseau 
can, in fact, be described as one of the earliest architects of the European Union project.  
Just like Rousseau, Immanuel Kant in his essay on Perpetual Peace argues for a 
‘compact’ among independent states for the purpose of securing a peaceful co-existence 
among them. His advocacy of confederation, like the ones proposed by the political 
thinkers discussed above, has peace as its ultimate objective. He counsels that a compact 
be established among independent state entities or nations with the aim of facilitating 
international peace. In Kant’s scheme of confederation, the confederating states retain 
                                                          
119
Ibid pp 18-20. For more on Rousseau’s federalism, see also: Patrick Riley, ‘Rousseau as a theorist of 
National and International Federalism,’ 1973 3(1) Publius pp 5-18. 
120
 J.J Rousseau Ibid p.19. 
121
  Ibid, p.18. 
122
 Ibid, pp 18-21. 
57 
 
their independence and sovereignty while pursuing mutual peace by voluntarily agreeing 
“to observe lawfulness.”123 By “lawfulness”, Kant implies the obligation of each of the 
confederating states to refrain from embarking on a course of action that may jeopardize 
the peace of her neighbour(s) or the peace of the confederation. The confederation is 
chiefly based on mutual agreement among its members to eschew violence and embrace 
international peace.
124
 This is why he calls it “foedum pacificum.” Like others before him, 
Kant argues that an international federation of this nature will guaranty the physical and 
economic security of the federating parties.
125
  
A major difference between Kant’s federal thought and those of Althusius, Montesquieu, 
and Rosseau is that while the federal theories of the latter three envisage a central 
administration to drive the goals of the union, Kant’s federalism does not contemplate a 
physical central administration as such. Rather, the confederation is driven by agreement 
among the confederates to pursue peace and eschew violence. By mutual understanding, 
authority is thus conferred on all of them, jointly or severally, to ensure the peace of each 
other. 
 An appraisal of the discussion thus far will reveal a common thread in the federal 
theories of the Philosophers and Thinkers examined above. Although, the three elements 
of covenant, cooperation and non-centralization of powers feature prominently in the 
federal ideas of these classical thinkers, their notion of federalism rests very deeply on 
‘delegation,’ that is, the ceding, by independent political entities, nations or states, of 
minimal authority to a central body mainly for the purpose of securing their defense 
interests. As pointed out earlier in this chapter, this was in fact the dominant federalism 
model up till the early 18
th
 century when federalism was revolutionized by the 
Americans. As we have seen above, under this notion of federalism espoused by the 
classical political philosophers, the (con)federating parties always retained their 
autonomy and sovereignty, surrendering only enough powers to enable the central 
government or administration to perform its duty of securing the confederation against 
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foreign aggressors. Federal unions formed through such arrangements were thus heavily 
dominated by the confederates, leaving the central government with little or no real 
power. 
It was this notion of federalism that informed the political arrangement entrenched in the 
1781 Articles of Confederation in America. But, as we know, this arrangement, burdened 
by an ineffective central government, failed to truly unite the American States, a situation 
that spurred American leaders to later devise an alternative federal arrangement. The 
problem with the confederative political arrangement is its unsuitability for political 
communities that want a stronger bond. Where there is a need for unity as opposed to 
separateness, confederation may not be the ideal political arrangement. This was the 
kernel of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay’s arguments in the 
Federalist.
126
 It was also a major factor that influenced several other American leaders in 
their support for a new federal arrangement. 
127
  
Unlike what obtained under the Articles of Confederation, the federal philosophy 
espoused by the Federalist entailed power sharing and division of powers between two 
autonomous levels of governments, each with sufficient authority to perform its 
constitutionally assigned functions. The Federalist advocated a non-centralized political 
arrangement under which the central government attends to foreign relations and matters 
common to the union while all other matters are constitutionally assigned to the states. 
According to Madison, under the new federal scheme “the powers delegated by the 
proposed constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to 
remain in the state governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be 
exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign 
commerce…The powers reserved to the several states will extend to all the objects 
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the 
people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the state.”128  
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Importantly, the central government under the arrangement advocated by The Federalist 
is, unlike the practice under the Articles of Confederation, not subservient or inferior to 
the state governments. The new central government proposed in The federalist derives its 
power, not from delegation from the states but directly from the constitution. And it is 
able to act directly on the citizens, unlike what obtained under the Articles of 
Confederation when it could only relate with the states and not the individual citizens.
129
 
The ideas espoused by The Federalist were the same ones eventually enshrined in the 
1789 constitution of America. The system of government set out in that constitution 
blazed a trail that would soon be replicated in the federal arrangements subsequently 
instituted by other countries in later years. This new federal system, with a more 
integrated structure, as against the loose alliances of the classical period, became known 
as federation while the previous classical-era arrangements came to be known as 
‘confederation.’130 
It must be noted however that although the federal system established by the 1789 
constitution of the United States is more integrated than the political arrangement under 
the Articles of confederation, it cannot by any stretch of the imagination be described as 
“centralized federalism” as William Riker persistently asserts in his major work on the 
subject.
131
 As shown in Madison’s statement quoted above, the federal system created by 
the American founding fathers via the 1789 constitution was never intended to create a 
centralized political arrangement. If anything, what was done at Philadelphia in 1787 was 
to endow the central government with enough powers to enable it unite the country and 
secure its borders while guaranteeing the powers and autonomy of the states in all other 
matters. It is certainly stretching the language to refer to this as centralized federalism. 
What the 1789 constitution created was a non-centralized federation thought to be more 
suitable to cater to the peculiar circumstances of the United States. Though the new 
political system was a total departure from the confederation that preceded it, it was, 
nevertheless, not a centralized federation as Riker appears to suggest.  
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Scholars regard both ‘federation’ and ‘confederation’ as species of federalism. In 
essence, the term ‘federal’ is regarded as a generic name for a political family which 
includes not only federation and confederation but also other manifestations of 
federalism, such as ‘consociation,’ ‘condominium,’ ‘federacy,’ and ‘associated states.’132  
My concern in this research is with ‘federation’ as a constitutional arrangement, for this, I 
believe, is the best arrangement for a country like Nigeria. Following its introduction in 
the United States in the 18
th
 century, federation as a political arrangement has been 
replicated in other parts of the world.
133
 And a number of scholars have subsequently 
endorsed this arrangement as the best form of federal government. Sir Kenneth Wheare 
was particularly emphatic in his characterization of America as the best example of a 
federal government.
134
 “The federal principle,” writes Wheare, “is the method of dividing 
powers so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, coordinate 
and independent.”135 According to Wheare, this federal principle is distinctly discernible 
in the United States’ constitution which “establishes an association of states so organized 
that powers are divided between a general government which in certain matters…is 
independent of the governments of the associated states, and, on the other hand, state 
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governments which in certain matters are, in their turn, independent of the general 
government.”136  
In advancing his “coordinate and independent” theory of federalism, Wheare was perhaps 
influenced by Freeman who had, years earlier, argued that the perfect form of the “federal 
ideal” is one in which the central government is “coordinate with the state governments, 
sovereign in its own sphere, as they are sovereign in their own sphere.”137 Each of the 
federating parties in a federal government, argues Freeman, “must be wholly independent 
in those matters which concern” it only.138 Expatiating on this point Freeman adds that 
the independence of each of the federating parties must be exercised “not as a matter of 
privilege or concession from any higher power, but as a matter of absolute right, by virtue 
of its inherent powers as an independent commonwealth.”139  Essentially, Wheare’s 
‘federal principle’ and Freeman’s ‘federal ideal’ are one and the same in substance. Both 
express a bias for absolute independence of all the parties to a federal government as well 
as absolute independence of the levels of government. In addition both are hinged on 
equality of the levels of government and equality of all the federating parties.    
At first glance, a major problem that may arise with the ‘coordinate and independent’ 
federal theory proposed by Wheare is the suggestion seemingly implied in it that in a 
federal system of government, the central and regional governments must perhaps operate 
uncooperatively, each looking out to protect its ‘independence’ and ‘sovereignty.’ Thus, 
for instance, in matters constitutionally assigned to the regional governments, this theory 
could be taken to imply that all decisions and all actions connected therewith should be 
exclusively designed and implemented by the regional governments with perhaps no 
assistance or help from other levels of government. The same could supposedly apply to 
matters constitutionally assigned to the central government. Such matters could, by virtue 
of this theory, be taken to be within the province of the central government exclusively 
without any aid or assistance from the regional governments.  
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In the 21
st
 century, this view of federal government would appear rather unrealistic, 
impracticable and unduly rigid. It is indeed doubtful that in an increasingly 
interconnected world, a regional government existing side by side with the central 
government and other regional governments within the same federation can operate 
almost in isolation, designing and implementing its own policies completely independent 
of other governments. 
A closer look at Wheare’s treatise on Federal Government, however, shows that Wheare 
was not in any way averse to cooperation within a federation. He should therefore not be 
accused of advocating separatism. Indeed, Wheare recognizes the significance of 
cooperation, especially in fiscal relations between the levels of government in a 
federation. From his study of three federations,
140
 he concludes that “federal 
governments” actually possess “a high degree of adaptability.”141 And the levels of 
government can indeed “work together in such a way that neither is completely 
independent of the other, though each is exercising its own independent powers, as 
allotted to it by the constitution.”142 In essence, cooperation is not forbidden or foreclosed 
in Wheare’s federalism. Rather he concedes that it is the “cooperative tendency in federal 
government which provides its most helpful prospect.”143 
Surely, the effective and efficient provision of public goods and services in a federation 
or any part thereof may require some form of inter-governmental cooperation or the 
other. This is more so when fiscal resources are limited, as they often are, and free 
movement of persons, goods and services takes place unhindered, as is often the case, 
across the federation. Cooperation is, in such circumstances, a crucial element in the 
smooth operation of the federal system of government. In any case, the federal 
arrangement established by the 1789 constitution of the United States which Wheare and 
Freeman uphold as the best expression of federal government,
144
 has, in practice, tended 
to be more cooperative than uncooperative.
145
 In sum, Wheare and Freeman’s federal 
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theory, coupled with their acknowledgment of the political arrangement instituted in the 
1789 constitution of the United States as “the most perfect development of the federal 
principle,”146 evidences their espousal of the central principles of covenant, cooperation 
and non-centralization of powers implicit in that political arrangement. 
Dispersed all over Wheare’s theory are traces of A.V Dicey’s federal theory which 
Wheare himself describes as “lucid and penetrating,” and eulogizes as “the classic 
discussion of federalism.”147 Wheare’s views on federalism are thus not essentially 
different from those expressed by Dicey some years earlier. Dicey acknowledges 
“compact” or covenant as an important building block in any federal arrangement. 
According to him, the federating states must be actuated by a “very peculiar 
sentiment….a desire to unite.”148 They must willingly subscribe to a compact contained 
in a “written constitution” outlining “a variety of terms which have been agreed to, and 
generally after mature deliberation, by the states which make up the confederacy.”149 
Dicey adds that this constitution must be supreme in the sense that governmental actions 
must derive their legal validity from it. The constitution must also be rigid to prevent its 
amenability to manipulation.
150
  
 Like Wheare, Dicey argues that the federal system of government entails the allocation 
of powers between a central nationwide government and “independent” states.151 This is 
the same description of federalism espoused by Professor Ben Nwabueze of Nigeria, an 
apostle of the “Whearean” school, who defines federalism as “an arrangement whereby 
powers and resources within a country are shared between a national, countrywide 
government and a number of regionalized governments in such a way that each exists as 
a government separately and independently from the others…”152  
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While I acknowledge that these scholars may have merely used the term “independent” in 
a loose sense to signify the autonomy of the state or regional governments, and not to 
categorize them as hermetic entities needing no interaction with other levels of 
government, care must always be taken to expressly clarify this point in the literature.  
The use of the adjective “independent” to describe the states of a federation is both 
misleading and unhelpful. It is also potentially risky. It is misleading and unhelpful 
because, as explained earlier in our discussion of Wheare’s theory, it conveys the 
impression that the individual states are hermetic entities, self-sufficient and impervious 
to interaction or partnership with other level(s) of government. It fails to, or does not 
sufficiently acknowledge the reality of cooperation or interdependence as a cardinal pillar 
of federal government in modern federations. It is risky because protagonists of 
separatism may take advantage of this confusion to advance, and perhaps enforce their 
ideologies, no matter how warped. Such are the pitfalls inherent in the indiscriminate and 
unqualified use of the word ‘independent’ to describe the constituent states of a 
federation. 
The levels of government in a federation cannot operate hermetically. The existence of 
these federations is anchored on the plinth of interdependence or cooperation. 
Interdependence or cooperation, no doubt, is a necessary element of modern federal 
government. 
Wheare’s conceptualization of federalism as a relationship between “coordinate” levels 
of government is another controversial element of his federal thesis. Criticizing this 
postulation, Michael Reagan, in The New Federalism, argues that the United States 
constitution itself recognizes the relative superiority of the federal government in the 
federal arrangement by rendering invalid any state law that is inconsistent with the letter 
and spirit of the federal constitution.
153
 Reagan further argues that “as a matter of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Wherean ‘coordinate and independent’ federal theory.  See Aaron T. Gana, ‘Federalism and the National 
Question in Nigeria: A Theoretical Exploration’ in Aaron T. Gana & Samuel G.Egwu Federalism in Africa 
Vol 1 (Africa World Press Inc, 2003) p.18. See also A.G Adebayo, Embattled Federalism- History of 
Revenue allocation in Nigeria, (New York: Peter Lang, 1993) p.5; Mike I. Obadan and I.B. Bello Imam, 
‘Intergovernmental Relations in Nigeria: Financing National Development’ in  J. Isawa Elaigwu, Fiscal 
Federalism in Nigeria- Facing the Challenges of the Future ( Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd, 2008) p.123.  
153
 This is stated in Article 6(2) of the US Constitution. See Michael Reagan, The New Federalism (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1981) p.8. 
65 
 
political theory” it is “dubious” to assert that “there can be a nation in which there is no 
institutionalized final authority.”154  
Truly, in most federations today, the balance of power is almost invariably tilted in 
favour of the central government. But this, in many cases, is necessitated by the uniting 
role that the central government plays in the federation in addition to functions 
specifically assigned to it under the constitution- functions which often transcend 
regional boundaries. The issue, therefore, is not whether the central government is 
superior to the regional governments. In fact, the word ‘superior’ is inappropriate in this 
context. The central government is not superior to the regional governments but it may be 
slightly more powerful for the reason highlighted above. The real problem arises where 
the balance of power among the levels of government is so disproportionately tilted in 
favour of the central government as to make the regional governments, mere appendages 
of the central government, in which case the country can no longer be rightly called 
federal but unitary.  
It is in this regard that Michael Reagan’s preachment of central government superiority in 
a federal system is untenable. There must be a difference between a unitary and a federal 
government. In a federation, no level of government is superior to the other. By virtue of 
the functions assigned to each level of government under the constitution, one may be 
slightly more powerful than the other. However, this is because such powers are 
necessary for the effective delivery of its functions and not because that level of 
government is inherently superior to the other(s).   
Contrary to Reagan’s advocacy of central government superiority in a federation, 
Professor Ben Nwabueze of Nigeria has argued that the autonomy of each level of 
government in a federation precludes its subordination or inferiority to any other level of 
government. For Nwabueze, “the autonomy of each government, which necessarily 
presupposes its separate existence and independence from the control of the other 
government, is essential to the federal arrangement….”155 And this “autonomy requires 
that each government must exist, not as an appendage of another government, but as an 
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autonomous entity in the sense of being able to exercise its own will in the conduct of its 
affairs, free from direction by another government.
156
 He adds that “federalism 
presupposes that the national and regional governments should stand to each other in a 
relation of meaningful independence resting upon a balanced division of powers and 
resources. Each must have powers and resources sufficient to support the structure of a 
functioning government able to stand on its own against the other.”157 
Nwabueze’s view of federalism and federation is supported by Ronald Watts who 
additionally argues that federalism is an “advocacy of multi-tiered government 
combining elements of shared rule and regional self-rule” which “is based on the 
presumed value and validity of combining unity and diversity i.e, of accommodating, 
preserving and promoting distinct identities within a larger political union.”158 Elsewhere, 
he writes that “federalism provides a technique of constitutional organization that permits 
action by a shared government for certain common purposes, together with autonomous 
action by constituent units of government for purposes that relate to maintaining their 
distinctiveness, with each level directly responsible to its own electorate.”159 For him, 
“the essence of federalism is the value of perpetuating both union and non-centralization 
at the same time.”160 He then clarifies his concept of federation. According to him, 
federation is a political arrangement between “at least two orders of government, one for 
the whole federation and the other for the regional governments,”161 in which there is “a 
formal constitutional distribution of legislative and executive authority” in a way that 
ensures “genuine autonomy” for each level of government.162  
Watts’ vision of federation also envisages “intergovernmental collaboration” among the 
levels of government especially in “those areas where governmental responsibilities are 
shared or inevitably overlap,” and a “supreme written constitution” which may only be 
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amended with the “consent” and approval of the “constituent units” of the federation.163 
If, in the view of Watts, the federal constitution may only be amended with the approval 
and consent of the federation’s constituent units, it is logical to infer that he also espouses 
the view that the constitution may only be formulated and adopted with the consent and 
approval of the constituent units. 
Watts’ federal perspective finds support in George Anderson’s characterization of 
federalism as a political system consisting of “at least two orders of government,” bound 
by a “written constitution” which distributes “legislative” and “fiscal powers” among 
them in a way that ensures “some genuine autonomy for each order” of government.164 
Some scholars have recently gone beyond federalism’s traditional focus on power sharing 
among levels of government, to include the dispersion of power and authority among 
both state and non-state actors. In the European Union (EU) literature, for instance, the 
last two decades have seen increasing focus on the concept of Multi-Level Governance 
(MLG), an idea widely used by EU scholars to rationalize or explain the “unraveling” of 
the “Central State” in Europe, as seen in the increasing role of sub-national governments 
and non-state actors in the governance process across the continent.
165
  
MLG has been defined as “a process of political decision making in which governments 
engage with a broad range of actors embedded in different territorial scales to pursue 
collaborative solutions to complex problems.”166 The governments refered to in the above 
definition include “federal”, “provincial”, “territorial”, and “municipal” while the “broad 
range of actors” used in the definition include non-state actors such as “umbrella 
organizations,” “citizen groups,” and “think-tanks,” “interregional commissions,” 
“chambers of commerce,” “inter-city agencies,” socio-cultural associations,  among 
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others.
167
 Apart from Europe, the concept has also been used to explain evolving 
governance architectures in North America, especially Canada, and the United States.
168
 
In their thought provoking discussion on the subject, Christopher Alcantara and Jen 
Nelles argue that federalism is not a “variant” or “form” of MLG but there can be 
“instances” of MLG in federal systems.169 This perspective is different from that of 
Hooghe and Marks who appear to conceive of federalism as a form of MLG,
170
 even 
though they agree that MLG could also entail the involvement of non-state actors in 
governance.
171
 
As we know, federalism traditionally focuses on the allocation of powers among levels of 
government. Federalism, in the traditional sense, must be distinguished from MLG, as 
conceptualized in the EU literature, which emphasizes the inclusion of other spheres of 
authority, besides governments, in the matrix of governance. In the operation of a federal 
system, a government may choose to engage in MLG by collaborating with other (non-
state) actors in order to achieve specific aims. But this does not translate the entire federal 
system into a MLG. As suggested by Alcantara and Nelles above, It is perhaps more 
appropriate to talk of particular instances of MLG in federal systems than equate 
federalism with MLG.  
 Although scholars are divided on the precise boundaries of MLG,
172
 there is sufficient 
concurrence, in the literature, on its key attributes of interdependence, cooperation, 
negotiation, and non-hierarchical interaction between a broad range of state and non-state 
actors across multiple jurisdictions.
173
 With these key attributes, MLG, in federal 
systems, can help to facilitate governments’ engagement with the public and ensure 
effective public participation in governance. While interdependence, cooperation, and 
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negotiation, are already crucial in the operation of federal systems, MLG, with its 
additional focus on non-state actors, has the potential to ensure the democratic 
involvement of a wider network of actors in the running of federal systems.               
Thus far, I have done a review of some perspectives on federalism, a subject that still has 
no universally accepted definition. However, as I have attempted to show above, despite 
the lack of a common definition of the subject, there are nevertheless certain fundamental 
principles that appear to feature explicitly or implicitly in the various federal perspectives 
examined above. They are covenant, cooperation, and non-centralization of powers, as 
earlier mentioned and discussed in this chapter. These three, covenant, cooperation, and 
non-centralization of powers are fundamental principles that are implicitly inherent in the 
idea of federalism. And as I will argue in chapter five, they are peremptory principles of 
federalism from which there should be no derogation.       
In the next section, I will examine what scholars have said about financial arrangements 
in federations, since the main subject of this thesis is division of powers and fiscal 
resources in Nigeria.  
2.3 Federalism in Relation to Finance 
There is perhaps no subject as tension-inducing and controversy laden as the issue of 
financial arrangements in federations. It is a subject that has engaged the attention of 
analysts and scholars for decades.
174
 Indeed, finance was a major bone of contention 
during the debates that preceded the promulgation of the 1789 constitution of the United 
States, compelling Alexander Hamilton to devote six long papers of The Federalist to the 
subject.
175
 
It would be recalled that under the 1781 Articles of Confederation of the United States, 
the central government had no independent source of revenue. Its revenue was sourced 
from the original thirteen American states many of which did not consider it obligatory to 
honour fiscal requisitions from the central government, the clarity of the Articles of 
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Confederation on this point notwithstanding.
176
 The central government was thus pushed 
into the uncertain position of relying exclusively on the magnanimity of the states for its 
sustenance. Not only did this situation render the central government under the Articles 
of Confederation ineffective, it ultimately precipitated the fall of the Articles itself into 
desuetude.
177
 
Hamilton, in The Federalist, criticized the system of federal finance under the Articles of 
Confederation
178
 and vigorously argued for a new federal financial arrangement under 
which the central government would be empowered to “raise its own revenues” by 
directly levying taxes on the people of the United States without infringing the right of 
the states to similarly levy taxes within their domains.
179
 Hamilton’s advocacy of such a 
division of fiscal powers among the central and state governments was made amid 
strident criticisms of the idea by those who preferred to maintain the fiscal supremacy of 
the states over the central government, fearing that a fiscally empowered central 
government would ultimately seek to overwhelm and undermine the states.
180
 Hamilton 
dismissed these fears by arguing that the proposed constitution was sufficiently protective 
of states’ fiscal autonomy as to discourage future central government interference or 
encroachment.
181
   
Hamilton’s arguments, as well as those of other federalists, prevailed in the long run and 
the constitution of 1787 that was subsequently promulgated made ample provision for 
both federal and state fiscal autonomy.  
The constitution’s policy of separate and autonomous revenue generation for both levels 
of government was a reflection of the federal arrangement envisaged for the United 
States by the framers of the 1787 constitution. According to Hamilton, this federal 
arrangement was designed to ensure that the “state governments would clearly retain all 
the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act, 
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exclusively delegated to the United States.”182 In effect, the states were to retain their 
power over matters not exclusively assigned to the federal government in the 
constitution. And implied in the ‘sovereignty’ of the states was autonomy in the exercise 
of their constitutionally assigned functions as well as protection from external 
interference.  
Flowing from the federalists’ idea of autonomy in the exercise of powers among the 
levels of government, was the imperative of autonomy in the raising of revenue to 
perform constitutionally assigned functions. Hamilton put it succinctly when he declared 
that “a government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the full 
accomplishment of the objects committed to its care, and to the complete execution of the 
trusts for which it is responsible, free from every other control but a regard to the public 
good and to the sense of the people.”183 And since “revenue is as requisite to the purposes 
of the local administrations as to those of the Union…It is as necessary that the State 
governments should be able to command the means of supplying their wants, as that the 
national government should possess the like faculty in respect to the wants of the 
Union.”184  
The policy of autonomy in the raising of revenue implicit in the US constitution is thus a 
reflection of the federal orientation espoused by the American founding fathers, and 
entrenched in the founding document of the United States- the constitution. 
In the modern epoch however, federations differ in the extent of fiscal powers and fiscal 
autonomy assigned to and exercised by each level of government? For instance, in his 
treatise on federal government, K.C Wheare, found that in the federations he studied,
185
 
the central government tended to exercise fiscal powers that somewhat outweighed those 
exercised by the regional governments. Wheare realized that amid scarce fiscal resources, 
the regional governments in these federal systems had to rely on significant financial 
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support from the central government in order to carry out their constitutionally assigned 
functions.
186
  
As a result of its fiscal supremacy and the concomitant dependence of the regional 
governments on it for funding, the central government, in the federations studied by 
Wheare, was able to dabble into fields originally assigned to the regional governments. In 
many cases funding for social services was provided to the regional governments along 
with conditions that made it difficult, if not impossible, for the regional governments to 
insist on their autonomy in the provision of such social services.
187
  
Wheare is not alone in this observation. Ronald Watts, in a more recent discussion on 
allocation of fiscal powers in federations, writes that “a common characteristic of the 
allocation of fiscal powers in nearly all federations is that the majority of major revenue 
sources have been assigned to the federal government. Even where some tax fields are 
shared or placed under concurrent jurisdiction, the federal governments tend to 
predominate because of the federal power to pre-empt a field of concurrent jurisdiction 
and because of provisions limiting the range of tax sources, both direct and indirect, that 
regional governments have been assigned.”188  
The relative fiscal supremacy of the federal government in most federations, according to 
Watts, has meant that regional governments which are, in most cases, comparatively less 
fiscally endowed, have had to rely on federal financial assistance in order to effectively 
provide social services in their domains.
189
And this reliance on federal aid has in some 
instances enabled the central government’s incursion into areas that are originally within 
the constitutional jurisdiction of regional governments.
190
 
The above notwithstanding, it must be stated that while it is, in fact, not abnormal for the 
central government to occasionally offer financial assistance or support to the regional 
governments, the implications of excessive central government dominance in the fiscal 
sphere, and excessive reliance of the regional governments on fiscal subventions from the 
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central government can be dire indeed. Not only can it lead to the dictatorship of the 
central government, as it has in Nigeria, for instance, it can also rob federalism of its very 
essence. It is crude oxymoron for fiscal relations in a supposed federation to be so 
dominated by the central government as to render the regional governments perpetually 
subordinate to it or dependent on it for their survival. There must be a difference between 
a unitary state and a federation. 
In ethnically diverse federations where the regions are often bound to have different 
economic, social, cultural, and political, interests, it is particularly impolitic to 
concentrate fiscal powers in the hands of the central government to the detriment of the 
regional governments. Fiscal arrangements in an ethnically diverse federal state must be 
so structured as to ensure that each regional government is fairly able to raise and access 
sufficient revenue to finance its constitutionally assigned responsibilities without 
becoming subordinated to or overly dependent on the central government in the process. 
Although the need for regional governments to have access to sufficient revenue to 
perform their constitutionally assigned responsibilities is recognized in the literature,
191
 
there is often insufficient clarity and a divergence of opinion as to the appropriate 
approach for achieving this objective. While some scholars favour a strong coordinating 
role for the central government in the fiscal sphere,
192
 others favour a decentralized 
approach that enables regional governments to exercise significant fiscal autonomy.
193
 
The traditional fiscal federalism approach generally favours fiscal decentralization 
especially where economic and social needs vary across the regions of a federation and 
the regional governments are able to efficiently provide local public goods and services 
in addition to efficiently mobilizing and collecting taxes.
194
 The central government, 
according to this approach, should only be concerned with “macro-economic 
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stabilization, income redistribution,”195 and the provision of “national public goods” 
whose utility transcend regional boundaries.
196
 But these are “general guidelines” only, 
and are not to be regarded as “firm principles.”197 
The several approaches available only show that there is no universally correct model of 
federal finance. Federal financial arrangements must be adapted to suit specific contexts. 
Each federation must design its fiscal arrangements to meet its peculiar social, political, 
cultural and economic exigencies. In ethnically diverse federations for instance, unless 
financial arrangements conform to social and political expectations or address socio-
political exigencies, they may turn out to be counter-productive or conflict-inducing. 
As we shall later see in chapter four, in the particular case of Nigeria, fiscal arrangements 
have, for decades, consistently discountenanced the federation’s diversity and the age-
long clamour for genuine self government in the regions of the country. Rather, fiscal 
centralization has remained a policy at the heart of successive constitutions of the 
country. In addition, financial arrangements that concern the entire federation have been 
mostly determined by the central government without any genuine consultation with the 
state and local governments or the people of Nigeria. In essence, little or no attention is 
paid to the need to ensure that the federation’s fiscal arrangements reflect the public will.  
I argue in this thesis that fiscal arrangements in a federation must be designed to 
accommodate the diverse social and political interests of the people. This is more so 
when the federation is ethnically diverse in character and there is popular demand for 
genuine regional self government. Basic fiscal arrangements must be covenanted and 
endorsed by the people. Fiscal arrangements must reflect the socio-economic diversity of 
the country. And fiscal arrangements must not be designed to concentrate fiscal authority 
in the central government as has been the case in Nigeria. 
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Conclusion 
The federal system of government is a unique political instrument for social engineering 
in ethnically diverse societies. This much has been acknowledged by scholars and 
political leaders for centuries, and has provoked a profusion of academic literature on the 
subject since the 16
th
 century. 
The discussion in this chapter has examined classical and contemporary perspectives 
about federalism from the Hellenistic era to the modern epoch. The discussion reveals 
that federalism has been practiced from the time of the Leagues of the city-states in 
ancient Greece. One of such Leagues, the Achaean confederation, according to Polybius’ 
extensive portraiture of it, was particularly renowned for the democratic values it 
promoted and the federal precedent it established, a precedent that may have influenced 
the founders of the American federal system in the early part of the eighteenth century. 
From the accounts of scholars like Ehrenberg, and Rufus King, we see that the Achaean 
league was characterized by a democratic division of powers between a central 
government that was mainly concerned with foreign policy and security, and constituent 
cities that  had full autonomy over their internal affairs. In essence, the League was 
structured in a way that fostered unity among the member cities but nevertheless 
preserved their individual integrity.  
The preoccupation of the central government with foreign policy and security was a 
common practice in most of the medieval-era leagues and alliances, most of which were 
specifically created as security mechanisms to protect their members against external 
aggression. Thus while the Achaean League was principally formed as a protective 
bulwark against Macedonian aggression, the 16
th
 century confederation of the United 
Dutch Provinces was created to ward off Spanish imperialism. And the 1781 Articles of 
Confederation was signed by the American colonies to secure their independence from 
British colonial rule. This explains why only few powers, bordering on defense and 
foreign policy, were delegated to the central governments under these confederative 
arrangements while the confederates retained their internal sovereignty and autonomy.     
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In the case of the American confederation however, this arrangement ultimately proved 
inefficient and unworkable. The quest for greater unity and coordination among the 
original thirteen American states led to the Philadelphia convention that produced a new 
political arrangement in 1787 and a new constitution that came into force in 1789. The 
new constitutional arrangement established by the 1789 constitution of the United States 
is particularly unique for its trail blazing status as the archetypal model of federalism in 
the modern sense. It set a bench mark against which many scholars have assessed 
subsequent federal arrangements.  
While most of the leagues and political associations that preceded the 1789 US 
constitutional arrangement were mainly security and foreign relations arrangements that 
ceded only minimal powers to the central government, the 1789 constitution of America 
created a stronger central government and endowed it with requisite political and fiscal 
authority to enable it play an effective uniting role in the new federation. This, however, 
did not deleteriously detract from the political and fiscal autonomy of the states in respect 
of their own internal affairs. 
Just like the United States, the Canadian and Ethiopian federal systems are characterized 
by strong central and regional governments that play key roles in major policy fields, and 
are sufficiently fiscally empowered to carry out the functions that are costitutionally 
assigned to them. 
The German and South African federal arrangements are characterized by strong central 
governments that work cooperatively with regional governments to achieve the goals of 
the country and cater to the needs of their respective constituencies. And as explained 
above, although the central governments in these two countries play dominant roles in 
their respective federal arrangements, the regional governments are not mere appendages 
of the central government. Rather, the regional governments are active players in the 
federal system through the significant functions specifically assigned to them under the 
constitution, and their cooperative work with the central government. The Austrian 
federal system is considerably more centralized due to the very dominant role of the 
central government in the federal system, but, as in Germany, this somewhat centralist 
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character of the Austrian system is mitigated by the active role played by the regional 
governments in implementing federal legislation. 
Finally, the Canadian and German federal systems operate fiscal equalization 
arrangements that help to ensure that less fiscally endowed regions are able to provide 
comparable quality of local public services to their constituents.          
Following this comparative analysis of the above mentioned federal systems, the  
discussion subsequently considered the works of several constitutional and political 
scholars of note on the subject of federalism. From Johannes Althusius’ 16th century 
corporatist constitutional theory to Montesquieu’s confederation of small states, as well 
as Rousseau and Kant’s advocacy of confederation as an instrument of international 
peace, the division of powers favoured by these scholars is one that is structured to allow 
federating parties retain their sovereignty and autonomy while delegating minimal 
powers to the central government to enable it carry out the aims of the confederal 
arrangement.    
Subsequent federal scholarship however tended to favour the American federal model as 
expounded by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay in The Federalist and 
established in the 1789 constitution of America. Leading the pack of scholars in this 
tradition was Oxford don Professor K.C Wheare whose work was influenced by earlier 
postulations of Dicey and Freeman on the subject. For Wheare, in a federation, power 
relations between the central government and constituent states are not characterized by a 
subordination either of them to the other, but rather by a division of powers among the 
two of them as “coordinate and independent” governments. Each government, argues 
Wheare, exercises unfettered autonomy in respect of those matters assigned to it in the 
constitution. 
More recent federalism scholarship such as those of Ronald Watts, Daniel Elazar, George 
Anderson, Michael Burgess, John Kinkaid, Ben Nwabueze and others describe 
federations in similar terms. For many of these scholars, the federation is a power sharing 
arrangement between at least two levels of government in which each level of 
government exercises autonomy in the fields constitutionally assigned to it. 
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The survey done, in this chapter, of federalism scholarship and practice, show quite 
clearly that although there is as yet no universally accepted definition of federalism, there 
is indeed an idea of federalism, in which is implicit certain principles that are very 
fundamental. These principles are covenant, cooperation and non-centralization of 
powers.  
Right from the alliances and leagues of the Hellenistic era, all through to the time of the 
American federal innovation in the eighteenth century and many subsequent federal 
arrangements, federal arrangements have been sealed by agreement or covenant. The 
federal arrangement cannot be imposed, neither can it be forced. Parties to it must agree 
on the specific principles and policies on which it is predicated. In particular, the specific 
guidelines for sharing powers and fiscal resources must be jointly covenanted by the 
federating parties and the people that make up the federation. In fact, the importance of 
covenant to federalism is underscored by the latin word “foedus” from which the term 
“federal” is derived. Foedus in Latin means “covenant,” “treaty” or “agreement.” 
Covenant also presupposes cooperation, for without cooperation, there can be no 
covenant. Covenanting parties in a federal arrangement must cooperate with each other to 
make the arrangement effective. Cooperation therefore is an important principle implicit 
in the federal idea. 
Finally, implicit in the idea of federalism, as seen in the federalism scholarship and 
practice examined in this chapter, is the principle of non-centralization of powers. In 
none of the federal arrangements discussed above was the federal system established with 
the aim of centralizing powers or establising the dictatorship of the central government. 
And in none of the federal theories discussed in this chapter is the federal arrangement 
regarded as centralizing. Rather, the predominant perspective is that the federal system of 
government is non-centralizing. In other words, overwhelming concentration of powers 
and resources in the central government is anathema to the federal system of government. 
It is the very antithesis of federalism. 
The principles of covenant, cooperation and non-centralization of powers are inherent in 
the idea of federalism, and they should form part of any federal construct. The failure of 
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the Nigerian federal system to reflect these principles in the allocation of powers and 
fiscal resources is the main subject of this thesis. Nigeria’s defective federal arrangement 
is not a recent problem. It is a problem that dates back to the country’s colonial and 
military eras. It is, in short, a colonial cum military legacy that has stunted the “unity in 
diversity” vision of the nationalists that fought for Nigeria’s liberation from colonial rule. 
A proper understanding of Nigeria’s history and the role this history played in shaping 
the current ‘federal crisis,’ is thus necessary as a background to the subsequent discussion 
of the subject matter of this thesis. It is to that history that I now turn in the next chapter. 
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                                                    CHAPTER THREE 
                    NIGERIA: A TROUBLED HISTORY OF CENTRALIZATION 
      
Introduction 
 
Debates about Nigeria’s federal system of government have, for decades, revolved 
around the constitutional division of powers and fiscal resources among the levels of 
government in the federation.
1
  It is not difficult to imagine why this is the case. Issues 
relating to the allocation of powers and fiscal resources are notoriously controversial in 
federations.
2
  Most countries operating the federal system of government have 
historically had to contend with the difficult tensions often associated with power 
allocation among central and regional governments. Such tensions are usually not 
unrelated to the nature of such allocations, how decisions on such allocations are taken, 
and the nature of the institutions to manage such allocations.
3
 Indeed some scholars have 
argued that the inter-governmental division of powers and fiscal resources is often the 
main problem of federalism.
4
 In the case of Nigeria, it is indeed a highly contentious 
problem given the country’s ethnically diverse character and the acrimonious struggle for 
power and fiscal resources by the ethnic groups since the country got her independence 
from Britain in 1960. Yet, it is a problem that must be squarely addressed considering its 
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 See generally the discussions in Augustine A. Ikein ed, Oil, Democracy, and The Promise of True 
Federalism in Nigeria (University Press of America, 2008) pp 1-484. See also T.Y Danjuma, ‘Revenue 
Sharing in Nigerian Federalism,’ in J. Isawa Elaigwu, P.C. Logams and H.S Galadiman, Federalism and 
Nation Building in Nigeria: The Challenges of the 21
st
 Century (Abuja: National Council on 
Intergovernmental Relations, 1994), pp 87-115; Adebayo Adedeji, Nigerian Federal Finance- Its 
Development, Problems and Prospects (Hutchinson Educational Ltd, 1969). 
2
 Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008), p.96. See also 
George Anderson, Fiscal Federalism: A Comparative Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2010) p.v 
3
 It was a major issue, for instance, in the debates leading up to the promulgation of the 1787 constitution of 
the United States. Hamilton, in fact, dedicated the whole of Federalist XXX-XXXVI to this issue. See 
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John Jay (London: J.M Dent & Sons Ltd, 1970) pp 142-175. 
4
 See A.H Birch, Federalism, Finance and Social Legislation (Oxford University Press, 1957) p. xi.  See 
also K.C Wheare, Federal Government, (Oxford University Press, 1963) p.93. 
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implications for the “political legitimacy, political stability and future of the federation 
itself.”5 
The tensions and controversies over the centralist division of powers and fiscal resources 
entrenched in the extant 1999 constitution of Nigeria
6
 can only be adequately understood 
against the background of the country’s socio-political history, for, as will be shown in 
this chapter, the seeds of the current impasse are buried somewhere very deep in the 
nation’s history. This history thus provides the background for my discussion of the 
subject matter of this thesis in subsequent chapters. The history is particularly important 
for two major reasons. First, it highlights the unilateralist, centralist and hegemonic 
history of constitution making in Nigeria since the country’s formal creation by colonial 
authorities in 1914, and thus explains one of the principal reasons why the tensions over 
the division of powers and fiscal resources entrenched in successive constitutions have 
been intractable even after Nigeria gained her independence from Britain in 1960. 
Second, as I will later show, implicit in this history itself is a pointer to what appears to 
be the most appropriate solution to the current imbroglio over division of powers and 
fiscal resources in the Nigerian federation. 
Thus, in this chapter, I provide a historical analysis of Nigeria’s federal evolution, 
highlighting the country’s pre-colonial make-up as a collection of distinct, separate and 
independent empires, kingdoms, city-states and communities with different cultures, 
languages, orientations and peculiarities. The discussion details how these stark 
differences were ignored in the forceful colonial amalgamation of these distinct entities to 
form the Nigerian state in 1914. As shown in the chapter, the seeds of the current 
centralized state structure in Nigeria were sown during the colonial and post-colonial era 
as the colonial authorities and their military successors unilaterally authored successive 
constitutions and incrementally strengthened central government control over powers and 
fiscal resources.  
Unilateralism and centralization have, for decades, been employed as instruments of 
governance in Nigeria despite the country’s character as an agglomeration of different 
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 Michael Burgess, Comparative Federalism-Theory and Practice (London:Routledge, 2006) p. 149. 
6
 The 1999 constitution is the current constitution of Nigeria.  
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ethnic nations separated by language, culture, economic needs, and political orientation.
7
 
Today, Nigeria is, without doubt, a caricature of a federation, a crude distortion of 
federalism. 
What follows is not intended to be an exhaustive history of Nigeria. I have highlighted 
and discussed only those aspects of the nation’s history that are relevant for a proper 
understanding of the context in which the subject matter of this thesis is treated.                 
 
3.1. Pre-Colonial Era- Era of Kingdoms, Empires and City-States 
Nigeria, as we know it today, with its physical boundaries and land-marks, is essentially a 
colonial creation.
8
 There was nothing like ‘Nigeria’ prior to the arrival of Europeans on 
the shores of West Africa in the late 14
th
 century. What we had, scattered all over the 
territory now called Nigeria, were well established empires, kingdoms, city-states, 
townships and villages most of which had already attained some level of political and 
cultural sophistication by the time the first set of Europeans arrived.
9
  
In his well-researched monograph on pre and post-colonial history of Africa, eminent 
historian, Professor Banji Akintoye, reveals that several politically independent African 
empires and kingdoms had, in fact, been in existence long before the advent of 
colonialism.
10
 For instance, the ‘Kanem-Bornu’ and ‘Old Oyo-empires’ had, for 
centuries, existed in what is now known as Northern and Southern Nigeria respectively.
11
 
Apart from these, old kingdoms such as the ‘Sokoto Caliphate’, was already well 
established in what is now North-Western Nigeria before colonialism took root in 
                                                          
7
 Nigeria’s ethnic groups “are diverse in their origins, and speak different languages. In many respects, their 
cultural patterns, political, institutional, social standards, and customary usages differ very widely.” 
Obafemi Awolowo, Thoughts on the Nigerian Constitution, (Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1966) p.162. 
8
 O.I Odumosu, The Nigerian Constitution: History and Development (London: Sweet & Maxwell, London 
1963) p.5. 
9
 See the pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Nigeria on this point in AG of the Federation v. AG of 
Abia State and 35 Ors, [2002] Vol.16 WRN 1-132 at p.68. According to the Court, “until the advent of the 
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existed at various times sovereign states known as emirates, kingdoms, and empires made up of groups in 
Nigeria. Each was independent of the other with its mode of Government indigenous to it. At one time or 
another, these sovereign states were either making wars with each other or making alliances on equal terms. 
The position existed throughout the land now known as Nigeria.” See also O.I Odumosu, Ibid.    
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 Akintoye writes that the old Ghana, Mali, Songhai, Mandinka and Tukolor empires predated the advent 
of colonialism. See S.A. Akintoye, Emergent African States- Topics in Twentieth Century African History 
(London: London Group Ltd, 1976) p.3; 15. 
11
 Ibid, p.3. 
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Nigeria.
12
 There were also the numerous city-states of the Niger-Delta which were not 
dissimilar to the ancient Greek city states of yore in size, population and social 
organization. The pre-colonial histories of these empires, kingdoms, and city-states, 
according to Akintoye, were characterized by different, distinct, and significantly 
developed social, political and economic traditions.
13
  
Akintoye’s account of Nigeria’s history tallies with those of several other first rate 
African scholars and students of African History. For instance, Professor Akinjogbin’s 
vivid portraiture of the Old Oyo Empire and the other kingdoms which together 
constituted the pre-colonial Yoruba country shows that these were organised assemblages 
of peoples, each with an efficient traditional system of government peculiar to it.
14
 
Similar descriptions have been used by other African and Asian scholars to emphasize 
the social, cultural and political organization of many African societies prior to colonial 
adventurism on the continent.
15
 
The accounts of these African and Asian scholars have been buttressed and given 
credence by western historians and researchers who travelled extensively in Africa in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and who have since documented their 
observations and findings on Africa’s history. Two of such scholars, Margery Perham 
and Michael Crowder, are particularly noted for their vivid portraiture of the ancient 
landmarks and peoples of the continent. For instance, Perham wrote about the “political 
and cultural sophistication” of Northern Nigeria’s “ancient Hausa states, with their walled 
red cities, crowded mosques, literate mullahs, large markets, numerous crafts in metal 
and leather, far-ranging traders, and skilled production of a wide variety of crops.”16 
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Drawing on the writings of 18
th
 century European explorers of Africa,
17
 Perham adds that 
the Hausa states were famous for “their organized trade and wide contacts, their custom 
of supplying housing, food and escort to travellers, and their capacity to breed individuals 
of high character and intelligence.”18  
Perham’s views are echoed in Michael Crowder’s 1962 classic The Story of Nigeria. 
According to Crowder, who spent several years teaching African history in Nigerian 
Universities, pre-colonial Nigeria had “a number of great kingdoms that had evolved 
complex systems of government independent of contact with Europe. Within its frontiers 
were the great kingdom of Kanem-Borno, with a known history of more than a thousand 
years; the Sokoto Caliphate which for nearly a hundred years before its conquest by 
Britain had ruled most of the savannah of northern Nigeria; the kingdoms of Ife and 
Benin, whose art had become recognized as amongst the most accomplished in the world; 
the Yoruba empire of Oyo, which had once been the most powerful of the states of the 
Guinea coast; and the city-states of the Niger Delta, which had grown partly in response 
to European demands for slaves and later palm-oil; the largely politically decentralized 
igbo-speaking peoples of the south-east, who had produced the famous Igbo-Ukwu 
bronzes and terracottas; and the small tribes of the Plateau, some of whom are 
descendants of the people who created the famous Nok terracottas.”19 
Dutch Historian, Thea Buttner agrees with Crowder. In her commentary on “the 
economic and social character of pre-colonial states in tropical Africa,”20 Butner writes 
that prior to the advent of colonialism, “many peoples of Tropical Africa (varying in 
locality) attained a relatively high standard of development which, by every measure, 
compared favourably with that of other peoples….In the course of several thousand years 
of its history, Tropical Africa knew important state formations with a high level of 
cultural attainment which overcame the Neolithic phase as early as the first millennium 
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of our era and which exercised an impact on and determined, the subsequent social 
development of the peoples of Africa.”21 
It is thus very clear, from the foregoing accounts of African and western Historians who 
have done extensive and detailed research on African history, that discernible political 
and social organization on the continent did not start with the arrival of Europeans. 
Social, cultural and political sophistication of the peoples of Africa, in fact, predated the 
continent’s contact with Europeans. 
The foregoing survey of historical accounts of pre-colonial Africa is necessary to dispel 
the notion created by some writers and scholars who, in a bid to justify colonialism and 
its attendant centralization and monopoly of power in Africa, have argued that Africa was 
devoid of any form of history prior to European arrival on the continent. Indeed, 
desperate attempts were made by these scholars to brand pre-colonial Africa as an 
enclave of barbarians and primitive beings who were incapable of rational and civilized 
existence.
22
 That was perhaps what Joseph Conrad sought to do with his very 
controversial Heart of Darkness which portrayed pre-colonial Africa as “pre-historic” 
and “unearthly.”23  
Conrad is not alone in this undisguised racist approach to African history. Georg Hegel in 
his Philosophy of History described Africa as “unhistorical.” Africa, according to Hegel 
“is no historical part of the world; it has no movement or development to exhibit. 
Historical movements in it...belong to the Asiatic or European world.”24 But it was the 
Oxford Historian Hugh Trevor-Roper who delivered the coup de grace. In a series of 
television lectures he delivered in the early 1960s, Trevor-Roper argued that “perhaps in 
the future, there will be some African history to teach. But at present there is none, or 
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very little: there is only the history of Europeans in Africa. The rest is largely 
darkness….And darkness is not a subject for history.”25 
We now know that Conrad, Hegel and Trevor-Roper were mistaken in their 
understanding of Africa and its history. Evidence compiled by serious researchers and 
travellers confirm to us that not only were many pre-colonial African societies well 
organized and politically astute, they in fact had their own forms of civilization.
26
  
What remains to be said is that the erroneous or deliberate perception of pre-colonial 
Africa as an enclave of barbarians and savages who were incapable of rational thought 
and political organization must have contributed to the administrative approach adopted 
by the colonialists in Africa from the early part of the nineteenth century to the early part 
of the twentieth century.
27
 As we shall see in the next section, perhaps in their bid to 
provide ‘civilized’ administration to the ‘savages’ and ‘barbarians,’ the colonialists 
forcefully lumped together many dissimilar ethnic nationalities, many of which already 
had a history of mutual warfare and antagonism, and imposed on them a single 
centralized government. Thus was the foundation of centralized governance, as well as 
separatist agitations, inter-ethnic rivalry, suspicion and hatred, all of which remain the 
hall mark of political and social life in Nigeria, laid. 
3.2. Colonial Era- Lugard’s Amalgamation and the Seeds of Centralization 
Much has been written already on the historic ‘scramble’ for the African continent by the 
European powers, a process which began at Berlin in 1884/1885 and went on over a 
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period of ten years.
28
 The ‘scramble’ culminated in a series of ‘take-overs’ which, 
according to Keltie, enabled the “most civilized powers of Europe” to parcel out amongst 
themselves “the bulk of one barbarous continent.”29  
Details of the partitioning process have been recorded elsewhere.
30
 What is important for 
the purposes of this research is the effect this mid-nineteenth century partitioning of the 
African continent has had on the peoples and traditional societies of Africa. Nothing 
highlights the tragic consequence of the partitioning than the words of an Official of the 
then British Government who, in recounting how the Nigeria-Cameroon border was 
drawn, stated that “in those days, we just took a blue pencil and a ruler, and we put it 
down at Calabar, and drew a line to Yola….I recollect thinking when I was sitting having 
an audience with the Emir [of Yola] , surrounded by his tribe, that it was a very good 
thing that he did not know that I, with a blue pencil, had drawn a line through his 
territory.”31 Earlier in 1890, Lord Salisbury, former British Prime Minister, had, after an 
Anglo-French convention convened for the purpose of sharing indigenous African 
territories among the two super powers, declared that “we have been engaged in drawing 
lines upon maps where no man’s foot ever trod; we have been giving away mountains 
and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediment that we never 
knew exactly where the mountains and rivers and lakes were.”32  
It was this arbitrary restructuring of the African continent, done without the consent of 
the societies and peoples whose lives were directly affected by the restructuring, that laid 
the foundation for the culture of unilateralism and the centralization of state power that 
appear to have become the hall mark of governance across Africa in general and Nigeria 
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in particular. The partitioning that officially commenced at the Berlin conference of 
1884/1885 and was consolidated over the next ten years marked the beginning of several 
acts of colonial ‘appropriations’ and ‘take-overs’ that gradually but assuredly robbed 
many hitherto independent African communities of their autonomy and identity.  
In the process, strikingly different ethnicities hitherto separated by language, culture, 
religion, social orientation, and politics were cobbled together under new political 
arrangements that were bound to generate inter-ethnic strife. Nobel Laureate, Professor 
Wole Soyinka put it succinctly when he said “….at the Berlin Conference, the colonial 
powers….met to divvy up their interests into states, lumping various peoples and tribes 
together in some places, or slicing them apart in others like some…tailor who paid no 
attention to the fabric, color or pattern of the quilt he was patching together.”33  
In the case of Nigeria, this lumping together, facilitated by colonial conquests, continued 
well into the 1890s and early 1900s and culminated in the famous amalgamation of the 
Northern and Southern territories of Nigeria in 1914. Both territories had been separately 
administered by Britain before 1914.
34
  
The 1914 amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria is noteworthy for two major 
reasons. First, like the partitioning of Africa itself, the scheme of amalgamation was 
designed and implemented solely by the colonial authorities through Sir Frederick 
Lugard, the colonial Governor of Nigeria. The plan, scheme and mode of amalgamation 
were entirely the work of Lugard.
35
 No attempt whatsoever was made to consult or gain 
the consent of the peoples and territories that formed the object of this amalgamation. 
The amalgamation was unilaterally conceived, unilaterally designed, and forcefully 
imposed on the ‘natives.’ Indeed, “Nigeria”, the new name given to the amalgamated 
territories was coined by Miss Flora Shaw, a Briton who later became the wife of Sir 
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Lugard, the colonial Governor of Nigeria.
36
 The unilateral manner in which the 
amalgamation scheme was conceived and implemented essentially set the tone for the 
colonial policy of centralization that followed in later years. As we shall see in the 
discussions in chapter four, this policy of centralizing state power is now fully entrenched 
in Nigeria’s body politic.        
The 1914 amalgamation is also remarkable for cobbling together more than 250 large 
ethnicities each of which had its own distinct identity, economic orientation, political 
traditions, and religious culture. The arbitrariness of the amalgamation, done without any 
regard for history, ethnicity, and culture, set the stage for the ethnic rivalry, strife and 
bigotry which have characterized inter-ethnic relations in Nigeria ever since. In a bid to 
ensure their individual survival, regain their autonomy, and preserve their identities and 
dignities, Nigeria’s many ethnic groups have remained locked in a spirited but 
acrimonious struggle for power and ascendancy. 
The foregoing account of Nigeria’s pre-colonial history up till and including the 1914 
amalgamation of the northern and southern territories of what is today called Nigeria, has 
now established two important facts. First, pre-colonial Nigeria was not an enclave of 
unsophisticated, socially unorganized, and politically naive barbarians, as some scholars 
and writers would have us believe. Indeed, as we saw above, the many ethnic nations that 
were scattered all over the territory now called Nigeria were distinct and independent 
entities that had attained varying levels of political sophistication prior to the advent of 
colonialism. The “barbarous pre-colonial continent” narrative is a deception that was 
mainly deployed to justify colonialism and the centralization of state power it engendered 
across Africa, a problem that has persisted till date. 
A second fact established by the discussion thus far is that, like the unilateral partitioning 
of the African continent by the super powers in the 19
th
 century, the amalgamation of the 
northern and southern territories of the land space now called Nigeria, in 1914, was 
unilaterally conceived and implemented by the colonial authorities without any 
consultation with the peoples of the amalgamated territories. Their opinions were neither 
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sought nor considered important. Such was the unilateralist and centralist nature of the 
amalgamation. 
As we shall see below, this policy of unilateralism and centralism despite the diversity of 
Nigeria, was to continue throughout the colonial era. Sadly, it has also persisted in the 
post colonial era despite the so called “federal” status of the country. The unilateral 
method used in adopting successive Nigerian constitutions and the centralist division of 
powers and fiscal resources in these constitutions lend credence to this assertion. In the 
next few paragraphs, I briefly examine each of these constitutions and the nature of 
power and fiscal allocation set out in them. This is aimed at setting a proper background 
for our discussion, in chapter four, of the nature of the current 1999 constitution of 
Nigeria and the centralist division of powers and fiscal resources entrenched in it. It is to 
these matters, then, that I now turn. 
3.2.1. Constitutional Developments 1914-1960 
If the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern territories to form Nigeria was 
arbitrarily and unilaterally done, the system of government established by the 1914 
colonial constitution further entrenched unilateralism and centralism as instruments of 
governance. Under that constitution, the Colonial Governor of Nigeria was invested with 
sweeping powers to exercise executive and legislative powers throughout the length and 
breadth of the new country, subject only to the authority of the British Crown.
37
 
Government Departments such as the “Railways, Military, Audit, Treasury, Posts and 
Telegraphs, Judicial, Legal and Survey” as well as Customs were directly under the 
control of the colonial Governor.
38
 The budgets for these Departments, and the revenues 
derived from them were centrally administered by the Governor.
 39
 The Governor was 
assisted in his duties by a retinue of colonial officers whose roles were merely advisory 
as the Governor retained the right to act unilaterally if the occasion demanded it. Such 
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was the magnitude of the Governor’s power over the entire colony under the 1914 
constitutional arrangement. 
A major highlight of the 1914 colonial administrative arrangement was the establishment 
of the Nigerian Council which the Governor set up as “a means of developing ‘an 
intelligent public opinion’ concerning the administration of Nigeria.”40 The Council was 
made up of the Governor himself and several other colonial officers in addition to six 
Africans handpicked by the Governor. These six Africans were regarded as unofficial 
members of the council.
41
 However, the Council had no executive or legislative powers. 
Its decisions or recommendations were not binding on the Governor who was at liberty to 
completely ignore such recommendations.
42
 In short, the Council’s role was merely 
deliberative and advisory.
43
  
Considering the structure and composition of the Council as well as its modus operandi, 
as described above, it is not clear what sort of “public opinion” on the affairs of Nigeria 
could have been developed by an advisory body whose membership consisted mainly of 
foreign colonial officers. The six Nigerians who were members of the council were 
unofficial members, and the legal instrument that set up the Council clearly gave 
precedence to the official members over and above the unofficial members.
44
 How could 
foreign colonial officers who, for the most part, rarely mingled with the ‘natives’ be 
expected to effectively assess and collate genuine public opinion about colonial 
administration in Nigeria? The hypocrisy of the ‘Nigerian Council’ arrangement is 
further exposed when it is considered that the Governor was, in any case, not bound to 
accept or act upon whatever was discussed or recommended at meetings of the Council. 
This is very clear from the express wording of the legislation that set up the council 
which stated that “no resolution passed by the Council shall have any legislative or 
executive authority, and the Governor shall not be required to give effect to any such 
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resolution unless he thinks fit and is authorised to do so.”45 Such was the extent of the 
centralization of state power under the 1914 constitutional arrangement.   
As the administrative and governance structure illustrated above shows, the Nigerian 
State established pursuant to the 1914 amalgamation of the Northern and Southern 
territories was essentially a unitary political entity structured to facilitate maximum 
colonial control over the peoples and societies of Nigeria. The new state was not 
designed to encourage genuine participation of the people in the governance of their 
country, neither was it intended to sincerely cater to their interests. In fact, like similar 
colonial projects elsewhere on the African continent, the creation of Nigeria by the 
amalgamation of different ethnic groups and nationalities was mainly aimed at furthering 
the trade and expansionist policies of the colonial authorities. This, it was thought, was 
best achieved by concentrating political and fiscal authority in the hands of the colonial 
Governor who was the representative of the British crown in the country. Thus began a 
political tradition of centralization which was to endure for decades and which has 
continued unrelentingly in the post-colonial era.      
Describing the system of administration under the 1914 constitutional arrangement, a 
former Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, Sir Udo Udoma, metaphorically writes 
that “...during the period…the Africans who were the wearers of tight shoes had no voice 
in how the shoes were made or altered. [Colonial] administrators constituted themselves 
Judges in their own cause: as so called experts, they alone thought out problems; 
formulated projects with a view to the solution of such problems; and all these without 
reference to the majority of the African population.”46 
Such disregard for the African population was brazenly exhibited when, as part of the 
1914 amalgamation scheme, the colonial authorities merged the finances of Northern and 
Southern Nigeria in a bid to stimulate economic growth in Northern Nigeria with 
revenues derived from its more prosperous Southern neighbour.
47
 For years before the 
amalgamation, Southern Nigeria with its booming trade and fertile soil had established 
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itself as an economically prosperous region while its predominantly Muslim Northern 
neighbour, inhibited from significant economic activity by religion and culture, struggled 
to remain afloat economically.
48
 The amalgamation was thus viewed as an opportunity to 
inject into the North, funds sourced from the South.
49
 But significant and consequential 
as this policy was, the southerners were not consulted or even notified.
50
  
Considering the age long history of war and animosity between Northern and Southern 
Nigeria, much of which pre-dated the advent of colonialism, one would have expected 
that a policy of this magnitude, with significant implications, would have been 
approached with greater circumspection, regard being had to the importance of securing 
the understanding and approval of the native population and leaders of the two regions. 
Consultation was however completely ignored.
51
 Rather, the colonial authorities 
proceeded to centralize the country’s fiscal system. Revenues generated throughout the 
country were centrally collated and disbursed on the basis of need or as the colonial 
authorities deemed fit.
52
  
In the circumstance, this unilateral and insensitive approach to governance was bound to 
further reinforce the age-long enmity between the North and the South with the latter 
viewing the former as reaping where it did not sow. 
Two things are now clear from the above analysis of the 1914 amalgamation. First is the 
motive for amalgamation. Second is the mode of amalgamation. As regards the former 
we have already seen that apart from the expansionist agenda of the British Empire, the 
need to use the wealth of Southern Nigeria to stimulate and sustain economic growth in 
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Northern Nigeria was a prime motivation behind amalgamation. As we shall see in 
chapter four, the situation is not significantly different today as revenues derived from oil 
exploration and exploitation in the Niger Delta in Southern Nigeria is what the entire 
country depends on, despite the existence of arable land for agriculture, as well as 
exploitable natural/mineral resources in every other part of Nigeria. As regards the mode 
of amalgamation, unilateralism was the method adopted by the colonial authorities to 
actualize this amalgamation scheme. The native population and leaders of the two regions 
were not consulted despite the significant implications of the scheme.  
The 1914 political and administrative arrangements set a centralist precedent that was to 
hallmark governance throughout much of the colonial and post-colonial era. It may 
therefore not be incorrect to say that the culture of centralization of powers and fiscal 
resources which is a major problem of Nigeria today, and which forms the subject matter 
of this thesis, actually has its roots in the country’s colonial history. Centralization of 
state power and resources, a culture alien to traditional African societies,
53
 is a colonial 
legacy introduced, imposed and bequeathed to Nigeria by colonialists who were not 
actuated by any genuine interest in the welfare of the Nigerian people. 
Former Premier of Northern Nigeria, Sir Ahmadu Bello aptly captured this point in his 
biography. According to him, “the colonial master who ruled Nigeria introduced a system 
of unitary government not for the present or future unity or well-being of all the 
indigenes of the country but for his own administrative convenience. Lord Lugard and his 
amalgamation were far from popular amongst us at that time.”54                   
Given the exclusionist character of the administrative arrangements set out under the 
1914 constitution as discussed above, public outcry against the system was bound to 
occur. This eventually took the form of critical activism by Nigerian Nationalists under 
the auspices of the West African National Congress.
55
Not only did the Nationalists 
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deprecate the 1914 arrangements, they trenchantly insisted on increased participation of 
Nigerians in the management of their country’s affairs.56   
Thus in 1922, the colonial administration in Nigeria, under the new leadership of 
Governor Hugh Clifford, introduced minimal reforms via a new constitution formulated 
and promulgated by the British Parliament for Nigeria.
57
 Unlike the 1914 constitution 
which established an administrative system made up entirely of expatriate colonial 
officers and unelected Nigerians under the absolute leadership of the colonial Governor, 
the 1922 constitution established, for the first time, a legislative council for the whole 
country and provided for the election of four Nigerians to this council.
58
 However, the 
fact that only four Nigerians were allowed to represent just two communities, Lagos and 
Calabar, out of the hundreds of communities scattered throughout the country, says a lot 
about how truly representative the Legislative Council was. In addition, the four 
Nigerians elected to the Legislative Council were actually regarded as unofficial 
members of the Council
59
, which in effect made their opinions or votes in the council 
subordinate to those of the official members who were British colonial officers. In view 
of the above, the 1922 constitution cannot be said to be much better than the 1914 
constitution considering that participation of Nigerians in the governance of their country 
under both constitutions was in fact significantly negligible. 
Another difference between the political and administrative structures established by the 
1914 and 1922 constitutions is that unlike the Governor-dominated legislative system 
established under the former, the legislative system created by the latter required the 
colonial Governor to make laws for “the peace, order and good government of Nigeria”, 
with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council.
60
 But although this was, in 
principle, an improvement on the arrangement under the previous 1914 constitution, in 
reality however, the consent of the Legislative Council in respect of laws introduced by 
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the Governor
61
 was, as one constitutional scholar put it, “a mere formality, given always 
as a matter of course,”62 as the Council was predominantly made up of officials 
personally appointed by the Governor and “bound to vote as directed by him.”63.  
Another feature of the 1922 constitution was that unlike the Legislative Council which, at 
least, had few Africans in it, the Executive Council established for Nigeria by the 
constitution was exclusively made up of colonial expatriate officers acting as advisers to 
the colonial Governor who was the sole policy maker for the country. He was, however, 
not bound to heed the advice of this Executive Council, neither was his discretion in 
policy matters fettered by any constitutional requirement for accountability to the 
Council.
64
 
As regards the finances of the country, budgets and revenues remained centrally 
administered, as before, during this period. In fact, Professor Adedeji who has done an 
extensive review of the fiscal system operated by Nigeria during this period argues that it 
was an era of ‘complete fiscal centralization’.65 
It is thus clear, from the foregoing, that although the governance arrangements under the 
1922 constitution appeared to indicate a slight improvement on the 1914 arrangement, 
there was in reality no fundamental or radical difference in the nature of governance 
under the two systems. Apart from the fact that both constitutions were conceived, 
formulated and promulgated into law by the British Parliament without any input from 
indigenous Nigerians, centralization of state power was, in fact, a principal feature of the 
two constitutions. The executive powers of the country, and to a large extent the 
legislative powers, were solely vested in the colonial Governor whose exercise of those 
powers was, for the most part, discretionary and even arbitrary. In addition, the fiscal 
system was completely centralized during this period.
66
 Indigenous Nigerians, for who 
legislation and executive policies were made during this period, were not allowed to play 
any significant role in government, neither were they consulted in the governance of their 
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own affairs. Thus, this period was, according to one scholar, an era of “complete 
subordination.”67 It was an era of full-fledged centralization. The political system in 
Nigeria retained this centralized character until 1945.  
Expectedly, like the 1914 constitution before it, the 1922 constitution became the subject 
of vitriolic attacks by the nationalist movement which had by this time expanded to 
include newly formed Nigerian political parties. There was a loud clamour for self-
government, democracy and devolution of powers to enable Nigerians participate 
actively in the management of their own affairs.
68
 It was clear that the 1922 constitution, 
with its centralist character, could no longer be relied upon to cater to the divergent 
interests of the several ethnic groups comprising the Nigerian state. British colonial 
policy in Nigeria had to change.  
The first major move towards change came in 1945 when the colonial Governor’s 
proposals for a new constitution were submitted to and ratified by the British 
Parliament.
69
This new constitution came into effect in 1947 and is now colloquially 
referred to as the ‘Richards Constitution,’ after Sir Arthur Richards, the colonial 
Governor that was responsible for its introduction.
70
 Though the new constitution was an 
improvement on the 1922 constitution in that a few more Nigerians were elected into the 
Central Legislature,
71
 and Regional Councils
72
 were established for each of the three 
Regions into which Nigeria had by then been divided,
73
 the nature of the Executive 
Council remained virtually unchanged. And the colonial Governor was still the head of 
the Central Legislature. The Regional Councils, consisting mostly of tribal Chiefs, were 
merely consultative assemblies with no real legislative power of any sort. While these 
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Regional Councils could advise the Governor on any matter concerning the Regions, the 
Governor was not constitutionally bound to heed their counsel.
74
  
In the Central Legislative Council, the colonial Governor was the originator of virtually 
all bills and he could effectively exercise a veto on any bill initiated in the Council 
without his consent.
75
 In addition, the Governor could enact a law without the Council’s 
contribution if he considered it necessary and expedient to do so.
76
 Most importantly, 
although the annual estimates of expenditure for each Region was expected to be 
presented by the Governor to the Regional Councils for their advice and 
recommendations, the Governor was not bound by such advice or recommendation, and 
could in fact reject them.
77
 Appropriation of funds for the Regions was thus 
discretionarily undertaken by the colonial Governor.
78
   
In fact, under the 1946 constitutional arrangement, the guiding principles adopted for the 
allocation of centrally collated revenues to the regions were unilaterally determined by an 
expatriate Fiscal Commissioner, Sir Sydney Phillipson who was appointed for that 
purpose by the colonial Governor. Records show that, in undertaking this important task, 
Philipson consulted mainly with expatriate colonial officers.
79
 Nigerians who would be 
directly affected by the revenue allocation policy were not consulted, neither was their 
input sought. In short, like the practice under previous constitutions, decisions on the 
1946 fiscal policy were centrally taken and arbitrarily imposed on the entire country. Not 
surprisingly therefore, the principles recommended by Philipson for the allocation of 
revenues to the regions, namely ‘even progress’ and ‘derivation,’80were not 
enthusiastically received by many Nigerians who felt that the application of these 
principles would significantly undermine their socio-economic interests. This could have 
been avoided if the colonial government had availed itself of the views and opinions of 
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Nigerians on the sensitive issue of revenue allocation before coming out with the new 
fiscal policy.              
Thus, the nature of political governance under the 1946 Richards constitution was not 
essentially different from what obtained under previous colonial constitutions. While that 
constitution slightly increased public involvement in certain aspects of governance, real 
political power still resided in the colonial Governor and not the peoples of Nigeria. The 
form of Government under this constitution was still essentially unitary, even if there was 
in fact some measure of administrative devolution to the Regions.
81
The role of the 
Regional Councils during this era was, as we have seen, mainly advisory. 
The limitations of the 1946 constitution, like the ones before it, did not endear it to 
Nigerian nationalists who mobilized and campaigned against it vigorously.
82
 The two 
principal flaws of the constitution, from all indications, included its evident lack of 
legitimacy, considering its formulation, adoption, and promulgation by the British 
Parliament without any consultation with the peoples of Nigeria,
83
 and its failure to 
establish a truly inclusive system of government under which Nigerians could be actively 
and effectively involved in the management of their own affairs.
84
 These flaws, as we 
have seen, had, in fact, been the hallmark of Nigeria’s legal order up till this time as the 
1914 and 1922 constitutions, as shown above, were similarly drafted and promulgated 
unilaterally by the British Parliament without the input of Nigerians, and power was, in 
like manner, exclusively concentrated in the hands of the colonial Governor under both 
constitutions.   
Given the controversy that dogged the 1946 Richards constitution, it is not surprising that 
the colonial authorities subsequently initiated measures aimed at engendering a more 
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liberal political arrangement. The change came with the appointment of Sir John 
Macpherson as colonial Governor of Nigeria in 1948 following the departure of Sir 
Arthur Richards. Macpherson eventually introduced a new constitution in 1951. Unlike 
the unilateralism that characterized the formulation of previous constitutions however, 
the process that produced the 1951 Macpherson constitution was somewhat inclusive. 
Consultations were made and meetings were held with Nigerians by the colonial 
authorities.
85
 
But as with subsequent constitution making processes up till the end of the colonial era, 
these consultations primarily involved the Nigerian elite which consisted of top 
politicians from the three largest ethnic groups in the country.
86
 And, other than its 
consideration by the Central legislative Council and the Regional Houses of Assembly 
comprising top politicians, the final text of the constitution was not subjected to a 
referendum or any other form of popular affirmative action involving Nigerians from all 
ethnic groups in the country as would be expected of a democratic constitution. This 
perhaps marked the beginning of the creation of a class of privileged Nigerian politicians 
who, in the process, imbibed the unilateralism of the colonial era and subsequently 
continued this practice in the post-colonial Nigeria. 
One would have expected that in a country like Nigeria, made up of several hitherto 
independent and distinct ethnic groups, separated by language, culture, political 
orientation and economic needs, a process as important as constitution making would 
invariably involve the participation of Nigerians from all these groups. Yet this has never 
really been the case in Nigeria. This culture of exclusion, first conceived and practiced in 
the colonial era, and perfected in the post-colonial period, has, for decades, remained the 
main albatross of political life in the country. 
As regards financial arrangements made pursuant to the 1951 constitution, a marked 
improvement over the 1946 arrangements is discernible. Unlike the unilateral approach 
adopted by Sir Sydney Phillipson in formulating and recommending the 1946 fiscal 
arrangements, the Fiscal Commission appointed in 1951 to advise on revenue allocation 
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in the country did make genuine efforts to consult with the leaders of the regions. But 
again, these consultations were not on a scale wide and inclusive enough to prevent 
further protests by regions that felt marginalized in the ensuing fiscal configuration.
87
  
More importantly, and perhaps most unfortunately, the Fiscal Commission that undertook 
this important assignment had no Nigerian member. Its three members were expatriates.
88
 
In addition, although the fiscal system introduced following the report of the 1951 fiscal 
commission strengthened the finances of the regions a little better than what obtained 
under previous fiscal arrangements, fiscal policy was still centrally managed and 
dictated.
89
 For instance, under the new fiscal arrangement, although the regions were 
allowed to levy and retain the proceeds of few insignificant taxes,
90
the central 
government nevertheless retained the power to fix the rates of these taxes.
91
 Apart from 
these taxes, the only other main source of income for the regions under the 1951 financial 
arrangements were ad-hoc grants, based on actual expenditure, from the central 
government.
92
 In actual fact therefore, fiscal power, during this period, was still largely 
vested in the central government.     
The foregoing notwithstanding, the 1951 constitution did make significant changes to the 
country’s political configuration. For instance, in response to the demands made by 
leading indigenous politicians across the country for a federal system of government, the 
1951 constitution established Regional Houses of Assembly with actual legislative 
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powers over certain matters.
93
 This represents a marked departure from what obtained 
under the 1946 constitution where the so called Regional Councils merely acted in 
advisory capacity. Perhaps, the most important innovation introduced by the 1951 
constitution was the predominant inclusion of elected representatives of the various parts 
of the country in the central and regional governments.
94
 Again this was a significant 
improvement over the 1946 constitution under which, unelected colonial officials and 
native authority personnel appointed by the colonial Governor dominated both levels of 
government. 
Despite the huge leap forward made by the 1951 Macpherson constitution however, the 
constitution was not without its fundamental flaws. The most significant of these, apart 
from those already highlighted above, was the power conferred on the central 
government by the constitution to, if it deemed it appropriate, block or quash a regional 
legislation, even if such legislation had been properly passed by the regional legislature.
95
 
Indeed a regional legislation could only be duly enacted with the express approval of the 
central government.
96
 In essence, although it made important concessions to the Regions, 
the 1951 constitution still retained significant centralist streaks that made it unacceptable 
as a governance framework for an ethnically diverse country like Nigeria. 
Agitations for greater devolution of power to the Regions soon erupted.
97
 The 
“reactionary nature” of the 1951 Macpherson constitution and the financial arrangements 
established under it was roundly denounced.
98
 One public figure cynically remarked that 
“..if the Richards constitution was the same old poison in a different bottle, the 
Macpherson Constitution is the same old bottle with a different label.”99 Such was the 
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disenchantment with the 1951 constitution that some local politicians made a strong case 
for a confederal arrangement that would see the regions exercise power over practically 
all matters except defence, external affairs, and customs which would be overseen by a 
central non-political body.
100
  
The colonial administration itself came to realize the need for the transfer of more powers 
to the regions in order to ensure that each region exercised, as much as possible, full 
control over its own internal affairs without interference from the central government. Sir 
Oliver Lyttleton, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies captured this sentiment 
succinctly when he said: “Recent events have shown that it is not possible for the three 
Regions of Nigeria to work together effectively in a federation so closely knit as that 
provided by the present constitution. Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, 
while greatly regretting this, consider that the Constitution will have to be redrawn to 
provide for greater regional autonomy and for the removal of powers of intervention by 
the Centre in matters which can, without detriment to other Regions, be placed entirely 
within regional competence...”101  
The Secretary of State’s remarks quoted above show that, by this time, it had become 
abundantly clear to the colonial authorities that Nigeria could no longer be administered 
as a unitary state, given its multi-ethnic character and the perpetual struggle among the 
country’s ethnic groups for power, resources, ascendancy and relevance. 
A conference was subsequently convened by the Colonial Secretary in London from 30
th
 
July to 22
nd
 August 1953 to discuss a suitable political arrangement for Nigeria. It was at 
this conference that a truly federal arrangement characterized by significant and 
substantial regional autonomy was first officially devised for the country. Conscious of 
the futility of governing an ethnically diverse society with a unitary constitution, Nigerian 
leaders present at this conference unanimously opted for a federal arrangement 
characterized by significant regional autonomy. 
102
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A follow up conference was later held in Lagos where decisions reached at the London 
conference were endorsed and their details worked out.
103
 Agreements reached at the 
London and Lagos conferences of 1953 were subsequently incorporated into a new 
constitution which came into force in 1954.
104
  
The 1954 constitution was a significant improvement on the previous 1951 constitution. 
For instance, under the 1954 constitution, the regional legislatures were not required to 
submit legislation duly passed by them to the central government for approval. A regional 
legislation, under the new dispensation, effectively became law upon its due passage by 
the relevant regional legislature.
105
 
A major highlight of the 1954 constitution was the division of powers among the levels 
of government entrenched in it. Matters common to the entire federation were assigned to 
the central government while powers for effective self government of the regions were 
assigned to the regional governments. Thus, matters such as “external relations, 
immigration and emigration, naturalization of aliens, defence and atomic energy, customs 
and foreign exchange, banking and public debt, mining, postal services, telephones and 
telegraphs, and central broadcasting”106 were assigned to the central government 
exclusively. The constitution also specified matters over which both the central and 
regional governments could concurrently legislate. These included “statistics, labour, 
insurance, research, water-power, national parks, industrial development, and the 
establishment of certain professional qualifications.”107 Matters not included in the 
exclusive and concurrent legislative lists above were reserved for the regional 
governments.
108
 This division of powers among the levels of government clearly vested 
significant powers in the regional governments. It was exactly what Nigeria’s leading 
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politicians had clamoured for and agreed upon at the various constitutional conferences 
that preceded the promulgation of the 1954 Constitution. 
However, although the 1954 Constitution enabled substantial transfer of powers and 
fiscal resources to the regional governments and significantly increased the participation 
of Nigerians in the governance of their own country, the central government still retained 
jurisdiction over the most lucrative taxes in addition to the power to fix the rates for taxes 
levied throughout the country even where such taxes were constitutionally reserved for 
the regions.
109
 In addition, the financial arrangements made pursuant to the 1954 
constitution were, in fact, solely recommended by an expatriate, Sir Louis Chick, who 
was appointed to undertake the task by the British Secretary of State.  
Like other Fiscal Commissions before it, there is no evidence to show that the Chick 
commission consulted widely with Nigerians from the several ethnic groups in the course 
of his assignment. Not surprisingly therefore, the principle of ‘derivation’ recommended 
by Chick for the allocation of centrally collected taxes to the regions was not well 
received by some regional governments which felt that full application of ‘derivation’ as 
the main factor in the allocation of centrally collected tax revenues would serve to 
“accentuate regional disparity in wealth and resources,” thus making the rich regions 
richer and the poor regions poorer, a condition which could foster jealousy and 
disunity.
110
  
The above notwithstanding, it must be acknowledged that the 1954 constitution was a 
significant improvement on previous constitutions before it. For the first time in the 
history of Nigeria, it established central and regional governments with autonomous 
powers assigned by the Constitution. In most cases, each level of government could 
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exercise discretion in the exercise of its powers, and none was regarded as subordinate to 
the other. Most importantly, the autonomy of the regional governments and the 
assignment of powers over local matters to them ensured that government was closer to 
the people, and Nigerians in each region could actively participate in the governance of 
their own affairs.   
However, Nigeria, at this time, still remained under colonial rule. Further conferences 
were thus held in London in 1957, 1958, and 1960 to press for internal self-government 
and independence throughout Nigeria. The end result was the independence constitution 
of 1960 which established self-government for Nigeria and further reinforced the powers 
of self government and autonomy already granted the regions under the preceding 1954 
constitution.
111
  
What must be noted about the conferences, consultations and discussions that preceded 
the promulgation of the 1954 and 1960 constitutions, however, is the quality of 
participation at the conferences. Like the process that midwifed the 1951 Macpherson 
constitution, participants at the 1953, 1957, 1958 and 1960 constitutional conferences 
were majorly drawn from the leadership of the three dominant political parties at the 
time.
112
 And decisions taken at the conferences were not in any way submitted for review 
and ratification by the generality of Nigerians. Instead, the decisions were incorporated 
into the new constitutions and promulgated into law by the British Parliament. 
Essentially, therefore, the constitutions produced at the end of these conferences can be 
regarded as elitist governance arrangements devised by top Nigerian politicians under the 
supervision of the colonial authorities. Thus while it is true that the 1954 and 1960 
constitutions ignited significant changes in the nature and character of governance in 
Nigeria, and in fact signified the sort of federal arrangement preferred and agreed upon 
by Nigerian leaders at the time, they were not essentially different from the 1914, 1922, 
1946 and 1951 constitutions in the elitist approach adopted in their formulation, as 
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evidenced by the involvement of only the leadership of the political class in the 
constitution making process, and the promulgation of these constitutions by the British 
Parliament instead of the Nigerian Parliament  
This disregard for popular affirmation of constitutional arrangements was to become a 
recurring decimal in subsequent constitution making processes in Nigeria. Centralization 
of the constitution making process has been one of the greatest governance problems in 
Nigeria ever since. When a constitution making process is not broad based and inclusive, 
the division of powers and fiscal resources entrenched in the ensuing constitution cannot 
be said to truly reflect popular interest, properly so called. And when a constitution does 
not represent popular interest, its democratic credential is severely undermined.   
The 1960 constitution was revised in 1963 to reflect the new status of Nigeria as a 
republic.
113
 Other than this minor alteration of the 1960 constitution to reflect the 
country’s change of status, the 1963 constitution was essentially the same in content and 
style as the 1960 constitution. Substantial powers of self government were assigned to the 
regional governments and their autonomy remained mostly unfettered, but the approach 
employed in formulating the 1963 constitution was precisely similar to the exclusivist 
approach employed in the formulation of the 1960 constitution. 
 
3.3. The Military Era: Re-Centralization of State Power 
In the foregoing discussion, Nigeria moved from being a highly centralized state in the 
aftermath of the 1914 amalgamation to being a significantly decentralized state after the 
official introduction of federalism in 1954. From 1960 to 1966, the regional governments 
wielded significant constitutional powers and were largely autonomous in the exercise of 
those powers.  
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The 1954 to 1966 era was remarkable for reversing the centralization of the colonial era 
and for bringing government closer to the people. Indigenous regional governments were 
empowered to promote the interests of people in the local communities.   
However, the gains recorded under the 1954, 1960, and 1963 constitutions, in terms of 
the assignment of significant powers of self government to the regions, were demolished 
on the 15
th
 of January 1966, when in the early hours of that day, a military coup d’etat 
carried out by a group of young military officers effectively terminated civil democratic 
rule in Nigeria.
114
 From then on, and for the next thirty-three years,
115
 a policy of power-
centralization was ruthlessly and firmly pursued by the military. What played out during 
the more than three decades of military rule in Nigeria was like a rehash of the 
governance paradigm of the 1914-1945 colonial era. As we know already, that era was 
one of extreme centralization with little or no allowance for democratic expression. What 
we had between 1914 and 1945 was full blown unitarism as against the federalist bent of 
the 1954-1966 era.  
It was to this unitary past that the military intervention of 1966 led Nigeria. Governance 
under the successive military administration was by decree, the constitution having been 
suspended.  The existing regions of the federation were unilaterally divided into smaller 
states during this period by the military authorities.
116
 Ostensibly, this fragmentation of 
the former regions into smaller regions (called states) was aimed at bringing government 
closer to the people. In reality however, it would appear that this was indeed a ploy by the 
military authorities to weaken other centers of power in the federation by reducing the 
numerical and economic strength of each of the newly created states, a situation which 
was expected to keep the new states perpetually subordinate to and dependent on the 
central government for their survival and sustenance.  
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The vision of the military was to create an omnipotent and monolithic central government 
from which other governments in the country would take instructions and to which other 
levels of government would be no more than mere appendages. This became quite clear 
from the Unification Decree which was promulgated by the military authorities soon after 
seizing power in 1966. The aim of this Decree was to impose a unitary agenda on the 
entire country.
117
 Although this Decree ultimately collapsed due to the widespread outcry 
that greeted it,
118
 it nevertheless revealed to all Nigerians, the centralist mindset of the 
military.     
Thus, although Nigeria continued to be called a federation during this period, the country 
had in reality become a unitary entity with the so-called ‘states of the federation,’ no 
more than ‘slavish appendages’ of the central government. Such was the total and 
complete control exercised by the central government over the states during the military 
era.
119
 
During this era, the allocation of governmental powers became increasingly centralized 
till practically all powers that had been reserved for the regional governments under the 
1960 and 1963 constitutions were transferred to the central military government. The 
legislative and executive powers of the entire country became the exclusive preserve of 
the Central Military Government since the federal and regional legislatures that existed 
under the previous civilian era had ceased to exist under the military.
120
 
In addition to the above, fiscal arrangements during the military era were, as could be 
expected, centralized. In fact, between 1968 and 1977, the military authorities in Nigeria 
unilaterally reviewed the revenue allocation system four times without setting up any 
advisory commission, as had been done prior to the 1966 coup.
121
 Fiscal policy was 
                                                          
117
 Michael Crowder, (note 19 supra) p.269. 
118
 Ibid 
119
 See Prof. Nwabueze’s discussion of the nature and character of the system of government established 
during the military in B.O Nwabueze (note 37 supra) 1982) pp.205-232. 
120
 Ibid. See also W.O Alli, ‘The Development of Federalism in Nigeria: A Historical Perspective’ in Aaron 
T. Gana & Samuel G. Egwu eds., Federalism in Africa vol.1 (Africa World Press Inc, 2003) pp 83-84. 
121
 Adedotun O. Philips, ‘Managing Fiscal Federalism: Revenue Allocation Issues’ (1991) 21(4) Publius 
p.104. See also J. Isawa Elaigwu, ‘The Challenges of Federalism in Nigeria: An Overview’ in J. Isawa 
Elaigwu ed., Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria- Facing the Challenges of the Future, (Adonis & Abbey 
Publishers Ltd, 2008), p.22.  For a more comprehensive account of the financial arrangements during the 
military era, see A.G Adebayo, (note 35 supra) pp 123-151. 
110 
 
centrally determined and centrally dictated such that by 1997, the fiscal system had 
become absolutely centralized. Commenting on this point in a 1997 paper, eminent 
Economist, Professor Adedotun Philips stated that:  
“..The federal (central) government dominates the fiscal system. This arises from the 
lopsided revenue structure which ensures that an annual average of over 90 percent of 
overall government revenue is collected by the federal government alone, whilst it 
accounts for about 75 percent of total expenditure in Nigeria. A vital contributory factor 
is that prolonged military rulership of Nigeria has virtually destroyed the constitutionally-
stipulated federal system and substituted a unitary, monolithic structure. Consequently, 
State and Local Governments are virtually insignificant in the fiscal system. Over the 
years, till date, budgetary administration has been characterised by....loss of autonomy by 
State and Local Governments in making expenditure decisions....The federal financial 
system has been progressively distorted over the years...Thus, upfront appropriation of 
revenues by the Federal Government has now become an annual practice, resulting in the 
retention by the Federal Government of a disproportionate share of federally-collected 
revenue and the undue reduction of revenues which ought to accrue to State and Local 
Governments.”122 
 
The above graphic description, by Professor Phillips, of Nigeria’s fiscal system during 
the military era lends credence to our earlier assertion that military rule in Nigeria was in 
effect a return to and continuation of the centralism of the colonial era. Such was the 
centralization of financial arrangements under the military during this era that the states 
of the federation were consistently dependent on the central government for more than 70 
percent of their revenue, a situation similar to what obtained during the colonial era.
123
 
A particularly problematic issue with fiscal arrangements throughout the colonial and 
military eras was that principles for allocating centrally collected revenues among the 
regional governments were mostly devised without any significant consultation with the 
peoples of Nigeria.
124
  Even when fiscal commissions were constituted by the central 
military government to advise on financial arrangements for the federation, the fiscal 
commissions mostly consisted of expatriate economists or Nigerian financial experts who 
often had only very little interaction with the people and who were only accountable to 
the central government. It is therefore not surprising that the fiscal policies and revenue 
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allocation principles recommended by these commissions were often condemned and 
rejected by the people.
125
    
Disregard and contempt for the culture of public consultation by the Nigerian political 
elite is one of the major reasons for the widespread public disenchantment with Nigeria’s 
federal system today. The tendency for the central government to unilaterally take 
important decisions on the allocation of powers and revenue, two issues that affect every 
part of Nigeria, without exhaustively consulting with the Nigerian people, is a major flaw 
of the current ‘federal’ arrangement.  
As we have seen above, the history of Nigeria’s so called federalism is replete with 
unilateralism, centralism and undemocratic practices, all of which are inconsistent with 
and antithetical to the idea of federalism.          
The autocratic and undemocratic nature of military rule in Nigeria from 1966 to the mid 
1990s precipitated a long and sustained struggle against dictatorship and a loud clamour 
for a return to democratic rule throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Ethnic organizations, 
non-governmental organisations, and individual Nigerians vigorously campaigned against 
the absolutism of the military and its attendant erosion of democratic values.
126
 
And so it was that in 1999, after decades of pressure from pro-democracy civil society 
organizations, the military authorities hurriedly handed over power to a civilian 
government. However, in the process of doing this, they also handed over another elitist 
constitution that was not debated, adopted or popularly ratified by the Nigerian people. 
Rather, the constitution was hurriedly drawn up by a committee unilaterally set up by the 
then military President of Nigeria and promulgated into law by a decree,
127
 thus 
effectively making the military authorities, and not the people of Nigeria, the source of 
the constitution’s authority. Since the people of Nigeria, drawn from the constituent units 
of the federation were not genuinely involved in making the 1999 constitution, the 
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division of powers and resources set out in the constitution cannot be said to reflect the 
will of the Nigerian people. It cannot be said to be an expression of their joint covenant. 
It is this, and the constitution’s insensitive concentration of powers and fiscal resources in 
the central government, despite the ethnically diverse character of the Nigerian state, that 
form the subject matter of this thesis. These are the issues I shall examine in the next 
chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined the history of constitutional arrangements in Nigeria, 
especially as they pertain to the allocation of powers and fiscal resources. I commenced 
by establishing that Nigeria was formed through a series of colonial ‘mergers’ and 
‘takeovers’ of native ethnic groups that began in the early 19th century and culminated in 
the grand amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914.  
Prior to amalgamation, many of these ethnic groups had existed as separate, distinct and 
independent entities with different cultures and languages as well as different political 
and economic traditions for centuries. In fact, most of them had attained very high levels 
of traditional political sophistication by the time the first set of colonialists arrived the 
shores of Africa. Painstaking research conducted and documented over many years by 
African and Western historians now confirms this. This revelation is important in light of 
the often bandied narrative that Africa had no history and culture before the advent of 
colonialism. As argued in this chapter, this narrative was perhaps deliberately propagated 
in order to justify colonialism and its legacy of power centralization in many African 
countries in the 18
th
, 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries. 
With the foregoing established, I proceeded to trace the history of power allocation in 
Nigeria through three different stages in the country’s evolution. The first stage, from 
1914 to 1945, was a period of extreme centralization of political and fiscal powers. 
During this period, executive and legislative powers were vested in the colonial Governor 
of Nigeria who also doubled as the representative of the British crown in the country. 
Constitutional documents produced during this period were unilaterally crafted by the 
colonial Governors, ratified by the British Parliament, and coercively imposed throughout 
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Nigeria. The people of Nigeria were not allowed to participate in the governance of their 
own country during this period. In the few instances when few Nigerians had some form 
of opportunity to do this, their roles were merely advisory and not binding on the colonial 
authorities. The 1914 to 1945 era was thus a period of absolute centralization. 
The second stage from 1946 to 1965 saw an incremental relaxation of colonial hold on 
the affairs of Nigeria and the eventual independence of Nigeria from colonial rule. 
Nigerians became more involved in political governance during this period with more 
powers incrementally devolved to the regional governments which now had more 
Nigerians as members. Yet, the constitutions promulgated during this period were not  
products of popular participation, for although the colonial authorities had by this time 
introduced consultation into the constitution making process, these consultations were 
predominantly done with top Nigerian politicians, most of who were members of the 
country’s largest ethnic groups. The implication is that minority ethnic groups were often 
left out in these consultations. In the same manner, fiscal arrangements devised pursuant 
to the various constitutions were often based on recommendations made by expatriate 
colonial officers who had done little or no consultation with ordinary Nigerians. Not 
surprisingly, these fiscal arrangements were always unacceptable to Nigeria’s ethnic 
groups whose aspirations were often at variance with the said financial arrangements.   
The third stage from 1966 to 1999 saw a complete reversal of the incremental devolution 
witnessed during the 1946 to 1965 period. Nigeria had by this time come under full 
blown military rule. From 1966, the military steadily and meticulously pursued a policy 
of centralization. Executive powers including fiscal authority were concentrated in the 
central military government at this time and the state and local governments were indeed 
no more than mere slavish appendages of the central government. The centralization 
policy of the military is now heavily reflected in the extant 1999 constitution of Nigeria 
which the military hurriedly and unilaterally put together on the eve of the return to civil 
rule and promulgated via a decree. As chapter four below will show, this 1999 
constitution and the power allocation arrangement contained in it have been a source of 
bitter controversy since it does not genuinely reflect the wishes and aspirations of the 
Nigerian people, and it denies the state and local governments the power to effectively 
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manage their own internal affairs. In short, the constitution is not significantly different in 
character and content from the centralist constitutions of the colonial and military era. 
For now, it is enough to say that two things are easily discernible from the foregoing 
discussion. First, power distribution arrangements in Nigeria have had a long and 
troubling history of centralization. This policy of centralization was forged in the crucible 
of colonialism and subsequently nurtured and reinforced on the altar of military rule. In 
essence, the centralist nature of the division of powers and fiscal resources in Nigeria 
today is a colonial cum military legacy that has corrupted the very soul of Nigeria’s 
federalism. It has entrenched and fostered a centralist perspective of federalism by 
institutionalizing the hegemony of the central government.  
Second the peoples of Nigeria have, for most of Nigeria’s history, been effectively 
excluded from participating in the determination of how they are governed. As we have 
seen in this chapter, allocation of powers and fiscal resources have, for long, been 
centrally determined and foisted on the component parts of the federation and their 
peoples. Consequently, agitations for greater participation in government, transfer of 
powers to the constituent units of the federation, fiscal autonomy, and resource control, 
which have come to be identified with Nigeria in the last few decades, are manifestations 
of popular disenchantment with the constitutional and political status quo. These 
agitations are reactions to a dysfunctional and illegitimate ‘federal’ constitutional 
architecture. 
Any attempt to address these agitations must therefore commence with a radical 
departure from the “centralist federal philosophy” entrenched in the 1999 constitution, 
and the introduction of constitutional reforms to reflect and entrench a new federal 
philosophy. This, I shall do in chapter five. But first, a look at the division of powers and 
fiscal resources under the extant 1999 constitution as well as the arguments for and 
against it is necessary to put current concerns about Nigeria’s federal system in clearer 
perspective. This forms the subject matter of chapter four.            
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                                                   CHAPTER FOUR 
DIVISION OF POWERS AND FISCAL RESOURCES UNDER THE 1999    
CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA 
 
INTRODUCTION  
In chapter three, I mentioned that the nature of the current constitution of Nigeria (the 
1999 constitution) is not significantly different from that of previous constitutions. It 
entrenches a political system that inordinately guarantees the political and fiscal 
hegemony of the federal (central) government over and above the other levels of 
government in the federation. Nigeria, under the 1999 constitution, has, in fact, been 
described as “a centralized federation with strong unitary elements.”1 Such is the power 
and control wielded by the federal government under the existing constitutional 
arrangement, that the state and local governments are, in reality, no more than its 
inconsequential appendages.  
The most striking and contentious features of the 1999 constitution include the highly 
centralized division of powers and fiscal resources entrenched in it,
2
 and the exclusionist 
approach employed in formulating this division of powers and fiscal resources. Both 
issues have been the subject of acrimonious controversy since the country’s return to civil 
rule in 1999.  
In this chapter I argue that the non inclusion of the people of Nigeria in the determination 
of the division of powers and fiscal resources entrenched in the 1999 constitution, and the 
                                                          
1
 J. Isawa Elaigwu, ‘The Federal Republic of Nigeria,’ in Aktar Majeed (et al) eds., Distribution of Powers 
and Responsibilities in Federal Countries (McGill Queen’s Press, 2006) p.217. Similar comments have 
been made by others. See for instance  Ignatius Akaayar Ayua and Dakas C.J. Dakas, ‘Federal Republic of 
Nigeria,’ in John Kincaid and Tarr, G. Alan eds., Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal 
Countries, (McGill-Queens University Press, 2005) pp 250-251; Abiola Sanni, ‘True Federalism: A 
Panacea to the Economic Crisis in Nigeria’ (7th Prince Bola Ajibola Annual Lecture Series, Magna Curia 
Chambers of the Obafemi Awolowo University Ile Ife, 2016) pp 2-3; Ladipo Adamolekun, I Remember 
(Ibadan: Safari Books Ltd, 2016) p.301. 
2
 See appendix, Table 1 below. 
116 
 
constitution’s concentration of powers and fiscal resources in the central government, 
represent the very antithesis of federalism. And this arrangement is absolutely unsuitable 
for an ethnically diverse society like Nigeria. The division of powers and fiscal resources 
entrenched in the 1999 constitution undermines democratic governance, promotes central 
government dictatorship, facilitates the domination of minority ethnic groups by the 
larger ethnic groups, and threatens the corporate existence of Nigeria. And unless it is 
urgently restructured through an inclusive constitution making process, the inter-ethnic 
conflict and violence that have attended this anomaly in the last few years will continue 
unabated.     
In what follows, I highlight and discuss the salient attributes of the existing division of 
powers and fiscal resources as well as the justification often claimed for it. In particular, I 
undertake an extensive critique of this power distribution framework with a view to 
assessing its suitability for a multi-ethnic state like Nigeria and its compatibility with the 
idea of federalism. 
I commence by discussing the two contentious features of this division of powers and 
fiscal resources that are relevant to this thesis. These include the manner of its 
formulation, and its centralist allocation of competencies and revenues. These two 
features are chosen for the controversy and tension they have jointly and severally 
generated since the promulgation of the 1999 constitution.  
In section 4.2, I discuss and examine the argument often advanced as justification for the 
centralized division of powers and fiscal resources in the constitution. As we shall see, so 
convinced are the advocates of centralization in the rectitude of their cause that they 
apparently never bother to assess its suitability for an ethnically diverse and 
heterogeneous society whose component parts not only have different needs, interests, 
cultures, and socio-political orientations, but are also desirous of autonomy in the 
management of their affairs. Section 4.3 is dedicated to critically assessing this 
centralized division of powers and resources, its suitability for multi-ethnic Nigeria, and 
its compatibility with the idea of federalism.  
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It is envisaged that the discussion in this chapter will furnish the content for the 
subsequent chapters on a new constitutional framework for the division of powers and 
fiscal resources among the levels of government in Nigeria. 
 4.1. Two Problems of the Existing Power Distribution Framework 
It is widely recognized that the most controversial, divisive and acrimonious issue in 
Nigeria’s federalism today is the centralized division of powers and fiscal resources 
entrenched in the extant 1999 constitution.
3
 For our purposes in this thesis, two salient 
problems associated with the existing power distribution arrangement are of particular 
interest. These include (a) the exclusionist approach employed in devising this division of 
powers and fiscal resources; and (b) the inordinate concentration of powers and fiscal 
resources in the federal (central) government.  
As we shall see in the following paragraphs, the two problems highlighted above are 
jointly indicative of the highly centralist character of Nigerian federalism. They are also 
distinctive markers of the centralist orientation that influenced the entrenchment of this 
power distribution regime in the 1999 constitution of Nigeria by the framers of that 
constitution. I will now consider each of these problems in turn.           
4.1.1. Approach Employed in Devising the Existing Power Distribution Framework.  
Any discussion of the problems associated with the division of powers and fiscal 
resources set out in the 1999 constitution must, for the sake of clarity and completeness, 
be preceded by a discussion of the approach utilized in devising this division of powers. 
And this must in turn be preceded by a discussion of the approach employed in 
formulating and adopting the 1999 constitution itself. This discussion is important 
                                                          
3
 See generally, Ekeng A. Anam-Ndu, ‘Renewing The Federal Paradigm in Nigeria: Contending Issues And 
Perspectives’ in Aaron T. Gana & Samuel G. Egwu eds., Federalism in Africa- Framing the National 
Question, vol.1, (Africa World Press Inc, 2003) p.51. See also J.Isawa Elaigwu ed., Fiscal Federalism in 
Nigeria- Facing the Challenges of the Future, (London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd, 2008), p.iv; 
Akpan H. Ekpo, ‘Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria: The Challenges of the Next Decade’ in J.Isawa Elaigwu ed., 
ibid, p.85; Olubayo Oluduro et al ‘Revenue Allocation and Resource Control in Nigeria’ (2009)  1(2) Lead 
City University Journal, p.400;  Abiola Sanni, (note 1 supra) pp 2-3; Ladipo Adamolekun, (note 1 supra) 
p.301; Ben Nwabueze, My Life and Work vol.3 (Ibadan: Gold Press Limited, 2014) pp 19-20; Wumi 
Iledare and Rotimi Suberu ‘Nigeria’ in George Anderson ed., Oil and Gas in Federal Systems (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) pp 232-234. 
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because the legitimacy of the division of powers and fiscal resources entrenched in the 
constitution is contingent on the legitimacy of the constitution itself.
4
 
As earlier mentioned in chapter 3, the promulgation of the 1999 constitution was done by 
military fiat.
5
 Its formulation, including the determination of its fundamental principles 
was exclusively done by military commanders and their civilian acolytes on the eve of 
the country’s return to civil rule in 1999.6 There was no constituent assembly to discuss 
proposed constitutional principles, neither was there any referendum to affirm the 
contents of the proposed constitution. The entire constitution making process was 
centrally conceived, centrally designed and centrally executed.
7
 Although a so called 
‘Constitution Debate Committee’ was appointed by the military authorities to produce the 
new constitution, this committee was not representative of the Nigerian people.
8
 
Members of the Committee were handpicked by the military and accountable only to the 
military.
9
 The draft constitution they produced was centrally ratified by the military 
authorities after unilateral amendments had been made to it by the Provisional Ruling 
Council, the highest organ in the military hierarchy.
10
 In effect, the 1999 constitution is 
not and cannot be regarded as an ‘original act of the people,’ properly so called. The use 
of the phrase “we the people” in the preamble to the constitution is certainly misplaced 
and misleading, for “the people” were not part of the arbitrary process that produced the 
constitution.
11
  
                                                          
4
 According to Professor Ihonvbere, “the process of constitution making is critical to the strength, 
acceptability and legitimacy of the final product” Julius O. Ihonvbere ‘How to Make an Undemocratic 
Constitution: The Nigerian Example’ (2000) 21(2) Third World Quarterly 346. 
5
 The constitution was promulgated via the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Promulgation) 
Decree No 24 of 5 May 1999. 
6
 Julius O. Ihonvbere, (note 4 supra) p.351. See also Ignatius Akaayar Ayua and Dakas C.J. Dakas, (note 1 
supra) p.250. 
7
 FT Abioye, ‘Constitution-Making, Legitimacy and Rule of Law: A Comparative Analysis,’ (2011) 44(1) 
The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa, pp.72-73. See also Julius O. 
Ihonvbere (note 4 supra) pp.346;351.   
8
 Tunde I. Ogowewo, ‘Why the Judicial Annulment of the Constitution of 1999 is Imperative for the 
Survival of Nigeria’s Democracy,’ (2000) 44(2) Journal of African Law p.144. 
9
 Ibid 
10
Ibid. 
11
 Professor Isawa Elaigwu captured this point adequately when he argued that the 1999 constitution 
“suffers a crisis of ownership because, when it was created, there was not even a pretense of general public 
participation.”  J. Isawa Elaigwu,‘The Federal Republic of Nigeria’ in Aktar Majeed (et al) eds. (note 1 
supra) p.213.     
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Buttressing this point in volume 1 of his Constitutional Democracy in Africa, Professor 
Ben Nwabueze succinctly argued that  “the 1999 constitution, with its unitary character”  
cannot lay any claim to being “an act of the people” as would be expected of a 
constitution.”12 Quoting Thomas Paine who, in his Rights of Man, had declared that “a 
constitution is not the act of a government, but of a people constituting a government,” 
Professor Nwabueze argued that “the 1979 and 1999 constitutions were made by the 
Federal Military Government, a government of absolute power…seized by force or threat 
of it from the Nigerian people….The people had no hand…. in the making or enacting of 
either of those constitutions.”13  
“A constitution,” writes Nwabueze, “is an act of the people if it is made by them either 
directly in a referendum or through a convention or constituent assembly popularly 
elected for this specific purpose, subject or not to formal ratification by the people in a 
referendum.”14 For him “the making of a constitution in this context refers to the act by 
which its substantive content, particularly the system of government, and the relations of 
governmental structures inter se and with the individual is determined and adopted….If 
the substantive content of a constitution is freely agreed and adopted by the people either 
in a referendum or through a constituent assembly popularly elected for the purpose, then 
it is their act”15 
It follows, from the foregoing, that the 1999 constitution is not “an act of the Nigerian 
people,” properly so called. Its pretension to legitimacy is significantly attenuated by its 
non-rootedness in the will of the people, for a key factor in the legitimacy of a 
constitution is its predication on the will of the people and its genuine articulation of their 
aspirations. This presupposes the active involvement of the people in its making. A 
constitution’s character as ‘an act of the people’ is a significant condition of its 
legitimacy. A constitution cannot genuinely lay any claim to legitimacy without the 
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 Ben Nwabueze, Constitutional Democracy in Africa vol.1 (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2003) p.64. 
See also Julius O. Ihonvbere (note 4 supra) p.352; FT Abioye, (note 7 supra) p.73. 
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 Ben Nwabueze, Ibid. Note that the 1999 constitution is almost a replica of the 1979 constitution. Like the 
1999 constitution, the 1979 constitution was also promulgated into law by the military. Professor Elaigwu 
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15
 Ibid. 
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people’s participation in its formulation.16 For a multi-ethnic society like Nigeria, the 
1999 constitution making process was an arbitrary exercise apparently designed to foist a 
pre-determined unitary and centralist agenda on the Nigerian people.  
Since the 1999 constitution is not an act of the Nigerian people, it certainly stands to 
reason that the division of powers and fiscal resources set out in it cannot be said to 
reflect the express will of the Nigerian people, but those of a predatory and hegemonic 
ruling class. If the 1999 constitution is illegitimate, the division of powers and fiscal 
resources set out in it is doubly illegitimate for it is then an illegitimate power sharing 
arrangement entrenched in an illegitimate constitutional document.  
One of the principal reasons for the widespread public disenchantment with the division 
of powers and fiscal resources set out in the constitution is that it is not a true reflection 
of the will of the overwhelming majority of the Nigerian people. The 1999 constitution 
and the division of powers and resources set out in it, is, in actual fact, alien to the 
Nigerian people and thus incapable of commanding their “loyalty, obedience and 
confidence.”17 Any attempt to address the problems associated with the division of 
powers and fiscal resources in the constitution must therefore commence with a 
rectification of the constitution’s legitimacy deficit. I shall return to this point in chapter 
five.  
In the next few paragraphs, I discuss the other problem associated with the constitution’s 
power distribution framework, to wit, its entrenchment of a highly centralized division of 
powers and fiscal resources. To this and other issues I now turn.  
4.1.2. Centralized Allocation of Powers and Fiscal Resources in the 1999 
Constitution   
Another controversial feature of the 1999 Constitution is its entrenchment of a highly 
centralized division of powers and fiscal resources in favour of the federal (central) 
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 Julius O. Ihonvbere  (note 4 supra) p 346. See also FT Abioye (note 7 supra) pp 72-73; Ignatius Akaayar 
Ayua and Dakas C.J. Dakas, “Federal Republic of Nigeria,” in John Kincaid and Tarr, G. Alan eds., (note 1 
supra) p.248; B.O Nwabueze (note 14 supra) p.5; Tunde I. Ogowewo (note 8 supra) 138-139. 
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 According to Professor Nwabueze, “the legitimacy of a constitution is concerned with how to make it 
command the loyalty, obedience and confidence of the people.” See B.O Nwabueze  (note  14 supra) p.4.   
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government. Under this Constitution, powers and fiscal resources are shared among the 
levels of government through the instrumentality of two legislative lists, namely the 
exclusive legislative list, and the concurrent legislative list. Both lists are attached as 
schedules to the Constitution. Residual powers in respect of matters not itemized under 
the exclusive or concurrent legislative lists are reserved for the States. The constitution 
also sets out a list of functions assigned to the local governments.
18
 
The Exclusive Legislative List is an overwhelmingly long catalogue of sixty-eight 
matters over which the central government alone may exercise legislative and executive 
powers. Included in this list however, are matters that should ordinarily be within the 
legislative jurisdiction of the state or local governments because of their strong 
connection with the internal affairs of these governments. For instance, election to the 
offices of Governor and Deputy Governor of a State; election to the Houses of Assembly 
of the States; local policing and other local security services; mines and minerals in the 
states; census in the states of the federation; local aviation; regulation of local political 
parties; judiciary of the states; formation, annulment and dissolution of marriages in the 
States; incorporation and regulation of companies in the states; registration of business 
names in the states; as well as wireless broadcasting and television, are some of the 
matters itemized under the Exclusive Legislative List.
19
   
The Concurrent Legislative List is a relatively shorter catalogue consisting of twelve 
different matters over which both federal and state governments may concurrently 
exercise legislative powers. Included in this list are matters such as university, 
technological and post-primary education; agriculture; electric power; archives; scientific 
and technological research; trigonometric, cadastral, and topographical surveys; and 
statistics.
20
 But the power of the state governments to legislate in respect of matters in the 
concurrent legislative list is circumscribed by a provision of the constitution which makes 
the validity of a state legislation in any of such matter(s) contingent on its consistency 
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 Fourth Schedule, 1999 Constitution. See also figure 2 in the appendix to this chapter. 
19
 Sections 4(2) & (3) ,1999 Constitution. The Exclusive Legislative List is set out in Part 1 of Schedule 2 
of the 1999 constitution. See Table 1 in the appendix to this chapter for a full itemization of the matters 
contained in this list. 
20
 Sections 4(7) (a) & (b), 1999 Constitution. The concurrent list is set out in Part 2 of Schedule 2 of the 
1999 constitution. See Table 1 in the appendix for a full itemization of the matters contained in this list.  
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with federal government legislation on the same matter(s).
21
 The implication of this is 
that the legislative jurisdiction of the states in such matters is effectively excluded or 
subject to the overriding authority of the federal government whenever the federal 
government comprehensively legislates in respect of such matters.   
Thus, not only is the federal government empowered to exclusively legislate and exercise 
executive powers in respect of matters such as local policing, state elections, census in 
the states, mines and minerals located within the territory of states, and state judiciary, all 
of which should ordinarily be within the jurisdiction of the states, it can also preempt or 
override state legislation in respect of matters in the concurrent legislative list.  
In actual fact, the federal government is the dominant power wielder in respect of most 
matters in the concurrent legislative list. For instance, agricultural development and 
policy, a matter within the concurrent legislative list, and one that is of direct interest to 
the local townships and rural communities, is effectively dictated by the federal 
government from its base at the federal capital city of Abuja.
22
 Same goes for electric 
power,
23
 University education as well as scientific and technological research.
24
 The 
federal government predominates in all the above mentioned fields. 
Some residual matters that are exclusively assigned to the states, under the constitution, 
have also been known to be unilaterally appropriated by the federal government without 
the consent of the States. For instance the federal government has of late taken over a 
significant part of primary education policy through its Universal Basic Education 
Program.
25
 And although, primary education is a residual matter reserved solely for the 
States, the consent of the states was not sought and received before this interference by 
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 Section 4(5), 1999 Constitution. 
22
 Agricultural policy throughout Nigeria is mostly dictated by the Federal Ministry of Agriculture Abuja. 
See Federal Ministry of Agriculture Abuja <http://fmard.gov.ng/about/> (accessed 15/5/2017). 
23
 The National Electricity Regulatory Commission, and the Power Holding Company of Nigeria, both of 
which are federal agencies, regulate and administer electricity generation and distribution throughout 
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 The National Universities Commission, an agency of the federal government regulates university 
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the federal government.
26
 Healthcare policy and development, also a residual matter, is in 
practice, dominated by the federal government. 
The federal government’s arbitrary incursion into fields that exclusively belong to the 
lower levels of government, and its excessive dominance in fields that are within the 
concurrent legislative list violate the principle of autonomy of the levels of government 
which is a cardinal tenet of federalism. Autonomy, in this context implies unfettered 
discretion in the exercise of executive and legislative authority over matters assigned to 
the states under the Constitution. It implies the ability of each state to, as far as is 
practicable, take charge of matters pertaining to its own territory.
27
 “The separate and 
autonomous existence” of each level of government and “the plenary character” of the 
powers assigned to it on specific matters by the constitution, necessarily imply that “the 
exercise of those powers is not to be impeded, obstructed or otherwise interfered with by 
the other government while acting within its own powers.”28 
The existing constitutional framework for the division of powers and resources impinges 
on the ability of each state of the federation to exercise effective and efficient control 
over its own internal affairs and determine its own destiny. This frustrating inability of 
the states to effectively manage their internal affairs is a major reason for many of the 
ethnic and intergovernmental conflicts that have dogged Nigerian federalism since the 
country’s return to civil rule in 1999. 
The autonomy of the constituent states of a federation is a cardinal principle of federalism 
that has garnered tremendous traction over the years. The Supreme Court of Nigeria has 
also pronounced on its importance in a long line of cases.
29
 Its significance as a principle 
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 See J. Isawa Elaigwu, ‘Federal Republic of Nigeria’ in Akhtar Majeed et al eds., (note 1 supra) p.229. 
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of federalism lies not only in its necessity for effective and efficient regional governance 
but also in its potential to act as a formidable check on the arbitrary exercise of power by 
the federal government. Its utility as a potent means of curtailing the excesses of the 
federal government makes it an indispensable asset in any federation. 
Tragically, save for its passing pronouncements on the subject in a number of cases,
30
 the 
Judiciary has had limited influence on the federal system of government in Nigeria. 
Although the role of the Courts in judicial review is well established in the Nigerian 
constitution,
31
 and the Courts would have been in a position to greatly enhance federalism 
by giving judgments or making pronouncements that give effect to the autonomy of states 
in specific cases and in relation to specific issues, judicial review in this context is 
constrained by two principal factors. First, the courts in Nigeria are expected to interpret 
the constitution as it is, not as it should be. This was emphasized in the well known case 
of Olawoyin v. Commissioner of Police where the Court held, inter alia, that “the 
function of the Court is to answer the questions refered to it by interpreting the 
constitution as it stands..”32Thus, in Nigeria, even when the court is minded to give effect 
to federal tenets, its power to do this is constrained by the highly centralized division of 
powers set out in the constitution. The Court cannot give a decision that is clearly at 
variance with the actual division of powers contained in the constitution. The courts can 
only affirm state autonomy in cases where the constitution clearly and unambiguously 
confers autonomy on the states in respect of specific matters.   
Second, unless specific issues concerning the division of powers set out in the 
constitution are brought before the courts, the courts cannot pronounce on those issues 
suo motu. The courts can only pronounce on issues properly brought before them by 
concerned parties.
33
 As such, questions on the division of powers set out in the 
constitution can only be determined by the Nigerian Courts when such questions are 
specifically formulated for the Courts to answer. The debate on Nigerian federalism has 
been mostly conducted outside the courtroom- at conferences, town hall meetings, the 
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media, and village gatherings. The influence of the Nigerian judiciary on the federal 
system of government in Nigeria has thus tended to be limited.   
The overall implication of the 1999 constitution’s division of powers among the levels of 
government is that the federal government is the actual custodian and repository of power 
in the federation. The state and local governments are, in reality, no more than powerless 
appendages of the federal government. This power distribution paradigm reflects the 
military and centralist orientation of the constitution’s framers. It has, in fact, been argued 
that the division of powers under the 1999 constitution is “aimed more at protecting a 
military past than shaping a democratic future.”34 It would be recalled from the 
discussion in chapter three that a major problem associated with military rule in Nigeria 
prior to 1999 was its marked centralization of powers. The centralist policy of that era 
and its attendant centripetal monopoly of power were transferred to the 1999 constitution 
by the military framers of the constitution.    
Along with the centralization of powers described above, there is also a simultaneous 
centralization of fiscal resources and fiscal authority under the 1999 constitution. Among 
other things, the constitution invests the federal government with authority to exclusively 
exercise legislative and executive powers over issues such as “borrowing of monies 
within or outside Nigeria for the purposes of the federation or of any state.”35 The federal 
government is also exclusively empowered to oversee trade and commerce, including the 
registration of companies and business names in all parts of Nigeria.  
In addition, virtually all the significant and productive taxes of the federation including  
stamp duties; taxation of incomes, profits and gains; corporation tax; petroleum profits 
tax; oil royalties; fees and licenses; customs and excise duties; export duties; as well as 
personal income tax, are within the exclusive or dominant control of the federal 
government.
36
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 Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu, ‘Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria: Issues, Challenges and Prospects’ 
TNV News 31 May 2009 <https://www.thenigerianvoice.com/news/9501/democratic-consolidation-in-
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 See Part 1 of Schedule II of the 1999 constitution. 
36
 See Parts 1 and 2 of the 2
nd
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The constitution does not specifically assign any tax power to the states. The local 
governments are however constitutionally empowered to collect and manage a number of 
insignificant fees, rates and levies, the most significant of which is the tenement rates on 
privately owned houses.
37
  
The constitution establishes a ‘Federation Account’ into which all revenues of the 
federation, including proceeds from all taxes collected throughout the country, are 
deposited and later shared among the levels of government.
38
 From this account, vertical 
and horizontal sharing of revenue is done according to an allocation formula solely 
formulated by the federal government.
39
 This allocation formula assigns 56 percent of the 
centrally generated tax revenue to the federal government while 24 percent and 20 
percent are allocated to the thirty six (36) states of the federation and the seven hundred 
and seventy four (774) local governments respectively.
40
 
The 24 percent allocation due to the States is distributed among the thirty six states using 
certain allocation criteria outlined in the constitution. These are “population, equality of 
States, internal revenue generation, land mass, terrain, and population density.”41 The 
distribution of the 20 per cent allocation among the seven hundred and seventy four local 
governments is similarly done using the same criteria listed above.
42
 
However, as mentioned in chapter three, apart from the fact that some of these revenue 
sharing criteria were arbitrarily entrenched in the constitution and have been arbitrarily 
used for revenue allocation in Nigeria since the colonial and military eras without any 
serious consultation with the constituent states of the federation, the criteria themselves 
have been notoriously controversial due to strong disagreements about their precise value 
or exact quantification.  
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For instance, population has been a very controversial issue in Nigeria since the colonial 
era.
43
 Indeed, there has never been any generally accepted census figure in the history of 
Nigeria.
44
 Census, a matter within the exclusive legislative list, has been centrally 
undertaken by the federal government since Nigeria’s independence. Its central 
management makes it susceptible to manipulation by the majority ethnic groups that are 
usually in control of the federal government. Historically, population figures have been 
widely disputed by minority ethnic groups who accuse the majority ethnic groups of 
manipulating the figures to favour themselves in revenue sharing.
45
  
Other revenue sharing criteria such as “land mass” and “terrain” are vague terminologies 
that are not clarified by the constitution. The vagueness, opacity, inexactitude, 
imprecision and controversy associated with these criteria provide a compelling case for 
their review and possible replacement with clearer and more transparent revenue sharing 
approaches that have been jointly agreed by the constituent units of the federation. 
The above represents Nigeria’s existing fiscal architecture. Clearly, the intention of the 
constitution’s framers was to concentrate control of the federation’s fiscal resources in 
the federal government, and thus guarantee its financial supremacy and hegemony vis a 
vis the other levels of government. The ability of the states and local governments to 
generate their own revenue and manage their own affairs is, by this arrangement, severely 
constrained, since they are forced to rely on and work with the fiscal subventions they 
periodically receive from the federal government.  
4.1.2.1. Power in Respect of Mines and Minerals 
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Thus far, I have discussed the controversial and undemocratic centralization of powers 
and fiscal resources under the 1999 constitution. This discussion will however be 
incomplete without a further discussion of the centripetal assignment of one power that 
graphically typifies Nigeria’s highly centralist political arrangement. This is the power to 
manage and legislate in respect of mines and minerals throughout the federation. It is 
pertinent to specially highlight and discuss this for one major reason; no other matter has 
generated the magnitude of conflict, acrimony and nationwide agitation that the exclusive 
assignment of this power to the federal government has induced since the return of 
Nigeria to civil rule in 1999.  
Since 1999, violent militancy has become commonplace in the Niger Delta,
46
 the region 
of Nigeria where the hydrocarbon deposits that fetch Nigeria more than “90 percent of 
export earnings and over 70 percent of government revenues”47 are located. The Niger 
Delta militancy is part of a nationwide clamour for a reassignment of the power over 
mines and minerals to the states in order to enable each state of the federation to exercise 
effective control over the exploration and exploitation of natural and mineral resources 
located within its territory.
48
 
The agitation for ‘resource control’ in the Niger Delta, in fact, predates 1999. As far back 
as 1990, the Ogoni Bill of Rights had been drawn up and published by the people of 
Ogoni land in the Niger Delta. Among other things, the Bill declared the right of the 
Ogoni people to “political autonomy,” and the right “to the control and use of a fair 
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proportion of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development.”49 The preamble to this 
Bill of Rights emphasized that colonialism forced the Ogonis into the Nigerian union and 
that they have benefited nothing from this union. It specifically pointed out that the 
Ogoni people were not adequately represented in federal institutions, they lacked health, 
education and other social facilities including electricity and pipe borne water. And their 
people were unemployed.
50
 Importantly, the preamble accused the federal government of 
transferring “Ogoni wealth exclusively to other parts of the Republic.”51 The Ogoni Bill 
of Rights is still prominently displayed on the website of the Movement for the Survival 
of the Ogoni people (MOSOP),
52
 a testament to the ongoing topicality of the issues raised 
in it and the commitment of the Ogoni people to the realization of their desire for political 
and fiscal autonomy.   
It was, however, the Kaiama Declaration of the Ijaw people of the Niger Delta in 1998 
that seriously drew public attention to the Niger Delta struggle for resource control. 
Following the precedent already set by the Ogoni Bill of Rights, the Kaiama Declaration 
emphasized that “all lands and natural resources (including mineral resources) within the 
Ijaw territory belong to the Ijaw communities.”53 The Declaration decried the “socio-
political, economic, cultural and psychological deprivations” the Ijaw people were 
suffering and demanded that the Niger Delta people be allowed full “self-government and 
resource control.”54 
In spite of this loud clamour for regional control of mineral resources however, the 
framers of the 1999 constitution nevertheless proceeded to exclusively assign power over 
mines and minerals to the federal government.
55
 The implication of this is that even 
though the mineral oils and resources are located within the territory of the states, the 
power to manage and legislate in respect of their exploration and exploitation shall be 
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exercised solely and exclusively by the federal government. This is notwithstanding the 
fact that the lands under which these mineral resources are located are actually ancestral 
lands that had belonged to indigenous communities several centuries before the creation 
of Nigeria by British colonialists in the 19
th
 century.   
The exclusive exercise of this power by the federal government is the cause of the 
widespread militancy, tension and conflict in the Niger Delta today. The leaders and 
people of the Niger Delta have steadfastly rejected this constitutional arrangement which 
they regard as an encroachment on their autonomy, that is, their right to exercise 
discretionary control over their territory and their natural resources.    
Ethnic associations, civil society groups, political leaders and social commentators have 
consistently condemned the constitution’s exclusive assignment of the power to control 
mineral resources to the federal government. For instance, Bola Tinubu, former Governor 
of Lagos State has argued that the exercise of power by States over resources located 
within their territories is “a fundamental characteristic of true federalism.” According to 
him, the states of the federation “are crying for devolution. They are tired of a federal 
government which prospers from their poverty. They want a change. They want to 
control their resources. They want to control their destinies…Over-centralization of 
powers and resources is the greatest bane of the Nigerian polity today.”56 He 
consequently argued for a transfer of “ownership, control and development of all natural, 
solid mineral and agricultural resources to the states.”57 
The views expressed above are no different from those expressed at a grand conference 
of the people of the Niger Delta in December 2009. At that conference, the Bayelsa state 
government emphatically declared that the people of Bayelsa, a state in the Niger Delta, 
wanted constitutional recognition of “absolute control and ownership of the resources of 
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the state….and the state’s retention of hundred percent of the revenue accruing from such 
resources.”58  
Arguing in a similar vein in May 2015, Aminosari Dokubo, the leader of the Niger Delta 
People’s Volunteer Front (NDPVF), a militant group operating in the Niger Delta, 
declared that the main agenda of his group was to facilitate the secession of the Niger 
Delta from the rest of Nigeria unless the states of that region were allowed to exercise 
total control over their resources. Among other things he declared: 
 
“our struggle indeed is about our collective freedom from a false and forced colonial 
union that has remained divided and unintegrated. It is about our being conferred with a 
slave status and seen as a conquered people who must exist at the mercy of the overlords 
and supremacist class….That is why we must now stand up like the Scottish to determine 
our going forward…and reject our oppressors. Let us state very emphatically that…our 
minimum expectation and demand as a people is and remains 100 percent control of our 
resources or nothing.”59  
 
 
And in August 2017, popular Niger Delta activist, Sam Ebolo emphasized that 
  
 
“Niger Deltans should be given the chance to control their resources. That is the only 
justice that can guarantee our peaceful co-existence as a people living in this country”60 
 
The struggle for autonomy in the Niger Delta is in part fueled by the perception that 
revenues derived from oil exploitation in the Niger Delta, a minority region located in 
Southern Nigeria, is largely used to fund infrastructure development in the more 
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populous parts of Nigeria, while the Niger Delta itself wallows in extreme poverty and 
squalor.
61
 It would be recalled from the discussion above that population is one of the 
major factors used in revenue sharing in Nigeria. 
Important as the agitation for regional control of mines and mineral resources is however, 
we must not lose sight of the fact that it is part of a wider struggle for comprehensive 
regional autonomy in Nigeria. Thus, efforts to reform Nigeria’s federalism must be 
holistic. Such efforts must not be limited to addressing the issue of power over mines and 
minerals alone, it must comprehensively address the flawed character of the existing 
political and fiscal arrangement as a whole and seek to fashion out a division of powers 
and fiscal resources that is truly consistent with the idea of federalism and the wishes of 
the Nigerian people.  
The clamour for regional autonomy has never been more strident than it has been in 
recent years. For instance, in 2014, the Yoruba people in South Western Nigeria 
demanded for “a restructuring of the Nigerian federation into regional autonomy, or an 
outright dissolution of the federation.”62 This was not a new demand. A similar demand   
had been made by Yoruba leaders and traditional rulers in 2005. In their 2005 Yoruba 
Agenda, they emphasized that “with regard to all matters of economy, internal security 
and social responsibilities, the Yoruba yearn to be autonomous.”63 They also declared 
that the Yoruba region “shall have control over its destiny and shall be the master of its 
internal affairs.”64  
Thus far, the foregoing discussion on the allocation of powers and fiscal resources under 
the 1999 constitution portrays Nigeria’s federal system as highly centralized and highly 
undemocratic. The discussion also shows a general public disenchantment with this 
power distribution arrangement. It must be stated that this highly problematic division of 
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powers and fiscal resources in the 1999 constitution is a direct consequence of the 
unilateral formulation of the constitution by a tiny clique of military adventurers and their 
civilian collaborators on the eve of the return to civil rule in 1999. A more inclusive and 
democratic constitution making process would have afforded the Nigerian people the 
opportunity to put forward and thoroughly debate proposals for a more acceptable 
division of powers among the levels of government. It would have afforded the various 
parts of Nigeria the opportunity to negotiate and agree among themselves, the power 
distribution framework that would best serve their collective interests. And this would 
have certainly prevented the adoption of the centralist division of powers that now 
hallmarks the 1999 Constitution. 
As we shall see below, the centralist distribution of powers in the1999 constitution is also 
reflected in the nature of the Fiscal Commission established by the constitution to 
undertake the very sensitive and important task of managing revenue allocation among 
the levels of government in the federation. 
No doubt, the major problem of Nigeria’s federal system, as it stands today, is its 
centralist character and orientation, especially its conception of political power as the 
preserve of an elitist and hegemonic ruling class. This, we have seen, is evidently 
manifest in the concentration of powers in the federal government, and the tendency for 
important decisions affecting the federation and all its constituent units to be taken 
unilaterally by the federal government without consulting with or securing the consent of 
other levels of government or the Nigerian people. 
4.1.2.2   Centralized Fiscal Commission 
As noted in Section 4.1.2 above, a further instance of centralization of power under the 
1999 constitution is seen in the nature of the Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal 
Commission (RMAFC), established by the constitution to monitor and manage inter and 
intra-tier allocation of revenue among the levels of government in the federation. The 
Commission is also charged with the task of periodically reviewing and devising revenue 
allocation criteria and formula for the entire Federation.
65
 The National Assembly, an 
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organ of the federal government, is constitutionally charged with ultimately ratifying or 
modifying whatever revenue allocation policy is devised by the commission.
66
 
However, as sensitive and important as the constitutional responsibility of this 
Commission is, the Constitution invests the President of the federation with exclusive and 
discretionary power to appoint its members.
67
 The constituent units of the federation have 
no constitutional say in who becomes a member of the Commission despite the fact that 
the important work of the Commission has significant implications for the fiscal survival 
of every part of the federation, and revenue allocation among the levels of government 
has always been one of the most contentious issues in inter-governmental relations in 
Nigeria.  
The constitution’s exclusive assignment of the power to appoint members of the 
Commission to the President renders the Commission susceptible to political pressure 
and manipulation as the President, who is the appointing authority, could use his 
discretionary power of appointment to fill the Commission with his cronies and political 
acolytes who would be amenable to his control and direction. Indeed, a major danger of 
having the President exercise such wide discretionary powers in respect of appointments 
to the Commission is the possibility of having a pliant Fiscal Commission that could 
connive with the federal government to undermine or shortchange the state and local 
governments by devising revenue allocation policies that will consistently foster the 
fiscal and political hegemony of the federal government.        
One other problem with RMAFC is its modus operandi. Nothing in the constitution 
obliges the Commission to consult with or invite the participation of the state and local 
governments, as well as the people of Nigeria in its decision-making processes. Yet, its 
decisions or recommendations have significant and far-reaching consequences for these 
sub-national governments.  
The point being made here is that the Commission, as established by the 1999 
constitution, is highly susceptible to the control and manipulation of the federal 
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government. It is thus not essentially different from previous fiscal commissions 
established during the colonial and military eras. It will be recalled, from our discussion 
in chapter three, that the ad hoc fiscal commissions set up during the colonial and 
military eras were similarly centrally controlled and exclusively managed.  
A fiscal commission set up to take important and consequential decisions regarding 
financial arrangements for an ethnically diverse federation ought to be constitutionally 
obligated to consult widely in order to ensure that its decisions on the federation’s fiscal 
arrangements genuinely reflect the wishes of the diverse peoples that make up the 
federation. A fiscal commission that takes decisions unilaterally is certainly not the ideal 
institutional design for a heterogeneous federation like Nigeria.  
The flaws identified above in the nature of RMAFC, that is, the unilateral mode of 
appointing its members by the President of the federation, and the unilateral manner in 
which the Commission could actually carry out its duties under the constitution, despite 
the sensitive nature of its work, make the Commission susceptible to political 
manipulation, corruption and inefficiency. We shall discuss this in greater detail in 
Chapter five.           
Thus far, the discussion in this chapter reveals a Nigerian power distribution architecture 
that is strikingly conservative and centralist in character. Its defining features, as 
discussed above, strongly suggest that the framers of the 1999 constitution were 
deliberately determined to concentrate political and fiscal powers in the hands of the 
federal government and make the state and local governments completely dependent and 
reliant on the federal government for their survival.  
What were the reasons for the adoption and entrenchment of this approach by the framers 
of the constitution? How has this approach fared in welding together a country marked by 
ethnic and socio-cultural diversity? And what are the arguments against this approach? I 
turn to these issues in the next section. 
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4.2. Justification for the Centralist Approach; The “Unity and Stability” Argument 
A major argument often advanced for the centralized division of powers and fiscal 
resources in Nigeria is that of “unity and stability.”68 Protagonists of this argument create 
the impression that the unity and stability of Nigeria is best promoted and preserved by 
concentrating the most significant powers of the federation in the hands of the federal 
government which, in their view, is in the best position to deploy power fairly among the 
constituent units of the federation, and thus ensure that no part of the country lags behind 
the others in terms of development. This approach, it is claimed, will forestall unhealthy 
rivalry among the constituent units of the federation and thus help to promote Nigeria’s 
unity as well as its political and economic stability.
69
 
But how tenable is the “unity and stability” argument? How cogent is it as justification 
for centralization in a multi-ethnic and heterogeneous society like Nigeria? And how well 
has centralization actually promoted or helped in achieving unity and stability in Nigeria? 
These are the questions which protagonists of the “unity and stability” argument appear 
to often overlook or deliberately ignore. 
The “Unity and stability” argument first gained currency in the aftermath of the ill-fated 
1966 military coup d’etat,70 but became particularly pronounced in the wake of the 
Nigerian civil war (1967-1970), following perceptions that Eastern Nigeria was 
emboldened to declare its secession from Nigeria because of the substantial powers and 
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fiscal resources available to regional governments under the 1963 constitution.
71
 General 
Yakubu Gowon, the then Head of the country’s military government alluded to this in a 
broadcast he made at the end of the civil war.
72
 According to him, “under the old (1963) 
constitution, the regions were so large and powerful as to consider themselves self-
sufficient and almost entirely independent. The federal government which ought to give 
lead to the whole country was relegated to the background.”73 Consequently, it was 
thought that in order to prevent future secessionist attempts, the country’s political 
stability and unity should be secured by investing the federal government with more 
powers vis a vis the regional governments.
74
 Several powers hitherto exercised by the 
regional governments were subsequently transferred to and vested in the federal 
government over the next few years.
75
  
Decree 1 of 1966, the first law promulgated by the military following the coup d’etat of 
that year was in fact very emphatic in its arrogation of the powers of the entire federation 
to the federal military government. The Decree guaranteed the power of the federal 
government to “make laws for the peace, order and good government of Nigeria or any 
part thereof with respect to any matter whatsoever.”76 It further prohibited the Military 
Governors assigned to each state of the federation from making any law without the 
consent of the federal government.
77
 With a law like this, the military was sure of 
achieving its vision of ensuring the unity and stability of the Nigerian federation.  
A Revenue Allocation Commission set up by the Federal Military Government in 1968 
succinctly captured the “unity and stability” philosophy underlining the policies of the 
federal government when it said: 
“we believe that fiscal arrangements in this country should reflect the new spirit of unity 
to which the nation is dedicated…..It is in the spirit of this new found unity that we 
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should view all the sources of revenue of this country as the common funds of the 
country to be used for executing the kinds of program which can maintain this unity”78  
 
Powers and fiscal resources which were hitherto regional were consequently brought 
under the jurisdiction of the federal government. The aim was to ensure, as much as 
possible, the political and financial supremacy of the federal government vis a vis the 
state governments in order to keep the country politically and economically united and 
forestall future secessionist activities, among other reasons.
79
 
Unfortunately, the ‘unity and stability’ argument for centralization has, since then, 
remained a cardinal influence in successive constitutional arrangements in Nigeria. 
Professor Ben Nwabueze who was, at the time of drafting the 1979 constitution, an 
advocate of federal government dominance, but who has since denounced that approach, 
has given a revealing insight into why and how the federal government was invested with 
all the significant powers of the federation under the 1979 constitution. According to him: 
“Everybody in the Constitution Drafting Committee was so overwhelmed with this 
feeling, this patriotic feeling that we needed unity and the most effective way to achieve 
unity of the country was by having a very strong central government. Most of us in the 
committee shared that idea at the time. Chief Williams shared it because of the patriotism 
in us and we wanted a united Nigeria, we felt we could achieve unity by having a strong 
central government. Then, what did we do to achieve our misguided objective? We took 
away 50 per cent of the items on the concurrent list and gave it to the centre. We felt that 
by doing this, we were establishing unity. We did not stop at that. We looked at the 
residual matters, these are matters exclusive to the states, we took a large part of it, more 
than 30 percent and close to 50 percent; we took it away from the states and gave to the 
centre. And the result is the almighty federal government. But what we discovered was 
that instead of producing unity, we produced disunity because of the intensity of the 
struggle to control the centre, and the misuse or abuse of the power. The intensity of the 
struggle and the abuse of the power is so much. It is not just the political power that was 
concentrated at the centre, much of the money also went to the centre….Too much 
money at the centre increased the struggle for the control of the centre and the incidence 
of abuse.”80 
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Turning to the power allocation structure under the current 1999 constitution, Nwabueze 
goes on to argue that: 
“the marked imbalance in the power and financial relations between the federal and state 
governments originated in the 1979 constitution and the belief among its makers, since 
belied by experience, that a concentration of powers and financial resources in the federal 
government would bring about national unity and progress. The lesson from that 
experience shows that an over-strong national government increases the intensity of the 
competition for its control, with a consequent undermining of national unity and stability. 
It also increases the incidence of corruption and the perversion of power, with a 
consequent undermining of progress.”81 
   
In actual fact, the unity argument did not emerge for the first time in 1979 as suggested 
by Professor Nwabueze in the statement quoted above. Rather, as earlier mentioned in 
this chapter, it antedated 1979. As far back as 1966, the military authorities and their 
civilian acolytes had invoked the same ‘unity and stability’ argument while issuing the so 
called “unification decree” to abolish federalism and merge together the administration 
and finances of all parts of Nigeria, with the aim of foisting a unitary political 
arrangement on the entire country.
82The 1966 Decree was designed to “force unity on 
Nigerians”83 by ignoring ethnic identity and de-emphasizing diversity. As would be 
expected, the promulgation of this Decree turned out to be a huge political misadventure. 
The inter-ethnic violence that greeted its enactment led to the collapse of the military 
junta that conceived the idea, and ultimately compelled the termination of the unification 
(unitary) policy.
84
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After the civil war in 1970, the “unity and stability argument” was exhumed and again 
deployed in justifying the policy of centralization that the military authorities 
subsequently introduced and established over the next three decades. 
 
As we have seen in the statements credited to Professor Nwabueze above, the ‘unity and 
stability’ sentiment evidently influenced the power distribution framework entrenched in 
the 1979 constitution, and the subsequent 1999 constitution. This power distribution 
framework  is designed to establish and entrench the political and financial hegemony of 
the federal government in the supposed hope that this would enhance its capacity to keep 
Nigeria together in ‘unity’ as one indivisible country.85 
The foregoing indicates that the centralist approach to governance in Nigeria is hinged on 
the perception that Nigeria’s political and economic stability as well as the country’s 
unity or oneness are contingent on a centripetal governance paradigm that establishes and 
entrenches the dominance of the federal (central) government over the other levels of 
government in the federation.
86
  
The main protagonists of centralization in Nigeria today are former military rulers and 
their erstwhile civilian collaborators, most of who have found their way back into 
government in the current political dispensation. For this group, the political and 
economic stability of Nigeria necessitates “a strong and interventionist central 
government” that would “keep the country together and provide leadership in 
development.”87 Constitutional division of powers must therefore be structured to ensure 
that policies of government throughout the federation are mostly determined centrally 
and executed uniformly.
88
 
However, the centralist approach to federal governance raises more questions than 
answers in the context of a multi-ethnic and diverse country like Nigeria. In fact, as I 
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discuss below, the glaring defects of this approach and the potential problems associated 
with it make its adoption by the framers of the 1999 constitution untenable.    
4.3. Critique of the Centralist Approach 
4.3.1. Distorted Idea of Unity 
 A major problem with the centralist approach to federal governance in Nigeria is its 
predication on a distorted and problematic idea of unity. Its fixation on homogeneity and 
uniformity despite the glaring evidence of the country’s pronounced diversity, betrays a 
flawed understanding of the Nigerian state and its complex history.  
Unity cannot be foisted on a multi-ethnic society, neither can it be decreed into existence. 
Unity is an ideal that evolves and crystallizes over time. Even then, the quality of unity in 
an ethnically diverse society will always be determined by that society’s willingness to 
acknowledge diversity. It is this recognition and accommodation of diversity that imbues 
genuine unity with its pristine sublimity. As oxymoronic as it sounds, unity and diversity 
are not mutually exclusive categories in a society with diverse cultures, beliefs, 
orientations, and needs, if the right approach is adopted and deployed.  
A ‘unity at all cost’ approach, pursued with a strategy of exclusion will always be 
counter-productive in Nigeria’s ethnically diverse milieu. The bane of the current 
approach, in my estimation, is its failure to sufficiently acknowledge Nigeria’s history 
and diversity in terms of the needs, economic interests, political aspirations, culture, and 
religious orientation of its constituent units.  
An approach that fails to recognize the constituent units of the federation as significant 
stakeholders in policy formulation and essentially denies them any meaningful ability to 
independently actualize their political aspirations, in a bid to create an artificial 
semblance of unity and stability, is certainly bound to produce the opposite effect. The 
assumption underpinning the adoption of the centralist approach to federal governance in 
Nigeria is thus certainly flawed and faulty.  
Rather than produce unity and stability, the centralist approach to federal governance has 
the potential to create several problems for the Nigerian State. One of these, as Professor 
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Nwabueze pointed out above, is the unhealthy competition for the power(s) at the centre. 
Others include the inefficient and ineffective provision of public goods and services in 
the state and local governments of the federation, and the susceptibility of centralized 
governance to fraud, opacity and manipulation. These and other potential problems that 
would be discussed below are capable of creating disunity, conflict, and instability in 
Nigeria. They indicate that the centralist approach to federal governance is often fraught 
with potential pitfalls and short-comings that render it untenable as a viable governance 
model for Nigeria. I will now examine each of these issues in turn. 
4.3.2. Unhealthy Competition for Power. 
In the checkered history of Nigeria, a major problem associated with the centralist 
approach is its tendency to encourage unhealthy competition for power at the centre. The 
concentration of powers and fiscal resources at the centre has, for decades, incentivized 
an unhealthy scramble among the constituent units of the federation for political offices 
at the centre.
89
 This scramble for political offices at the centre is often fueled by the 
widely held belief that the ethnic groups from which the key leaders of the central 
government emerge automatically gain access to unrivalled political and financial 
patronage over and above other ethnic groups.
90
 Conversely, ethnic groups that are 
unable to win elections or secure important political offices at the centre are invariably 
marginalized fiscally and politically.
91
  
This belief, which is often reinforced by actual instances of nepotism and ethnic 
favoritism perpetrated by leaders of the central government,
92
 propels a frenetic struggle 
for ascendancy among the ethnic groups. It instigates rancorous competition among them 
for the power and fiscal resources concentrated at the centre.
93
 Indeed, it is often a major 
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cause of bitter inter-ethnic rivalry marked by political assassinations, campaigns of ethnic 
hatred, electoral malpractices, bribery and corruption. Competition for the highest offices 
in the country is often considered a matter of life and death among the country’s ethnic 
groups and among politicians. Indeed, a former President of Nigeria once declared that 
wining an election was, for him, his ethnic group, and his political party, “a do or die 
affair.”94  
Prof Claude Ake captured this point impeccably when he wrote that interactions among 
the ethnic groups in Nigeria are “essentially relations of raw power in which right tends 
to be co-existensive with power and security depends on the control of power. The 
struggle for power… is everything and is pursued by every means.”95 
Writing in the same vein, another scholar declares that “Nigerian politics is largely a 
struggle for the privatization of the State to the benefit of personal or sectional interests. 
Since election outcomes in Nigeria greatly determine access to power and to the 
enormous resources controlled by the state (in this case the central government),  
electoral contests often extend beyond the electoral space and are conducted in ways that 
undermine the rule of law. In this way, elections are inevitably akin to war, and therefore, 
prone to manipulation and violence.”96 
The import of the foregoing is that in Nigeria, the idea that centralization fosters unity is 
not supported by the available evidence. Instead, centralization has been a source of 
division and rancour, driving wedges between ethnic groups and threatening the 
corporate existence of the country. Rather than establish unity and stability, centralization 
in Nigeria has accentuated age-long ethnic differences and has pitched ethnic groups 
against each other as they compete for the power and wealth concentrated in the central 
government. 
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4.3.3. Impediment to Effective and Efficient Local Governance 
Apart from its tendency to foster disunity and unhealthy competition for power, 
centralization also carries with it the tendency to impede or constrain effective and 
efficient provision of public goods and services at the sub-national levels of government. 
For instance, states and local governments are more likely to be better informed about the 
needs of their constituents, and are thus in the best position to devise suitable policies to 
meet these needs.
97
 Federal dominance in policy making, as a result of the centralized 
allocation of powers and financial resources in the constitution, may hamper the efficient 
and effective provision of some public goods and services in local communities, since 
federal policy makers may not be sufficiently familiar with the exact needs of particular 
local communities.
98
 It may thus not be uncommon to see local communities that are 
having to grapple with federal programs, policies or projects that are ineffective, 
inefficiently executed, or completely out of sync with local aspirations.  
A typical example of this in Nigeria is the centralized provision of security and policing 
functions throughout the country. Under the constitution, the federal government is 
assigned the power to exclusively legislate and provide police services in every part of 
the country.
99
 Policing in the local communities is a service that may be better provided 
by the state or local governments who know the security issues and needs of their 
constituents better than a federal government whose seat is in the federal capital territory.  
The high level of insecurity in Nigeria may not be unconnected with this illogical and 
impolitic centralization of police services. 
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4.3.4. Impediment to Local Initiative and Creativity 
 As already shown in this chapter, the existing federal arrangement in Nigeria is 
characterized by centralization of public services and a high dependence on fiscal 
transfers from the federal government to the state and local governments.
100
 But from all 
indications, federal fiscal transfers are often grossly inadequate to enable states and local 
governments perform their constitutional obligations.
101
 Many state governments have 
complained that fiscal transfers from the federal government are barely sufficient to pay 
salaries of state workers, talk less of funding infrastructure development and social 
service delivery.
102
 As a result, they are unable to fulfill their constitutional obligations to 
their constituents. Many of them constantly struggle to keep up with salary 
commitments.
103
 
Centralization of public services and fiscal resources has created a culture of “fiscal 
laziness” among the state and local governments and has tended to discourage creativity 
in regional policy making and revenue generation, since all states and local governments 
are guaranteed some fiscal transfers from the federal government every month.
104
 The 
federal government in turn generates the bulk of its revenue from the sale of crude oil in 
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the Niger Delta. Thus, the entire country depends on the oil in the Niger Delta, when, in 
fact, each state of the federation can potentially generate substantial revenue for itself 
from responsible taxation, agriculture, and the exploitation of its own mineral resources. 
Table 3 below shows that every state in Nigeria is naturally endowed with one mineral 
resource or the other from which it can potentially raise substantial revenue to finance 
development projects and provide public goods and services within its territory. 
4.3.5. Impediment to Local Accountability and Fiscal Prudence. 
Apart from the deleterious effect that centralization might have on local policy and fiscal 
creativity, centralization could also constitute a disincentive to local accountability. In a 
political milieu where the constitution assigns to the federal government practically all 
the significant powers and fiscal resources of the federation, and the state and local 
governments depend on, and are guaranteed, regular fiscal transfers from the federal 
government, there may be no incentive for local political leaders to be politically and 
financially accountable to their constituents. In essence, federal dominance of the 
political and fiscal spheres may dis-incentivize political and financial accountability at 
the state and local levels of government. Non performing local leaders may blame their 
own irresponsible or abysmal performance in office on federal incompetence or 
insufficient fiscal transfers from the federal government.  
And since the states and local governments know that they are guaranteed some form of 
fiscal subvention from the federal government every month, the incentive for prudent and 
responsible spending is removed. This can result in embezzlement of public funds or 
wasteful and indulgent expenditure. Such wasteful spending of scarce financial resources 
and criminal embezzlement of public funds have, in fact, been commonplace under the 
current political dispensation in Nigeria.
105
 Since they are not responsible for generating 
the revenue that they expend, many state governors and local government chairmen have 
had no trouble engaging in profligate spending and embezzlement of funds meant for 
financing projects in their constituencies.     
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4.3.6. Arbitrariness in the exercise of Federal Powers. 
Centralization of powers and resources also tends to facilitate arbitrariness in the exercise 
of the powers of the federal government. For instance, in a political environment like 
Nigeria where a state or local government’s access to federal patronage is often 
dependent on the State Governor or Local Government Chairman’s membership of the 
federal ruling party, states or local governments controlled by opposition parties may 
encounter significant obstacles in their bid to secure the provision of centrally 
administered public goods or financial resources for their constituents. 
Two areas in which this sort of federal arbitrariness is often manifest in Nigeria are in the 
disbursement of federal grants in aid, and in the exercise of the borrowing powers of the 
federation. It is well known that two alternative sources of funding for the states are 
public loans, and federal grants-in-aid. But these may often be inaccessible to state and 
local governments controlled by opposition political parties because access to these 
financial instruments is tightly and centrally controlled by the federal government. 
Constitutionally, the disbursement of federal grants-in-aid to sub-national governments is 
at the federal government’s discretion,106 a condition that renders the administration of 
the grants prone to the vagaries of politics. The implication of this is that state and local 
governments controlled by opposition political parties may be unable to secure fair access 
to the grants.  
Similarly, state governments that are constantly critical of policies of the federal 
government, and are thus perceived to be political ‘enemies’ of the federal government, 
may also be arbitrarily denied the grants for political reasons. In fact, the federal 
government has, on a number of occasions, deliberately denied states controlled by 
opposition political parties of revenues that are even rightfully and legally theirs.
107
 If the 
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federal government could do this in respect of funds that legally belong to the states, it is 
certainly capable of doing worse in respect of funds that are disbursed at its discretion.  
A recent instance of discriminatory disbursement of federal grants was the exclusive 
allocation of ecological funds for the maintenance of the environment to states controlled 
by the ruling party while opposition or “unfriendly” states “got nothing.”108 According to 
the Governor of Kaduna State who subsequently chaired the committee that investigated 
the disbursements of the funds “…what President Jonathan did was to take N2bn each 
from the Ecological Fund and gave to some PDP states. Any PDP state that was not his 
friend…didn’t get. And all the..opposition parties (states)…got nothing.”109   
In the same vein, exclusive federal control of the borrowing powers of the entire 
federation implies that states cannot access bank loans for major capital projects or the 
provision of public services without the approval of the federal government.  As in the 
case of federal grants-in-aid, the ability of states to access loans may be adversely 
affected by politics. The potential impact of an abuse of exclusive federal control of 
borrowing powers is captured in statements credited to the Governors of Lagos and River 
States as recently as March 2015 and December 2013 respectively. According to the 
Lagos Governor; 
“Today the Honourable (federal) Minister for finance….has stopped Nigerian banks from 
funding state governments…, as if the needs of the people for roads, healthcare, drugs, 
education and security has stopped. She has insisted that in spite of individual appraisals 
of each bank by their credit committees, all state request for funding by banks must be 
approved by her Ministry. To the best of my knowledge, she has not granted any of the 
requests submitted to her for approval…..”110 
 
The Rivers State Governor was even more direct. While lamenting the inability of his 
State to access a World Bank loan for the provision of portable water for the people of 
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the State as a result of an alleged refusal by the federal minister of finance to approve the 
loan, the Governor declared in frustration that; 
 
“the (federal) Minister of finance…..is using her position to undermine the safety and 
health of the people of Rivers State…..The people who are dying and deprived of the 
potable drinking water are Rivers people who don’t have water in their homes….But the 
(federal) Minister of finance has refused to release (approve) it (the loan). They want 
Rivers people to die.”111  
 
It is instructive to note that the two Governors quoted above were opposition Governors 
at the time of making these statements. The foregoing shows that excessive 
centralization, the type that exists in Nigeria, may facilitate the arbitrary exercise and 
abuse of power, and undermine the effective and efficient delivery of local public goods 
and services. And this may adversely affect the quality of life available to citizens in the 
states and localities. 
 
4.3.7. Susceptibility of Centralization to Fraud, Opacity and Manipulation  
A further problem with Nigeria’s centralized power distribution architecture is its 
susceptibility to fraud and mismanagement. In Nigeria, the federal government has been 
known to make arbitrary and illegal withdrawals from the Federation Account which is 
jointly owned by the federal and state governments without consulting with the states. 
For instance, in 2008, it was discovered that Nigeria’s Federal Ministry of Finance had 
unilaterally diverted excess profits made from the sale of crude oil into a special account 
unilaterally created by the federal government without any consultation with the state 
governments. The federal government had then proceeded to make unilateral withdrawals 
from this special account (called Excess Crude Account (ECA)).
112
  
Further unilateral withdrawals were subsequently made from this account, ostensibly to 
fund projects initiated by the federal government. A suit filed at the Supreme Court by 
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the 36 States of the federation against the central government in 2008 challenging the 
constitutionality of the ECA and the unilateral diversion of revenues into it by the central 
government has suffered several setbacks at the court for political reasons and is yet to be 
decided.
113
  
The setting up of the ECA and the diversion of revenues into it by the federal government 
without the consent of the state and local governments is clearly unconstitutional. Section 
162(1) of the 1999 constitution is very clear on the compulsoriness of depositing all 
revenues of the federation in the Federation Account which belongs to the entire 
federation. According to that section of the constitution “the Federation shall maintain a 
special account to be called “the Federation Account” into which shall be paid all 
revenues collected by the government of the Federation…”114 “All revenues” in this 
context certainly includes surplus revenues made from crude oil sales by the federation. 
As a result, such revenues should, as a matter of law, be paid into the Federation Account 
and subsequently shared among the levels of government.  
The Excess Crude Account and all such extra-constitutional fiscal arrangements are 
unknown to the Nigerian constitution and thus clearly illegal. Even if an account like the 
ECA must be set up, an amendment of section 162(1) of the 1999 constitution will have 
to be effected with the consent of the state and local governments of the federation. And 
the management of such an account will have to be the joint responsibility of the federal, 
state and local governments. This is what is expected under a federal system of 
government. 
The arbitrariness of the federal government in relation to the ECA, as described above, 
further raises serious questions about the tenability and suitability of Nigeria’s centralized 
political and fiscal structure as an appropriate governance arrangement for the country. It 
raises questions about the compatibility of the country’s centralized political and fiscal 
arrnagements with the federal system of government.  
                                                          
113
 Tobi Soniyi, ‘No End in Sight to Resolving Dispute Over ECA as S’Court Adjourns Suit to October 18’ 
Thisday (9 March 2016)< http://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/03/09/no-end-in-sight-to-resolving-
dispute-over-eca-as-scourt-adjourns-suit-to-oct-18/> (accessed 11/11/2016). 
114
 See Section 162(1) 1999 constitution. 
151 
 
The susceptibility of Nigeria’s centralized political and fiscal system to manipulation and 
fraud is further underscored by recent revelations regarding massive looting and 
misappropriation of funds belonging to the entire federation by operatives of the federal 
government.
115
 As these revelations show, the country’s centralized political structure 
has, for several years, aided corruption and graft at the federal level to the detriment of 
the sub-national governments and their constituents.    
Thus, as the discussion in the last few paragraphs reveals, there are significant problems 
associated with the adoption of a centralized ‘federal’ system in Nigeria. Many of these 
problems have negative implications for the country’s democracy as well as its survival 
as a corporate entity. A ruling political party controlling all the levers of political and 
fiscal power at the centre can conveniently utilize this advantage to harass, victimize and 
muzzle opposition political parties and opposition states, as shown above.  
In particular, the federal (central) government can use its enormous political and fiscal 
powers to arbitrarily dispense patronage to those states and ethnic groups that support its 
policies to the detriment of those that are openly in opposition. Important social amenities 
can be deliberately withheld from those states and ethnic groups considered ‘hostile’ to 
the federal government.  
The concentration of political and fiscal powers in the federal government has, for several 
decades, fostered a culture of reckless struggle for power among the country’s ethnic 
groups, with each group battling to ‘capture’ power at the centre. Politics is perceived as 
a ‘war’ to be won, a ‘do or die affair.’ Those who lose out in this ‘war’ often threaten to 
secede from the federation. In many cases, these are the minority ethnic groups located in 
some states of the federation. They often lack the numerical and political strength to 
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‘capture’ power at the centre. Thus frustrated with a ‘federal’ system that seems 
structured to ensure their perpetual marginalization, they resort to violent secessionist 
struggles and other forms of ethnic conflicts.  
The import of the discussion thus far is that centralization of powers in Nigeria has 
created a problematic federal system that stifles democratic governance, establishes the 
dictatorship of the federal government, entrenches inefficiency, kills local creativity, 
encourages opacity and corruption, promotes arbitrariness, and threatens the very 
existence of the federation itself. The problems associated with centralization calls for a 
dismantling of the existing hegemonic ‘federal’ system and its replacement with a more 
democratic, sensitive, responsive and inclusive federal arrangement.  
In short, there is an urgent need to restructure the division of powers among the levels of 
government in Nigeria. But what should be the nature of this restructuring? How should 
it be done? And what should it entail? These and other issues form the subject matter of 
chapter five.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discussed the highly centralized division of powers and fiscal resources 
entrenched in the 1999 constitution of Nigeria as well as the supposed justification for 
this arrangement. As discussed in the chapter, the constitution establishes a federal 
system that is abnormally characterized by a high degree of centralization. This 
centralization manifests itself in two principal ways. The first is the manner in which the 
division of powers among the levels of government, as entrenched in the 1999 
constitution, was conceived, framed, adopted and promulgated. This directly implicates 
the framing, adoption and promulgation of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria itself.  
As discussed above, the 1999 constitution was exclusively conceived, exclusively 
framed, exclusively adopted and exclusively promulgated by military fiat. The people of 
Nigeria were neither consulted nor involved in the making of the constitution. As such, 
the constitution lacks the legitimacy required to command loyalty to and support for it. It 
is not an original act of the people, as expected of a constitution. Thus, everything 
contained in the constitution, including the division of powers and fiscal resources 
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entrenched in it, cannot be said to genuinely reflect the will of the Nigerian people as 
jointly and solemnly agreed by them. In short, the 1999 constitution and the power 
distribution arrangement set out in it cannot be regarded as an expression of the people’s 
covenant.  
The second marker of centralization in the 1999 constitution is the centripetal 
concentration of powers and fiscal resources in the federal government despite the 
ethnically diverse character of the Nigerian federation and the age-long clamour for 
autonomy by the constituent units. So centralized is the division of powers and resources 
in the constitution that matters that are of local interest and which ordinarily ought to be 
within the executive and legislative competence of the state and local governments are 
assigned to the federal government. In addition, the constitution allows the federal 
government to pre-empt or override the state governments in the exercise of powers that 
are within the concurrent jurisdiction of both levels of government.  
The centralist character of the 1999 constitution is further evident in the unilateralism that 
characterizes the operation of the fiscal system established by it. The constitution assigns 
to the federal government wide powers and discretion in the management of the fiscal 
system to the exclusion of the state governments. Yet, policy decisions in relation to the 
fiscal system often have significant implications for the lower levels of government. An 
instance of such unilateralism is seen in the constitution’s grant of discretionary power to 
the President of the federation to unilaterally appoint members of the country’s Fiscal 
Commission (RMAFC), and the absence of a constitutional provision mandating the 
Fiscal Commission to consult widely before taking important policy decisions that have 
significant implications throughout the federation. 
A major argument often adduced in support of Nigeria’s centralized “federal” 
arrangement is the need to preserve the country’s unity and stability. As shown in the 
chapter however, centralization has in fact done more to engender disunity and instability 
in the country. The concentration of powers and fiscal resources in the federal 
government has only served to intensify the unhealthy scramble for the control of the 
federal government. The result is a bitter and acrimonious rivalry among the ethnic 
groups, as each struggles to secure its own share of the “national cake.” The struggle for 
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power is often characterized by political assassinations, political marginalization, inter-
ethnic conflicts, and bare-faced criminal activities, and secessionist threats. Such is the 
degree of instability brought on by a rigid adherence to centralization under the 1999 
constitution. 
Apart from the instability it fosters however, other arguments against centralization of 
powers and resources discussed in this chapter include centralization’s tendency to 
undermine local autonomy, the tendency of centralization to foster arbitrariness in the 
exercise of federal powers, the tendency of centralization to impede efficient local 
governance and local creativity, the tendency of centralization to serve as a disincentive 
to local accountability, and its tendency to foster fraud, inefficiency, manipulation and 
opacity in the exercise of federal powers. All of these make centralization unsuitable for 
an ethnically diverse federation like Nigeria.     
In summary, the central argument advanced in this chapter is that the division of powers 
entrenched in the 1999 constitution is undemocratically centralized, highly defective and 
grossly inefficient. This division of powers is completely antithetical to the idea of 
federalism. It facilitates the hegemony and dictatorship of the federal government and the 
simultaneous marginalization and subjugation of the sub-national governments. And, for 
an ethnically diverse society, the existing framework for the division of powers is 
unsuitable and untenable. The challenge, therefore, is to restructure the constitutional 
division of powers in Nigeria, replacing the existing arrangement with one that truly 
conduces to the goal of ‘unity in diversity’. How should this restructuring be done? What 
should be the nature of the new power distribution arrangement? What values should 
hallmark the new arrangement? Theorizing this alternative federal framework forms the 
subject matter of chapter five. 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Exclusive and Concurrent Legislative Lists as set out in the 1999 
constitution of Nigeria. 
Exclusive Legislative List   Concurrent Legislative List 
(1) Accounts of the Government of the 
Federation, and of offices, courts, and 
authorities thereof, including audit of 
those accounts 
Antiquities and monuments 
(2) Arms, ammunition and explosives Archives and Public records 
(3) Aviation, including airports, safety of 
aircraft and carriage of passengers and 
goods by air   
Electricity and electric power stations 
(4) Awards of national titles of honour, 
decorations and other dignities 
Censorship of cinematographic films 
(5) Bankruptcy and insolvency Scientific or technological research 
(6) Banks, banking, bills of exchange 
and promissory  notes   
promissory notes 
Statistics 
(7) Borrowing of monies within or 
outside Nigeria for the purposes of the 
Federation or of any State. 
 
 or of any State 
Trigonometrical , cadastral and 
topographical surveys 
(8) Census, including the establishment 
and maintenance of machinery for 
continuous and universal registration of 
births and deaths throughout Nigeria. 
 maintenance  of machinery for 
continuous and universal registration of 
births and deaths throughout Nigeria 
University education, post-primary 
education, primary, technological education 
and professional education 
(9) Citizenship, naturalisation and aliens  
(10) Commercial and Industrial 
monopolies, combines, and trusts 
 
(11) Construction, alteration and 
maintenance of such roads as may be 
declared by the National Assembly to be 
Federal trunk roads 
 
(12) Control of capital issues  
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(13) Copyright  
(14) Creation of States  
(15) Currency, coinage and legal tender  
(16) Customs and excise duties  
(17) Defence  
(18) Deportation of persons who are not 
citizens of Nigeria 
 
(19) Designation of securities in which 
trust funds may be invested 
 
(20) Diplomatic, consular and trade 
representation 
 
(21) Drugs and poisons  
(22) Election to the offices of President 
and Vice- President or Governor and 
Deputy Governor and any other office to 
which a person may be elected under 
this constitution, excluding election to a 
local government council or any office 
in such council     
 
(23) Evidence  
(24) Exchange control; Export duties  
(25) External affairs  
(26) Extradition  
(27) Fingerprints identification and 
criminal records 
 
(28) Fishing and fisheries other than 
fishing and fisheries in rivers, lakes, 
waterways, ponds and other inland 
waters within Nigeria 
 
(29) Immigration into and emigration 
from Nigeria  
 
(30) Implementation of treaties relating 
to matters on this list  
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(31) Incorporation, regulation and 
winding up of bodies corporate, other 
than co- operative societies, local 
government councils and bodies 
corporate established directly by any law 
enacted by a House of Assembly of a 
State; Insurance; Labour, including trade      
 
(32) Insurance  
(33) Labour, including trade unions, 
industrial relations, conditions, safety 
and welfare of labour  
 
(34) Industrial disputes  
(35)Prescribing a national minimum 
wage for the federation or any part 
thereof, and industrial arbitration   
 
(36) Legal proceedings between 
Governments of States or between the 
Government of the Federation and 
Government of any State or any other 
authority or person 
 
(37) Maritime shipping and navigation  
(38) Meteorology  
(39)Military (Army, Navy and Air 
Force, including any other branch of the 
armed forces of the Federation) 
 
(40)Mines and minerals, including oil 
fields, oil mining, geological surveys 
and natural gas. 
 
(41) National parks being such areas in a 
State as may, with the consent of the 
Government of that State, be designated 
by the National Assembly as national 
parks 
 
(42)Nuclear energy  
(43) Passports and visas  
(44)Patents, trade-marks, trade or 
business names, industrial designs and 
merchandise Marks.  
 
(45)Pensions, gratuities and other like 
benefit payable out of the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund or any other public funds 
of the Federation 
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(46)Police and other government 
security services established by law 
 
(47)Posts, telegraphs and telephones  
(48)Powers of the National Assembly, 
and the privileges and immunities of its 
members 
 
(49)Prisons  
(50) Professional occupations as may be 
designated by the National Assembly; 
 
(51)Public debt of the Federation; Public 
holidays; Public Relations of the 
Federation 
 
(52) Public service of the Federation 
including the settlement of disputes 
between the Federation and officers of 
such service; quarantine; Railways; 
Regulation of political parties 
 
(53) Service and execution in a State of 
the civil and criminal processes, 
judgements, decrees, orders and other 
decisions of any court of law outside 
Nigeria or any court of law in Nigeria 
other than a court of law established by 
the House of Assembly of that State 
 
(54)Stamp duties;   
(55)Taxation of incomes, profits and 
capital gains, except as otherwise 
prescribed by this constitution  
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(56) The establishment and regulation of 
authorities for the federation or any part 
thereof (a) to promote and enforce the 
observance of the Fundamental 
Objectives and Directive Principles 
contained in this Constitution, (b) to 
identify, collect, preserve or generally 
look after ancient and historical 
monuments and records and 
archaeological sites and remains 
declared by the National Assembly to be 
of national significance or national 
importance, (c) to administer museums 
and libraries other than museums(e) to 
prescribe minimum standards of 
education at all levels  and libraries 
established by the Government of a 
State, (d) to regulate tourist traffic, and 
(e) to prescribe minimum standards of 
education at all levels.  
 
(57) The formation, annulment and 
dissolution of marriages other than 
marriages under Islamic law and 
Customary law including matrimonial 
causes relating thereto      
 
(58) Trade and commerce, and in 
particular (a) trade and commerce 
between Nigeria and other countries 
including import of commodities into 
and export of commodities from Nigeria, 
(b) establishment of a purchasing 
authority with power to acquire for 
export or sale in world markets such 
agricultural produce as may be 
designated by the National Assembly, 
(c) inspection of produce to be exported 
from Nigeria and the enforcement of 
grades and standards of quality in 
respect of produce so inspected, (d) 
establishment of a body to prescribe and 
enforce standards of goods and 
commodities offered for sale, (e) control 
of the prices of goods and commodities 
designated by the National Assembly as 
essential goods or commodities, and (f) 
registration of business names    
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(59)Traffic on Federal trunk roads  
(60)Water from such sources as may be 
declared by the National Assembly to be 
sources affecting more than one state 
 
(61)Weights and measures  
(62) Wireless broadcasting and 
television other than broadcasting and 
television provided by the Government 
of a State, allocation of wavelength for 
wireless, broadcasting and television 
transmission 
 
(63)Any other matter with respect to 
which the National Assembly has power 
to make laws in accordance with the 
provisions of the constitution 
 
(64) Any matter incidental or 
supplementary to any matter mentioned 
elsewhere in this list. 
 
 
Source: Parts I and II, Second Schedule 1999 constitution 
 
Table  2 
Functions of Local Governments 
(a) The consideration and the making of recommendations to the state 
commission on economic planning or any similar body. 
(b) Collection of rates, radio and television licenses. 
(c) Establishment and maintenance of cemeteries, burial grounds and homes 
for the destitute or infirm. 
(d) Licensing of bicycles, trucks, canoes, wheel barrows and carts. 
(e) Establishment, maintenance and regulation of slaughter houses, slaughter 
slabs, markets, motor parks and public conveniences. 
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(f) Construction and maintenance of roads, streets, street lightings, drains and 
other public highways, parks, gardens, open spaces, or such public 
facilities as may be prescribed from time to time by the House of 
Assembly of a state. 
(g) Naming of roads and streets and numbering of houses. 
(h) Provision and maintenance of public conveniences, sewage and refuse 
disposal. 
(i) Registration of all births, deaths and marriages. 
(j) Assessment of privately owned houses or tenements for the purpose of 
levying such rates as may be prescribed by the House of Assembly of a 
state. 
(k) Control and regulation of outdoor advertising and hoarding; movement 
and keeping of pets of all description; shops and kiosks; restaurants, 
bakeries and other places for sale of food to the public; laundries; 
licensing, regulation and control of the sale of liquor. 
(l) Participation in the government of a state as respects (i) the provision and 
maintenance of primary, adult and vocational education; (ii) the 
development of agriculture (iii) the provision and maintenance of health 
services (iv) such other functions as may be conferred on a local 
government council by the House of Assembly of the state. 
 
Source: Fourth Schedule, 1999 constitution. 
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Table 3. States and their Mineral/Natural Resources. 
S/N             State                          Mineral/Natural Resources 
1 Abia              Gold, Lead/Zinc, Limestone, Oil/Gas, Salt 
2 Abuja Cassiterite, Clay, Dolomite, Gold, Lead/Zinc, Marble 
Tantalite 
3 Adamawa                Bentonite, Gypsium, Kaolin & Magnesite 
4 Akwaibom Clay, Lead/Zinc, Lignite, Limestone,Oil/Gas,Salt, 
Uranium 
5 Anambra 
Clay, Glass-sand, Gypsium, Iron-ore, Lead/Zinc, 
Lignite, Limestone, Phosphate/Salt 
6 Bauchi 
Gold, Cassiterite (tin-ore), Columbite, Gypsium, 
Wolfram, Coal, Limestone, Lignite, Iron-ore, Clay 
7 Bayelsa 
Clay, Gypsium, Lead/Zinc, Lignite, Limestone, 
Manganese, Oil/Gas, Uranium 
8. Benue 
Barite, Clay, Coal, Gemstone, Gypsium, Iron-ore, 
Lead/Zinc, Limestone, Marble & Salt 
9 Borno 
 
Bentonite, Clay, Diatomite, Gypsium, Kaolin, 
Limestone 
10 Cross-river 
Barite, Lead/Zinc, Lignite, Limestone, Manganese, 
Oil/Gas, Salt, Uranium 
11 Delta 
Clay, Glass sand, Iron-ore, Kaolin, Lignite, Marble, 
Oil & Gas 
  
12 Ebonyi 
                       
                       Gold, Lead/Zinc, Salt 
13 Edo 
Bitumen, Clay, Dolomite, Phosphate, Glass-sand, 
Gold, Gypsium, Iron-ore, Lignite, Limestone, Marble, 
Oil/Gas 
14 Ekiti 
          
         Feldspar, Granite, Kaolin, Syenite, Tatium 
15 Enugu 
                    
                     Cold, Lead/Zinc, Limestone 
16 Gombe 
                       
                        Gemstone and Gypsium 
17 Imo 
Gypsium, Lead/Zinc, Lignite, Limestone, Marcasite, 
Oil/Gas, Phosphate, Slat 
18 Jigawa 
                                      
                                     Butyles 
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19 Kaduna 
Amethyst, Aqua Marine, Asbestos, Clay. Flosper, 
Gemstone, Gold, Graphite, Kaolin, Hyanite, Mica, 
Rock, Crystal, Ruby, Saphire, Sihnite, Superntinite, 
Tentalime, Topaz, Tourmaline 
20 Kano 
Gassiterite, Copper, Gemstone, Glass-sand, Lead-Zinc, 
Pyrochinre, Tantalite 
21 Katsina 
 
Kaolin, Marble and Salt 
22 Kebbi 
 
Gold 
23 Kogi 
Cole, Dolomite, Feldspar, Gypsium, Iron-Ore, Kaolin, 
Marble, Talc & Tantalite 
24 Kwara 
Cassiterite, Columbite, Feldspar, Gold, Iron-Ore, 
Marble, Mica, Tantalite 
25 Lagos 
Bitumen, Clay, Glass sand, Oil/Gas 
26 Nasarawa 
Amethyst, Barytex, Barite, Cassiterite, Chalcopyrite, 
Clay, Columbite, Coal, Dolomite/Marble, Feldspar, 
Galena, Iron-Ore, Limestone, Mica, Salt, Sapphire, 
Talc, Tantalite, Tourmaline,uartz, Zireon 
27 Niger 
  
Gold, Lead/zinc, Talc 
28 Ogun 
Bitumen, Clay, Feldspar, Gemstone, Kaoline, 
Limestone, & Phosphate 
29 Ondo 
Bitumen, Clay, Coal, Dimension stones, Feldspar, 
Gemstone, Glass sand, Granite, Gypsium, Kaolin, 
Limestone, Oil/Gas 
30 Osun 
 
Columbite, Gold, Granite, Talc, Tantalite, Tourmaline 
31 Oyo 
Aqua Marine, Cassiterite, Clay, Dolomite, Gemstone, 
Gold, Kaolin, Marble, Silimonite, Talc, Tantalite 
32 Plateau 
Barite, Bauxite, Betonite, Bismuth, Cassiterite, Clay, 
Coal, Emeral, Fluoride, Gemstone, Granite, Iron-ore, 
Kaolin, Lead/Zinc, Marble, Molybdenite, Phrochlore, 
Salt, Tantalite, Columbite, Tin, Wolfram 
33 Rivers 
  
Clay, Glass-sand, Lignite, Marble, Oil & Gas. 
34 Sokoto 
Clay, Flakes, Gold, Granite, Gypsium, Kaolin, 
Laterite, Limestone, Phosphate, Potash, Silica, Sand & 
Salt 
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35 Taraba 
 
Lead/Zinc 
36 Yobe 
Soda Ash, Tintomite 
37 Zamfara 
 
Coal, Cotton and Gold 
Source:   Federal Ministry of Youth Development, Nigeria
116
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 Federal Ministry of Youth Development<http://www.youthdevelopment.gov.ng/index.php/nigeria/2013-
12-19-03-40-31/natural-resources >(accessed 29/4/2017). 
165 
 
 
                                             CHAPTER  FIVE 
                      A  SYMBIO-DEMOCRATIC FEDERAL FRAMEWORK  
INTRODUCTION 
The division of powers and fiscal resources in the 1999 constitution is overwhelmingly 
and inordinately centralized. It fosters the federal government’s dominance of the 
political space and severely constrains the participation of the state and local 
governments in meaningful public governance. The highly centripetal character of this 
power distribution arrangement is antithetical to the idea of federalism and grossly ill-
suited for a multi-ethnic federation of diverse peoples with varied interests, needs, 
cultures and political orientation. It stifles democratic participation, fosters opacity and 
corruption, constrains local experimentation, inhibits healthy regional competition, and 
negatively impacts regional development. As discussed in chapter four, this dysfunctional 
division of powers and fiscal resources has continued to fuel strident agitations for 
change across Nigeria. No doubt, the time has come for a fundamental review of the 
existing constitutional framework for division of powers and resources in Nigeria. 
In this chapter, I identify and argue for alternative approaches to problems associated 
with the existing constitutional framework for the division of powers and resources in 
Nigeria. The alternative approaches proposed in this chapter are inspired by the 
recognition that existing approaches, as set out in the 1999 constitution of Nigeria and 
discussed in chapter 4, are predicated on a fundamentally flawed conception of the 
federal system of government. My main aim in this chapter, therefore, is to 
fundamentally address the problems associated with the division of powers set out in the 
1999 constitution by undertaking a theoretical reconstruction of Nigeria’s federalism. In 
essence, in this chapter I will re-conceptualize federalism in Nigeria. As will be shown in 
the following paragraphs, for a multi-ethnic federal state like Nigeria, federalism is 
capable of accommodating a more liberal conceptualization shorn of the rigid 
conservatism that hallmarks existing approaches.  
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The discussion in this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 briefly summarizes the 
problems inherent in the existing institutional framework, and sets the background for the 
discussions that follow in sections 5.2 and 5.3. In Section 5.2, I outline the symbio-
democratic federal framework developed and proposed in this thesis as an alternative to 
the centralist ‘federal’ arrangement entrenched in the 1999 constitution of Nigeria. In 
Section 5.3, I set out and discuss specific proposals for constitutional reform based on 
this symbio-democratic federal framework.    
 
5.1. The Problems of the Existing Power Distribution Arrangement Briefly 
Summarized. 
A critical appraisal of the centralist approach to “federal” governance in Nigeria, as 
clearly depicted in the 1999 constitution, and discussed in chapter four, will immediately 
reveal an exclusionist thread running through this approach. As discussed in chapter four, 
this approach prioritizes the federal government’s monopoly of legislative and fiscal 
powers and seeks to foster and strengthen its dominance of the federal system. It aims at 
institutionalizing the hegemony of the federal government and facilitating the perpetual 
subjugation of the federation’s constituent units by significantly constraining their 
participation in governance. In short, this approach is reactionary and ill-suited to meet 
the exigencies of federal democratic governance in multi-ethnic Nigeria. 
Apart from the unilateralism and exclusionism shown in the centralized formulation of 
the 1999 constitution, one other thing is evidently decipherable from our earlier 
discussion in chapter four, the allocation of powers and resources among the levels of 
government is overwhelmingly skewed in favour of the federal government, and 
insensitive to the democratic and developmental aspirations of the state and local 
governments. For instance, powers, which by nature and necessity should be within the 
legislative and executive jurisdiction of the state and local governments because of the 
direct significance of such powers for development and democratic participation in the 
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state and local governments, have been assigned to the federal government under the 
1999 constitution.
1
  
According to a recent World Bank data, 52 percent of Nigerians live in the country’s 
rural communities.
2
 Many of these communities lack basic infrastructure. And most of 
them suffer from neglect.
3
 They feel the heat of under-development and bear the brunt of 
dysfunctional and misplaced policies occasioned by centralized as opposed to local 
development planning. They are adversely affected when state and local governments, 
which are closer to them and better informed about their local needs, are unable to 
provide suitable social services to them either because the power to provide such services 
have been constitutionally assigned to the federal government or the state and local 
governments are severely constrained as a result of limited financial resources available 
to them.  
There is thus a compelling need for the state and local governments to exercise a greater 
stake in the federal system. As we saw in chapter four, the state and local governments 
wish to be allowed to exercise untrammeled control over their internal affairs. They wish 
to be involved in formulating and managing the basic fiscal policies of the federation 
since these policies significantly affect them and their communities. They also wish to 
have greater access to financial resources sufficient enough to support their 
constitutionally assigned functions. In short, they wish to be in a position to exercise 
control over their own destinies and those of their communities. Their inability to achieve 
these ends under the current federal arrangement is the direct cause of the seemingly 
intractable nationwide agitations for constitutional change and the violent conflicts that 
often attend such agitations.
4
 
On the other hand, as evident in the underlining philosophy of the 1999 constitution, the 
military framers of this constitution apparently believed that a centralized political 
                                                          
1
 See Appendix, figure 1 in chapter 4. 
2
 The World Bank, Rural Population (% of total Population, 2016) 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS>  (accessed 17/11/2016). 
3
 Nigeria’s Renewal- Delivering Inclusive Growth in Africa’s Largest Economy (2014 Report on Nigeria 
by the Mckinsey Global Institute)  <http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/middle-east-and-
africa/nigerias-renewal-delivering-inclusive-growth>  pp 17-18; 33; 44-47 (accessed 17/11/2016).  
4
 I discussed all these in detail in chapter 4. 
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system, characterized by a centralist allocation of powers and fiscal resources, was the 
best way to keep Nigeria together as a single corporate entity. For proponents of this 
perspective, the unity and stability of the federation require a strong central government 
exercising maximum control over the political and fiscal system.  
In chapter four, I argued that while unity in a multi-ethnic federation is desirable and 
indeed important, the conception of unity that informed the division of powers and fiscal 
resources set out in the 1999 constitution is fundamentally flawed. Unity in a multi-ethnic 
federation cannot be decreed into existence as the framers of the 1999 constitution 
apparently intended to do. Unity in an ethnically diverse federation can only materialize 
from a sustained process of political association that nevertheless recognizes diversity 
and difference.    
The question that remains however is how to reconcile the two tendencies discussed 
above? How can we ensure that, as much as possible, federal political and fiscal 
arrangements in Nigeria bear the imprimatur of the Nigerian people, reflect their 
aspirations, and genuinely cater to their needs without upsetting or jeopardizing the 
country’s unity, as well as its economic equilibrium and stability? How can we ensure 
that the national economy remains properly coordinated without stifling development in 
the constituent units of the federation? How can we guarantee national political and 
economic stability as well as satisfaction of regional aspirations without centralizing 
power or pandering to separatist tendencies? In short, how should Nigeria’s federal 
political and fiscal architecture be structured to ensure the country’s unity without 
discountenancing its diversity? These are the questions I propose to answer in this 
chapter. 
5.2. A Symbio-democratic Theory of Federalism. 
As discussed above, a major problem with the division of powers and fiscal resources 
entrenched in the 1999 constitution is its predication on a fundamentally flawed centralist 
conception of federalism. Apart from its view of the federal government as the dominant 
custodian and repository of power in the federation, this perspective of federalism pays 
scant attention to the need to significantly engage the federation’s constituent units in the 
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governance of the federal system. As a multi-ethnic federation deeply characterized by 
diversity, this neglect remains a major source of conflict in Nigeria. It is a neglect that 
erroneously portrays federalism as a cloistered construct, disconnected and detached from 
its socio-political milieu.  
My framework for addressing the problems associated with the division of powers and 
fiscal resources in the 1999 constitution of Nigeria is inspired by the above-mentioned 
neglect and deprivation. This framework is defined by three principal ideas. First, I will 
argue that the division of powers and fiscal resources in a multiethnic federation must, for 
its legitimacy, reflect the interests and wishes of the people. This implies that not only 
should the constitutional division of powers and fiscal resources bear the people’s 
imprimatur, it must also genuinely reflect their aspirations.  
A key aspect of this legitimacy is the predication of the federation’s division of powers 
and fiscal resources on the will of the people. Constitutional division of powers and fiscal 
resources must reflect what the people have jointly covenanted. Democratic participation 
of the people in the determination of how powers and fiscal resources should be 
constitutionally distributed among the levels of government must be constitutionally 
guaranteed. In short, the agreement or covenant of the people on division of powers and 
fiscal resources should be a fundamental component of any federal construct. 
Second, the division of powers and resources must be structured in a way that enables 
state and local governments of the federation to exercise significant control and 
autonomy over their internal affairs. The division of powers and fiscal resources must be 
structured in a way that takes government closer to the people, especially those in the 
localities and rural communities. This would, in the case of Nigeria, entail a 
constitutional reassignment of powers and a concomitant reallocation of fiscal resources 
in order to empower state and local governments to take on functions that directly impact 
their immediate communities. The arrangement leverages on the relative proximity of the 
state and local governments to the local communities, a factor which will enable local 
policies to truly reflect local needs, since states and local governments are better placed 
to identify, understand, and cater to local needs.  
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This arrangement is however without prejudice to the need for the federal government to, 
for instance, provide national public goods and services that cut across regional 
boundaries, or the possible need for synergy and cooperation between the levels of 
government to provide certain services for their constituents, or the possible need for 
richer governments in the federation to cooperatively assist in augmenting the finances of 
less endowed ones. Thus, while recognizing the need to assign more powers and 
autonomy to the state and local governments to enable them manage their internal affairs, 
this arrangement nevertheless allows the levels of government to team up to 
cooperatively provide beneficial services to each other in the overall interest of the 
federation.        
What all of the foregoing implies is that the division of powers and fiscal resources in the 
federation should be designed to enhance state and local government autonomy within 
the framework of a united federation. And this division of powers and fiscal resources 
must be clearly set out in a democratically crafted constitution that has binding force on 
all persons and governments, and contains appropriate safeguards that compel adherence 
to the defining tenets of this framework.  
Thus, three things are strongly implicated by the constitutional framework for division of 
powers and fiscal resources proposed in this thesis. These are covenant, cooperation and 
non-centralization of powers. As we have seen, the proposed framework emphasizes the 
need to ensure that constitutional division of powers and fiscal resources, including the 
principles and conditions underlying such division, bears the sanction and approval of the 
people. In essence it must reflect what the people have agreed. It must evidence what 
they have jointly covenanted. 
The framework also promotes the constitutional assignment of more autonomous powers 
to the state and local governments to enable them manage their internal affairs. It takes 
government closer to the people and enhances the people’s participation in government. 
It assigns to the state and local governments, powers which are reasonably necessary to 
guarantee them genuine internal self government without jeopardizing the unity and 
stability of the federation. In essence, the framework entrenches non-centralization of 
powers.     
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Lastly the framework emphasizes the democratic participation of the constituent units of 
the federation in the management and operation of common institutions and programs, 
especially those that impact the entire federation. Such joint endeavour is an instance of 
cooperation among the constituent units to promote their individual interests and those 
of the federation. Cooperation, in this sense, can be vertical between the federal, state and 
local governments as in when the federal government collaborates with a state or local 
government to provide targeted funding, loan facilitation or technical support in order to 
enhance the provision of certain public goods and services by that state or local 
government to its constituents.  
Cooperation can also be horizontal as in when state or local governments that are 
contiguously located team up to jointly provide public goods and services to their 
constituents or when financially buoyant state or local governments give up part of their 
own wealth to augment the revenue available to poorer states or local governments via 
the system of fiscal equalization.  
The framework is thus one of mutually beneficial coexistence among the constituent units 
of the federation by covenant, cooperation and non-centralization of powers as defined 
above. It is, in short, an advocacy of symbio-democratic federalism. The term “symbio-
democratic” is a derivative of ‘symbiotic’ and ‘democratic’, two terms that capture the 
core essence of this proposed framework. The term ‘symbiotic’ is an adjective derived 
from the word ‘symbiosis.’ The Compact Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘symbiosis’ 
as “a relationship between different people or groups that is beneficial to both.”5 The 
term is given a broader definition in the Cambridge online dictionary. There, ‘symbiosis’ 
is described as “a relationship between people or organizations that depend on each other 
……or a relationship between two types of animal or plant in which each provides for the 
other the conditions necessary for its continued existence.”6 In short, symbiosis stresses 
interdependence and cooperation, both of which are important to the federal political and 
fiscal system being proposed in this thesis. 
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The word “democratic” on the other hand is derived from “democracy” which places 
significant premium on “the people.” The word “democracy” is from the Greek words 
“demos” which translates into “people” in English, and “kratos” which means “rule” or 
power in English.
7
 Read together, “demokratia”8 from which democracy is derived would 
therefore mean ‘people power’ or ‘rule of the people’ in English. Participation of the 
people in their own government is widely regarded as a fundamental attribute of 
democracy. And participation of the people in their own government is a fundamental 
element of the federal political and fiscal framework proposed in this thesis.  
Lastly the word ‘federal,’ as we saw in chapter two, is derived from the latin word foedus 
which means ‘covenant’ or ‘treaty.’9 Covenant is in turn defined as “agreement.”10 What 
this implies, as discussed in chapter two, is that covenant is not only inherent in the idea 
of federalism, it is integral and basic to it. Federal political and fiscal arrangements must 
be predicated on the joint covenant or agreement of the people. The division of powers 
and fiscal resources cannot be imposed or foisted on the people. It must be informed by 
the overwhelming will of the people. 
Put succinctly therefore, the symbio-democratic federal system, for our purposes, is a 
mutually beneficial federal relationship between political entities or groups of political 
entities. This relationship is driven by covenant, and it is non-centralized in order to 
preserve the distinctness and autonomy of the levels of government involved in the 
federal arrangement. The theory of symbio-democratic federalism, as conceived in this 
thesis, is predicated on the idea that to attain the goal of unity in diversity in ethnically 
diverse federations, constitutional division of powers and fiscal resources must have 
‘covenant,’ ‘cooperation’ and ‘non-centralization of powers’ as its defining principles.  
At the heart of the concept of symbio-democratic federalism is the notion that, so basic, 
integral and fundamental are covenant, cooperation and non-centralization of powers to 
                                                          
7
 Encyclopaedia Britanica <https://www.britannica.com/topic/democracy> (accessed 14/8/2017). 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Online Etymology Dictionary, <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=federal> (accessed 
03/12/2016). See also Daniel J. Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in Politics, Vo.1 (London: Transaction 
Publishers, 1995) p.26. 
10
 English Oxford Living Dictionaries Online <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/covenant> 
(accessed 03/12/2016). 
173 
 
the idea of federalism that derogation from anyone of them will detract from the its very 
essence. They are, in essence, peremptory principles of federalism from which there 
should be no derogation. It is this peremptoriness of ‘covenant,’ ‘cooperation’ and ‘non-
centralization of powers’ in relation to the idea of federalism, that gives symbio-
democratic federalism its originality and uniqueness. And it is this conception of 
federalism that provides, for us, the best guarantee of unity in diversity in ethnically 
diverse federations.   
In conceptualizing symbio-democratic federalism, I recognize that Johannes Althusius 
had in his 16
th
 century magnum opus, Politica Methodice Digesta, propounded his 
association theory of politics in which he broached the idea of ‘symbiotics’ as “the art of 
associating men for the purpose of establishing, cultivating, and conserving social life 
among them…”11 In his theory, Althusius’ conceives of a political society built through 
its primary associations and resting on their consent.  
These ‘primary associations,’ according to Althusius include several ‘villages,’ ‘towns,’ 
‘cities’ and ‘provinces’12 which together form a ‘universal association’ or 
‘commonwealth.’13 In essence, it is these primary associations that constitute the building 
blocks of the universal association or commonwealth. Through their associations, the 
towns, cities and provinces, “pledge themselves each to the other, by explicit or tacit 
agreement, to mutual communication of whatever is useful and necessary for the 
harmonious exercise of social life.”14  
In other words “by the bond of an associating and uniting agreement,”15 the symbiotes, 
that is, the towns, cities, provinces, etcetera- “communicate among themselves whatever 
is appropriate for a comfortable life of soul and body.”16 For Althusius therefore, the 
symbiotes are “participants or partners in a common life.”17 By propounding his 
association theory, Althusius constructs a conception of political society in which the 
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associating entities retain their individual identities while agreeing with each other to 
ensure ‘harmonious exercise of social life’ in the ‘commonwealth.’  
Stimulating and attractive as Althusius’ conception of political society is however, there 
are significant differences between his conception of political society and mine. First, 
Althusius’ theory is heavily influenced by his Calvinist background as seen in his 
reverent attribution of legal primacy to the Decalogue and natural law as well as his 
insistence on the conformity of secular laws to the two tables of the Decalogue and 
natural law or the law of reason.
18
 Second, Althusius’ conception of sovereignty is not 
popular sovereignty as we know it and as conceived in this thesis, since the members of 
his political society do not include individuals but are mainly the primary associations 
that successively form his hierarchical tree of private and public associations. And it is to 
these associations as corporate bodies that Althusius attributes sovereignty.
19
 In essence, 
Althusius espouses a corporatist conception of sovereignty. 
The above mentioned attributes of Althusisus’ political theory, that is his Calvinist 
attachment to the Decalogue and his corporatist conception of sovereignty, are not 
implicit or explicit in the theory of symbio-democratic federalism as conceived in this 
thesis. But his ideas of ‘association,’ ‘consent,’ and “mutual communication of what is 
good,” no doubt, make him a veritable forerunner of federalism in the modern sense.  
Turning back to our symbio-democratic federal framework, it is at this juncture necessary 
to do a summary of what has been said so far about this framework. I argued above that 
in an ethnically diverse federation like Nigeria, the goal of unity in diversity is better 
served when constitutionally entrenched division of powers and fiscal resources is 
peremptorily based on covenant, peremptorily anchored on cooperation, and peremptorily 
non-centralized as already defined above. The decision on how powers and fiscal 
resources should be distributed among the levels of government cannot be unilaterally 
taken and imposed by the federal government. Such decision must be taken in 
consultation with the constituent units and peoples of the federation. On such decisions, 
there must be agreement on as wide a scale as possible so as not to leave anyone in doubt 
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as to what the prevailing will of the people is on the matter. In essence, such decisions 
must be genuinely covenanted.  
Additionally, the federal arrangement must be such that the levels of government can 
cooperate with each other in the provision of public goods and services to their respective 
constituents in a way that promotes public welfare and harmonious social existence in the 
federation. Vertical and horizontal inter-governmental interactions must thus be framed 
to enhance such cooperation. Lastly, power and autonomy in matters of local interest 
should be assigned to the state and local governments. This will help to take government 
closer to the people, and ensure that government policies genuinely reflect the aspirations 
of the local people. It will also encourage popular participation in government.  
The foregoing is a succinct articulation of the symbio-democratic conception of 
federalism. It is a counter-hegemonic construct that is particularly most suited for 
ethnically diverse federations as a framework for forging unity in diversity.  
In the next few paragraphs, I will elaborate on the scope of this federal framework by 
discussing how, in practice, the symbio-democratic federal framework can be used to 
ensure that the division of powers and fiscal resources in Nigeria do not reflect and 
enhance the hegemonic interests of the federal (central) government, but the collective 
aspirations and welfare of all stakeholders in the Nigerian federal project. In essence, I 
will highlight and discuss the institutional reforms necessary for the effectuation of a 
federal architecture that accommodates popular participation and diversity without 
endangering national unity. 
5.3. The Symbio-Democratic federal framework- Proposals for Constitutional 
Reform 
5.3.1    Abrogation and Replacement of the 1999 constitution 
Any attempt to address the problems associated with Nigeria’s existing division of 
powers and fiscal resources must commence with a radical change in the country’s 
current constitution. As already explained in chapter four, the current constitution cannot 
lay any claim to legitimacy as it did not emerge through any democratic process. The 
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central tenets and basic principles of the constitution were not decided by the people of 
Nigeria, neither were its finer points popularly agreed. The constitution was bequeathed 
to the nation by the military, and its promulgation into law was effected by fiat.
20
 It 
stands to reason therefore that the division of powers and fiscal resources set out in this 
undemocratic constitution cannot, realistically, be said to genuinely represent the true 
wishes of the people of Nigeria. In essence, the existing constitutional division of powers 
and fiscal resources among the levels of government in the Nigerian federation is not 
owned by the Nigerian people. It is not an expression of the people’s covenant.21 
To bear the mark of legitimacy and reflect what has been covenanted by the people, the 
division of powers and fiscal resources in the constitution must bear the imprimatur of the 
people of Nigeria. The people must unanimously endorse and approve the constitution’s 
division of powers and fiscal resources. The most acceptable way to do this in a 
democratic society is to ensure that the Constitution that contains this division of powers 
and fiscal resources is itself  birthed through a process that entails extensive negotiations 
and consultations among the people of Nigeria. And ultimately, the people of Nigeria 
must jointly covenant to be bound by the constitution that emerges through this 
bargaining and consultative process. 
Nigerians from the thirty six states of the federation must willingly subscribe to the 
Constitution that serves as the basis of the country’s federal arrangement. In other words, 
the Constitution itself must be a direct expression of the people’s covenant. It must be 
publicly acknowledged as the evidence of their joint subscription to the guiding 
principles of the country’s federal system.  
The 1789 Constitution of the United States (US), the model upon which the Nigerian 
presidential system of government is purportedly based, is the classic expression of a 
public covenant.
22
 The Constitution was a product of intense negotiations.
23
 The text of 
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the Constitution was prepared and intensely debated at a specially convened 
Constitutional Convention attended by delegates from the federating American states.
24
 
Notably, the subject of division of powers and fiscal resources was hotly debated due to 
widespread concerns that the political and fiscal autonomy which the federating states 
had enjoyed for several years would be eroded under the new Constitution.
25
 But the 
public discussions, negotiations, and debates which preceded the promulgation of the 
Constitution into law allowed the parties to reach amicable compromises and 
concessions. The final text of the constitution was later ratified through popularly elected 
conventions in the States’ assemblies. 26   
“The significance of the adoption of the US constitution” writes Professor Ben Nwabueze 
“…lies partly in the novel principles, ideas, and the frame of government enshrined in it, 
but more perhaps in the democratic process by which it was adopted- through a National 
Convention in Philadelphia and State ratifying conventions. In the result, the republic was 
anchored upon a solid moral foundation resting on the will and consent of the people- on 
“a voluntary social compact…established by peaceful debate” rather than by imposition 
by an imperial sovereign or a dominant ruling group within the country.”27   
It is its anchorage in the will and consent of the people that makes the constitution of the 
United States an expression, an articulation of the binding covenant of the American 
federation. The constitution outlines the basic political, institutional and fiscal 
arrangements which the American people voluntarily and overwhelmingly subscribed to. 
In Africa, there are excellent examples of how constitutions have been used to express 
the people’s covenant and enrich the democratic process in Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea and 
South Africa. The promulgation of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda, for instance, was 
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preceded by a seven-year period of consultations and negotiations. The constitution 
making process was marked by unprecedented popular participation.
28
  
As part of the constitution making process, a committee of experts was set up to prepare a 
draft constitution after travelling throughout the country to collate the views of the people 
over a two- year period. The draft constitution was then subjected to another round of 
intense debates and later promulgated into law by a constituent assembly popularly 
elected for that purpose.
29
 Notably, the constituent assembly consisted of elected 
representatives of the various communities and interest groups in Uganda.
30
 
It must be added that like Nigeria, Uganda had experimented with three other 
constitutions before the 1995 constitution.
31
 These previous constitutions failed largely 
because, as in Nigeria, they were documents put together by the political elite without the 
people’s input. Accordingly, the said constitutions failed to reflect the people’s 
aspirations, apart from being out of sync with the socio-political realities of the Ugandan 
nation at the time.
32
 The democratic constitution making process that culminated in the 
promulgation of the 1995 constitution was thus a radical departure from the political 
tradition that prevailed in Uganda prior to that time. 
A similar process took place in Eritrea in the early 1990s following the country’s 
independence from Ethiopia. There, by a government proclamation,
33
 a Constitutional 
Commission was established to “draft a constitution on the basis of wide ranging public 
debate on the matter and through expert consultations.”34 The draft of the proposed 
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constitution was then debated by an elected constituent assembly which promulgated the 
new constitution into law in May 1997.
35
  
Like Uganda and Eritrea, the promulgation of the 1996 constitution of South Africa was 
preceded by an elaborate consultative process which, among other things, included a 
series of public participation programs primarily aimed at creating public awareness 
about the constitution making process.
36
 A popularly elected Constitutional Assembly 
was thereafter saddled with the task of producing a new Constitution for the country. 
After extensive deliberations, the final draft of the Constitution was ratified by an 
overwhelming majority (87 percent) of the Constitutional Assembly. An innovation in the 
South African example was the requirement for a certification of the new constitutional 
text by the country’s Constitutional Court. The requirement of certification was to ensure 
that the text of the new Constitution complied with certain principles which the South 
African people had earlier agreed should be the guiding beacons of the new Constitution. 
Eventually, the constitutional court certified the new constitution in December 1996 and 
it was promulgated into law later that month by President Mandela.
37
   
Ethiopia’s 1995 Constitution was also the product of an extensive process of debates, 
consultations and negotiations. The process commenced with the establishment of a 
Constitutional Commission in 1993. The Commission was charged with coordinating the 
drafting of the Constitution as well as the associated public debates, presentations, and 
numerous seminars that were organized to educate the public on the fundamental 
principles of the proposed constitution.
38
 The draft constitution prepared by the 
Commission was submitted to a Constituent Assembly specifically elected for the 
purpose of debating and promulgating the final text of the Constitution.
39
 The 
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constitution making process was designed to make the constitution a people’s document 
reflecting popular opinion on how government in Ethiopia should be organized.
40
 
Demands for a people driven constitution making process was also very loud in Zambia 
from the early 1990s up to 2007 when the Government of that country set up a National 
Constitutional Conference with very broad membership composed of representatives 
from all sections of the country as well as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), 
trade unions, the Legislature, other democratic institutions and the academia. The 
National Conference which was set up via the “National Constitutional Conference Act 
19” of 2007, was statutorily mandated to, inter-alia, examine, debate and adopt proposals 
to alter the constitution.
41
 
The foregoing shows that popular participation in the constitution making process is not 
an alien concept in Africa. In an ethnically diverse federation like Nigeria, the imperative 
of genuine popular participation in the process of making and adopting a constitution 
cannot be over emphasized. It is perhaps the only way to prevent oligarchy or the 
subjugation of some groups by other groups. Additionally, as mentioned in chapter four, 
popular participation in the constitution making process fosters fidelity to the 
Constitution itself. It gives the people a sense of ownership. And it imbues the 
constitution with the legitimacy required to make it an authoritative document. It makes 
the constitution an expression of the people’s covenant on how they wish to be governed.  
As we have seen in the last few paragraphs, popular participation was a common thread 
in the constitution making process in South Africa, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda. 
Conversely, as we saw in chapters three and four of this thesis, genuine popular 
participation has never really been a feature of Nigeria’s constitution making process. In 
essence, no constitution, in the history of Nigeria, can be properly and correctly regarded 
as a true expression of the people’s covenant. This, precisely, is why the divisions of 
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powers and fiscal resources set out in all Nigeria’s known constitutions since the 1914 
amalgamation, have been controversial. The people of Nigeria never truly participated in 
negotiating those power distribution arrangements, neither did they overwhelmingly 
agree to be bound by them. In short, the said power distribution arrangements were never 
covenanted by the people.  
Thus, to gain legitimacy and popular support, the federation’s division of powers and 
fiscal resources must be entrenched in a democratically adopted constitution, the details 
of which have been subjected to extensive public discussion and debate. Any effort to 
address the problems associated with Nigeria’s power distribution architecture must 
commence with a deliberate move to produce a “people’s Constitution” in the true sense 
of that phrase. Since the fundamental principles of the federal system, including the 
division of powers and fiscal resources, are set out in the Constitution, Nigerians must be 
allowed to design their own constitution through a transparent process characterized by 
extensive discussions and negotiations to determine, among other things, the nature of the 
federal system to be adopted by the federation as well as its fundamental principles and 
tenets- including the division of powers and fiscal resources. 
To do what is suggested above, a complete change in the existing constitutional 
arrangement must be undertaken. The first step in this direction should be the complete 
abrogation of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria and its replacement with a genuine 
democratic Constitution. But what is a democratic constitution for our purposes?  “A 
democratic Constitution,” writes Professor Nwabueze, is “one approved or adopted by 
the people either directly at a referendum, or through a Constituent Assembly specially 
elected and specifically mandated in that behalf.”42 In essence, it is its predication on the 
will of the people, as indicated by the people’s approval or adoption of it through an 
inclusive constitution making process, that makes a Constitution truly democratic. A 
constitution is not democratic merely because it establishes a democratic form of 
government. It must, in addition to establishing a democratic form of government, 
represent the will of the people as expressed through a popular referendum or a 
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Constituent Assembly specifically elected to adopt a constitution on behalf of the people 
“or a combination of the two”- constituent assembly and referendum.43   
A democratic Constitution, as defined above, is a sine qua non for political legitimacy in 
an ethnically diverse federation, for it is through it that indigenes of every part of the 
federation can truly have a say in how the federation is structured and governed, a 
condition that compels the people’s loyalty to the Constitution and the federation itself.44 
In other words, such a democratic constitution “is not only the foundation of the State, 
with roots anchored in the people, it is also a medium for the people in a Convention…, a 
Constituent Assembly…. to define and affirm their aspirations to become a nation, to 
define the purposes, aims and objectives, they, by the Constitution, are creating, and the 
direction they desire it (the State) to go. The definition and affirmation of aspirations, 
aims and objectives is not a mere matter of formal or verbal formulation by a legal 
draftsman but rather an authentic embodiment of the true feelings and sentiments of the 
people, commanding wide acceptance by the generality of them.”45  
It is thus a democratic constitution, articulating the prevailing will of the people, that 
serves as the true expression of their joint covenant. The absence of such a covenant, 
expressed in a democratic constitution, made, approved and adopted by the people, is a 
major cause of the widespread disenchantment with the division of powers and fiscal 
resources set out in the extant 1999 constitution of Nigeria. The Constitution being 
undemocratic, the division of powers and fiscal resources set out in it is bereft of popular 
support and legitimacy.  
How then can we produce a democratic constitution for Nigeria? How can we put in 
place a constitution that genuinely reflects the collective will and aspirations of the 
Nigerian people, and not just those of a select few? In the next few paragraphs, I propose 
a number of steps that should be followed in order to produce a federal democratic 
constitution for Nigeria. In doing this I draw on lessons garnered from the constitution 
making processes of other countries in Africa and outside Africa, as already discussed 
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above. I also take into consideration the peculiarities of Nigeria as a multi-ethnic 
federation, and the need to make the constitution making process as inclusive and 
participatory as possible. 
5.3.1.1 Constitution Drafting Committee  
The first step in the making of a democratic constitution for Nigeria is for the existing 
government of Nigeria to set up a broad based Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) 
consisting of constitutional experts, as well as professionals and traditional rulers to 
consult widely with people from every part of Nigeria on the nature and fundamental 
principles of the proposed constitution. In addition to organizing public debates on the 
proposed constitution, the committee should be mandated to solicit from Nigerians in all 
the thirty-six states of the federation, memoranda detailing their vision for the proposed 
constitution. This committee should then proceed to prepare a draft constitution based on 
the views expressed by Nigerians during the consultative process. As we have seen 
above, such a committee of experts was set up to prepare a draft constitution during the 
political process that birthed the 1995 constitution of Uganda.  
In the case of Nigeria however, it is suggested that membership of this committee should 
not be limited to constitutional experts alone. Because of the importance of the 
committee’s assignment and the need to engage as widely as possible with Nigerians 
throughout the federation, especially those resident in the rural communities and villages, 
traditional rulers in each state of the federation should also be members of this 
committee. Traditional rulers in Nigeria command a lot of respect, loyalty and admiration 
among urban and rural dwellers. The membership of traditional rulers in the CDC will 
help to bolster the confidence of the local communities in the entire constitution making 
process and reassure them that far from being one of the several elitist projects of the 
federal government, this process requires their input and is ultimately aimed at protecting 
their interests in the federation. Further particulars of this committee are discussed in my 
recommendations in chapter six.   
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5.3.1.2 Constituent Assembly 
The draft constitution prepared by the CDC, should be submitted to a Constituent 
Assembly specially elected for the purpose of debating and adopting the proposed 
constitution on behalf of the people. The Constituent Assembly should consist of elected 
representatives of all the existing Local Government Councils in Nigeria. This would 
help to ensure that every section of the country is fully represented in the constitution 
making process. The main task of the Constituent Assembly is to thoroughly and 
exhaustively debate the draft constitution. Such a debate would enable every part of the 
country, through its representative in the Constituent Assembly, to have a say in the 
making of the constitution. In the course of debating the draft constitution, the 
Constituent Assembly may invite anyone or any group of people whose opinion or advice 
is required in respect of any aspect of the proposed constitution. Such consultative actions 
will further strengthen the legitimacy of the constitution that emerges through this 
process. A more detailed discussion on the Constituent Assembly is available in chapter 
six of this thesis. 
5.3.1.3. Referendum   
A final draft of the constitution debated and adopted by the Constituent Assembly should 
then be subjected to a referendum that would involve every Nigerian of voting age. This 
referendum should be conducted by the Independent National Electoral Commission 
which is the country’s electoral umpire. 
Adherence to the constitution making procedure outlined above is perhaps the surest way 
to ensure that the Constitution genuinely represents the wishes of the Nigerian people. It 
is the surest way to ensure that the constitution is an articulation of the people’s covenant 
in respect of the country’s government. It is certainly the surest way to ensure that the 
division of powers and fiscal resources set out in the constitution truly reflects the will 
and agreement of the Nigerian people. 
Apart from the expression of public covenant which the federal democratic Constitution 
represents however, the process of producing the Constitution, characterized as it is by 
public debates, interactions, negotiations and joint decision making among the people, is 
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an instance of cooperation among them. With an inclusive and democratic constitution 
making process, the people are enabled to cooperatively design a constitution that caters 
to their common good. And as we shall see below, it is not only in the making of a 
Constitution that the utility of cooperation is discernible. Cooperation is significant in the 
operation of the federation itself.  It is through the cooperation of the people that the 
common goals of a federation are met. This cooperation towards the attainment of 
common goals creates and enhances the bond of unity that helps to keep the constituent 
units of the federation together. Indeed it is in its quality as a catalyst of unity that 
cooperation finds its most important political relevance. Therein lies the reason for the 
indispensability of cooperation in an ethnically diverse federation desirous of attaining 
unity in diversity. 
It is now necessary to do a quick summary of our discussion thus far. In the last few 
paragraphs, I have discussed the need for a symbio-democratic federal system 
peremptorily based on ‘covenant,’ ‘cooperation’ and “non-centralization of powers” in 
multi-ethnic Nigeria. I argued that such a federal system is the best political arrangement 
for engendering unity in diversity in an ethnically diverse federation like Nigeria. I also 
argued that establishing the symbio-democratic federal system will require a democratic 
constitution that serves as an expression of the people’s ‘covenant’, reflecting what has 
been agreed by them as the fundamental objectives, principles and basic framework of 
the federation.  
I outlined the procedure for crafting a democratic constitution that truly articulates the 
wishes and aspirations of the Nigerian people on how they wish to be governed. I argued 
that this procedure, characterized as it is by public debates, interactions and negotiations 
among the people from every part of the federation is an instance of cooperation among 
them to jointly promote the common good. ‘Cooperation,’ I argued, is an indispensable 
condition for bringing forth unity in the midst of diversity. 
But apart from engaging a democratic process in crafting the constitution, the constitution 
itself must promote a federal democratic political arrangement. It must entrench a power 
sharing system that fosters inclusivity and popular participation. The federal framework 
proposed in this thesis will ensure that power is not concentrated in the hands of a 
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hegemonic central government but dispersed among all stakeholders in the federation. In 
other words, rather than the centralized and lopsided allocation of powers and fiscal 
resources in favour of the federal government under the current 1999 constitution, the 
symbio-democratic federal framework proposed in this thesis will ensure that power is 
shared and exercised in a way that enables the constituent units of the federation to 
effectively manage their own affairs and have a say in how they are governed.    
In the following sections of this chapter, I will discuss the need for the legislative lists in 
the proposed constitution to be structured in a way that ensures that powers over matters 
of local interest are effectively assigned to the states and local governments as against the 
assignment of many of such powers to the federal government under the current 1999 
constitution. I will also discuss the need for the establishment of a new fiscal commission 
for the entire federation. I will make proposals regarding how this important commission 
should be structured and managed  to ensure that it is not susceptible to pressure and 
manipulation from the federal government, as is the case under the current 1999 
constitution. Finally I will set out proposals on how to ensure that the states and local 
governments, as well as the general public have a say in the policies and decisions of the 
commission.   
5.3.2. Non-centralization of Powers. 
The measures proposed above for instituting a democratic constitution will not amount to 
much if, in the constitution itself, the division of powers and fiscal resources among the 
levels of government is not structured to ensure that state and local governments are 
effectively in charge of their internal affairs or matters that most closely concern them. 
As discussed in chapter four, a major problem of the 1999 Constitution is its lopsided 
allocation of powers in favour of the federal government.
46
 A number of functions which, 
by nature, should ordinarily be within the jurisdiction of the state and local governments 
are within the jurisdiction of the federal government under the constitution. Thus, matters 
like policing and other security services in the states; elections in the states, labour 
matters in the states; air, rail and water transportation in the states; incorporation and 
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regulation of companies in the states; insurance; mines and minerals in the states; 
regulation of traffic in the states; census in the states of the federation;  regulation of local 
political parties; judiciary of the states; formation, annulment and dissolution of 
marriages in the states; registration of business names in the states; as well as wireless 
broadcasting and television, are exclusively assigned to the federal (central) government 
under the exclusive legislative list in the constitution.
47
 The implication is that the federal 
government exclusively and centrally carries out these functions throughout the 
federation.
48
 
I also pointed out in chapter four that even under the concurrent legislative list which sets 
out matters that are simultaneously within the legislative jurisdiction of the federal and 
state governments, the federal government is effectively vested with overriding powers in 
respect of the functions mentioned in the list. Section 4(5) of the Constitution stipulates 
that “if any law enacted by the House of Assembly of a state is inconsistent with any law 
validly made by the National Assembly, the law made by the National Assembly shall 
prevail, and that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.” Thus, for 
instance, although matters like education, agriculture, electricity provision, elections to 
local government councils, are within the concurrent legislative list, with the implication 
that power in respect of these matters can be exercised by either the federal or state 
government, the implication of section 4(5) of the constitution is that a state cannot make 
any law in respect of any of these matters where federal legislation has comprehensively 
covered such a matter, except the state law is in total conformity with federal law on the 
matter.  
This raises two questions. What happens where a state needs to enact a law which, 
though inconsistent with an existing federal law, is nevertheless essential to meet some 
peculiar need of the state? For instance, what happens where, in a bid to design its local 
policies on agriculture to meet the peculiar needs of its local farmers or the food 
production needs of its constituents, a state enacts a law that is inconsistent with an 
existing federal legislation? Clearly, going by the provision of section 4(5) of the 1999 
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constitution, the state law in question will be void ab initio. This is despite the fact that 
agriculture, being on the concurrent legislative list, the state government, just like the 
federal (central) government, is also empowered to make laws on agricultural 
development. Under the existing power distribution arrangement, the state government’s 
policies on agriculture must conform to those of the federal government even if the 
federal government’s policies are unfair, unrealistic or unsuitable for the state in question. 
The same goes for a situation where a state government, desirous of adapting its policies 
on university education to meet its own peculiarities or needs, enacts a law which is 
inconsistent with a federal law on the same matter. Under the 1999 constitution, such a 
state law will be void to the extent of its inconsistency with the federal law. It does not 
seem to matter whether the federal law is inadequate or unable to address the peculiar 
needs of the state in question. 
Secondly, what happens where a state law already exists on a matter in the concurrent 
legislative list, and a federal law is subsequently enacted which is clearly at variance with 
the already existing state law? Will the state law be void for its inconsistency with the 
subsequent federal law? Section 4(5) of the 1999 constitution would seem to suggest so. 
The constitution is silent on what happens if the inconsistent state law predates the 
federal law. Under the existing arrangement, the significant factor in determining the 
validity of a state law seems to be its consistency or inconsistency with a federal law on 
the same subject. The date on which the state law was made appears to be 
inconsequential. And it does not seem to matter whether the earlier state law was 
designed to meet specific needs of the state in question. Such is the lopsidedness, 
unfairness and defectiveness of the power allocation structure under the 1999 
constitution. The configuration of power in respect of matters in the concurrent 
legislative list makes it possible for the federal government to arrogate more than enough 
powers to itself or even encroach on the authority of the states. In actual fact, as 
mentioned in chapter four, the federal government predominates in most of the matters 
itemized in the concurrent legislative list. 
In some cases, the concurrent legislative list also creates confusion and lack of clarity on 
who should be constitutionally responsible for a particular field. For instance, primary 
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education is a matter listed in the concurrent legislative list, but it is listed in a way that 
suggests that the power is reserved for the state governments.
49
 However, since the 
constitution empowers the federal government to legislate “on any matter in the 
concurrent legislative list,”50 the federal government has effectively taken over legislation 
in respect of primary education in Nigeria through its Universal Basic Education policy 
which is aimed at establishing a uniform primary education program for the whole of 
Nigeria.
51
 
The foregoing indicates that the concurrent legislative list is a potential instrument of 
centralization, usurpation and oppression. It has, in reality, served to broaden the scope of 
the powers assigned to the federal government well beyond that which it already 
possesses under the exclusive legislative list, thus making the federal government the 
dominant and indisputable repository of power in the federation.  
The centralist structure of the legislative lists set out in the 1999 constitution is certainly 
defective and unsuitable for a multi-ethnic federal state like Nigeria with diverse 
interests, needs and peculiarities. Matters such as policing in the states; the election of 
State Governors, their Deputies, and state legislators; the Judiciary of the states; 
regulation of local political parties; mines and minerals in the states; intra-state 
transportation; intra-state regulation of traffic; secondary education; tertiary education; 
tertiary healthcare, etcetera are internal affairs of states, and they ordinarily ought to be 
within the jurisdiction of the state governments.  
Apart from this, matters such as primary education, agriculture, and primary healthcare 
are matters which should ordinarily be within the jurisdiction of the local governments 
considering that agriculture, education and health care are matters that typically impact 
the rural communities in profound ways. Agricultural activities in Nigeria, for instance, 
largely take place in the rural communities.  
Being the closest to the local communities, the states and local governments are better 
placed to know the nature and type of education, healthcare and agriculture schemes that 
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best suit their respective communities. This is especially true of primary and secondary 
education, as well as primary healthcare.  The same can be said of a matter like local 
policing which, arguably, can be more efficiently provided by the state and local 
governments acting jointly or severally. States and local governments are more likely to 
know their local communities and their specific needs better than a central government 
that is far away. They are thus better positioned to assess local security needs and devise 
homegrown and community focused strategies to cater to those needs. Indeed, there is a 
general consensus in the literature that the relative proximity of regional or local 
governments to the townships and local communities make them better placed to provide 
certain public goods and services more efficiently to these communities.
52
 
As shown above, the division of powers and fiscal resources under the 1999 constitution 
is so overwhelmingly skewed in favour of the federal government that the state and local 
governments are, in reality, no more than ordinary appendages of the federal government, 
a condition that clearly contradicts the idea of federalism. The centralist character of the 
extant power allocation structure and its unsuitability for an ethnically diverse Nigeria, 
calls for a radical departure from the existing power distribution arrangement, and its 
replacement with a power distribution arrangement that is truly consistent with the idea 
of federalism. 
Ideally, the federal government ought to be concerned only with matters that jointly 
pertain to the entire federation while the state and local governments focus on their 
respective internal affairs. An example of this sort of arrangement is seen in the extant 
constitution of the United States of America (US). Under that constitution, power is 
shared among the levels of government via the instrumentality of only one legislative list 
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which sets out the powers exclusively assigned to the federal government.
53
 All other 
matters not specifically assigned to the federal government are assigned to the states.
54
   
In one of his Federalist papers, Madison explains the logic that informed the division of 
powers under the US constitution. According to him, the powers assigned to the US 
federal government under the constitution were expected to be “exercised principally on 
external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce…The powers reserved 
to the several states will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, 
concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, 
improvement, and prosperity of the state.”55 The division of powers in the US 
constitution is thus such that “the powers delegated by the…constitution to the federal 
government are few and defined” while “those which are to remain in the State 
governments are numerous and indefinite.”56 In essence, the framers of the US 
constitution were conscious of the need to preserve the right of the states to manage their 
internal affairs without undue interference from the federal government.  
The clear delineation of the powers assigned to the US federal government and the states 
was designed to prevent confusion as to who should exercise what power. It was also 
designed to forestall any undue encroachment on the powers reserved to the state 
governments or any attempt to undermine their autonomy. The US Supreme Court 
buttressed this when it said that “the preservation of the states, and the maintenance of 
their governments, are as much within the design and care of the constitution as the 
preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government. The 
Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of 
indestructible States.”57  
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The autonomy of the American states with respect to their internal affairs has been 
emphasized in the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court,
58
 And although a number of 
other decisions
59
 of the Court have tended to expand federal powers through a broad 
interpretation of the so called commerce clause,
60
 these decisions have not deleteriously 
detracted from the philosophy of state autonomy originally enshrined in the US 
constitution.
61
  
Just like the U.S Constitution, the 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia clearly sets out the 
powers that are assigned to the federal government and stipulates that “all powers not 
given expressly to the federal government alone, or concurrently to the federal 
government and the states are reserved to the states.”62 
A look at the powers assigned to the federal government in Ethiopia shows that like the 
US, the federal government is mainly saddled with defense, external matters, and the 
setting of basic minimum standards for programs and projects throughout the country.
63
 
The states, on the other hand, are constitutionally assigned all other significant legislative 
and executive powers of government. Thus, for instance, each state is allowed to run its 
own police force. Each state effectively controls its own land and natural resources.
64
 
And the power to legislate in respect of education, health and agricultural programs are 
effectively within the jurisdiction of the states since they are not among the powers 
assigned to the federal government. In fact, a major aim of the Ethiopian federal system 
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is to establish a system of administration that “best advances self government” for the 
states.
65
 
In the US and Ethiopian constitutions examined above, there is clarity in the division of 
powers among the federal and state governments. And a major policy of those 
constitutions is non-centralization. Both constitutions are designed to, as much as 
possible, guaranty the autonomy of the regional governments in those matters that are 
internal to them. This sort of arrangement is very important and useful in ethnically 
diverse federal countries where the people of each region or province have different 
cultural beliefs, political orientations, social needs, and religious practices. Ethiopia for 
instance is an ethnically diverse country, and the frame of government established by the 
country’s 1995 Constitution is informed by the “almost unprecedented ethnic, racial and 
religious diversity”66 of the country. At the time of making the 1995 constitution of 
Ethiopia, it was felt that the diversity of the country and the distinctness of each of the 
constituent units should be given expression by effectively empowering the states for 
internal self government. Prior to 1995, the battle for regional self government in 
Ethiopia had been bitterly fought by way of ethnic armed insurrection against the 
country’s centralist dictatorship.67 
There is no doubt that the conflicts bedeviling most of the multi-ethnic states of Africa 
are attributable to the several inter-ethnic competitions for power going on in these 
countries. Ethnic diversity is more pronounced, more consequential, and more deeply 
rooted in Africa than other parts of the world. As I argued in chapter three, the 
indiscriminate and reckless lumping together of hitherto independent and culturally 
distinct African communities, empires, and kingdoms during the colonial era led to the 
emergence of African States in which ethnic groups, in a bid to retain their identities and 
relevance, struggle for self-government. This is the reality of Africa. And although 
western scholars often struggle to understand or appreciate this, it is nevertheless Africa’s 
most evident reality. Federalism, the type that allows genuine political and fiscal 
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autonomy in the constituent units of a federation, is the answer to Africa’s numerous 
conflicts. It is the future of peace in Africa. 
In Nigeria, there is an urgent need to assign to the state and local governments, power and 
autonomy in respect of matters which directly concern them. The Nigerian federal system 
should aim at empowering the state and local governments to manage their respective 
internal affairs without any external interference or encumbrance, while reserving matters 
of general or common interest for the central government to administer centrally. The 
federal system should not seek to unduly empower the central government to the 
detriment of the state and local governments. 
However, for the non-centralization paradigm advocated above to be effective, 
reassignment of functions to the state and local governments must also be accompanied 
by a concomitant reallocation of revenue and fiscal authority to these tiers of government. 
Fiscal arrangements among the levels of government would thus have to be specially 
configured to reflect and accommodate the increase in the functions constitutionally 
assigned to the state and local governments.      
5.3.2.1. A Restructuring of the Legislative Lists 
To forestall incidents of encroachment on the powers of the states by the federal 
government as earlier discussed in this chapter, and to prevent the confusion that the 
concurrent legislative list may from time to time induce, as already discussed in this 
chapter, this thesis proposes the abolition of the concurrent legislative list and advocates 
the replacement of the current technique of power sharing with one that clearly spells out 
the legislative competences of each level of government, while reserving residual powers 
to the States.  
Thus instead of sharing power among the levels of government through the exclusive and 
concurrent legislative lists, as we have it under the 1999 constitution, it is proposed that 
three legislative lists be set out in the new constitution. These are the federal list, the state 
list, and the local government list. Each of these legislative/administrative lists should 
clearly and unambiguously spell out the legislative powers assigned to each level of 
government under the constitution. Power in respect of residual matters, that is, those 
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matters that are not listed under the federal, state, or local government lists should be  
assigned to the state governments. The constitution should also contain a provision 
granting autonomy to each level of government in the exercise of the powers assigned to 
it.         
The non-centralization of powers, and the accompanying power sharing technique 
advocated above will help to achieve a number of significant objectives. First, it will help 
to whittle down the excessive powers vested in the federal government under the 1999 
constitution, thus breaking that government’s hegemony and ending its decades-long 
subjugation of the state and local governments. Second it will help to take government 
closer to the people, such that community needs and aspirations are promptly and 
efficiently met, and local people can actually participate in the making of policy decisions 
that affect their daily lives. These are important goals that make non-centralization of 
powers in the form advocated above compelling indeed.  
Third, as mentioned in chapter four, non-centralization of powers, as advocated above, 
will help to promote experimentation, creativity, accountability, and healthy competition 
among the levels of government. Each state and local government in the federation will 
be able to develop policies that suit its immediate constituency. In designing and 
implementing policies, each state will be able to take into consideration the peculiar 
culture, traditions and needs of its people. States and local governments will be free to 
experiment with policies and projects until they know what works best for their people. 
And states and local governments will be able to learn from each other. A policy that is 
working well in a particular state might be adopted and tested in another state. Lastly, 
healthy competition will be induced among the state and local governments in the overall 
interest of the country’s economy. 
Importantly, with significant state and local government autonomy, political leaders in 
the state and local governments will be compelled to be more accountable to their people, 
since they know that their constituents will hold them directly accountable for the quality 
of governance in their constituencies and may vote them out during state and local 
government elections if they fail to perform. It is easier for people in the townships and 
rural communities to hold local leaders accountable for governance since these local 
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leaders are closer to them than officials and leaders of the central government who may 
have no incentive to provide quality governance considering that the local people may 
not be able to directly influence their elections.          
In addition to the foregoing, the power sharing technique proposed above will conduce to 
clarity in the constitutional division of powers and resources, and put an end to the 
dictatorship of the federal government which has, for long, been facilitated through the so 
called “concurrent legislative list.” Although the “concurrent legislative list” is in use in 
the constitutions of some other federal countries,
68
 it is important to ask whether, in the 
case of Nigeria, it has been helpful in any way? A country’s legal and constitutional 
policies must be tailored to suit its peculiarities and address its challenges. I have shown 
above that, in the experience of Nigeria, the concurrent legislative list has been most 
unhelpful and problematic. It has helped to facilitate centralization of powers by 
broadening the scope of powers available to the federal government under the 
constitution, thus entrenching the federal government’s dictatorship and hegemony. 
Abolishing it, as proposed, will significantly contribute to stemming the tide of 
centralization so far experienced in Nigeria’s federal system. 
5.3.2.2. What does Autonomy Portend? 
A question that needs to be addressed at this point is what autonomy in the exercise of 
constitutionally assigned powers, as advocated above, portends for the federal, state and 
local governments? Does autonomy imply independence, in terms that suggest total 
exclusivity in the socio-economic and political activities of each of the three levels of 
government? In other words, are the three levels of government to operate in watertight 
compartments, sequestered from each other, and completely impervious to social 
intercourse with each other? Put succinctly, does autonomy, in this sense, entail isolation 
or non-interaction? 
Clearly, no single level of government, in a country like Nigeria with limited human and 
fiscal resources, can be self-sufficient. Indeed, scholars agree that in all modern 
federations, cooperation and interdependence among the levels of government in the 
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delivery of public goods and services are in fact inevitable.
69
 According to Professor 
Nwabueze, “federalism conceives the national and state governments in the relation of 
mutually complementary parts of a single governmental mechanism. It demands of them 
co-operation with one another in order to promote the welfare of the nation through their 
combined powers.”70 Such cooperation, argues Nwabueze, is fostered through interaction 
among the levels of government in “pursuit of common economic, social and political 
purposes and interests.”71  
Thus, for instance, a state government may choose to work with the federal government 
to provide a public good or service for its constituents. Under such a cooperative 
arrangement, the state may, for instance, conceive of, and design, an electricity project 
for its constituents while the federal government could support this project by way of 
special grants or loan facilitation.  A group of states or local governments may also enter 
into cooperative arrangements in pursuit of similar economic or social goals. They may 
“take joint action on common problems, operate joint ventures, or establish linkages in 
various areas.”72 Autonomy is thus not a bar to cooperation. And cooperation does not 
necessarily detract from autonomy if cooperative arrangements are appropriately 
structured and managed. Cooperation is very important in an ethnically diverse federation 
like Nigeria that is beset by latent centrifugal forces.  
I believe that cooperation in multiethnic federations is the glue that keeps society 
together. The South African constitution recognizes this by stipulating the specific 
“principles of cooperative government and intergovernmental relations” that must be 
adhered to by the levels of government.
73
  Among other things, the South African 
constitution mandates the levels of government to promote cooperation by “fostering 
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friendly relations, assisting and supporting one another, informing one another of and 
consulting one another on matters of common interest, coordinating their actions and 
legislation with one another, and adhering to agreed procedures.”74 All of these go to 
show the importance attached to cooperation in that constitution. The Nigerian 
constitution could incorporate similar principles as a way of encouraging comity and 
respect for mutual cooperation among the levels of government in the federation. 
 
5.3.2.3. Arguments Commonly Raised Against Regional Autonomy 
A. Secession  
We must now turn to two major arguments often raised against non-centralization of 
powers and grant of autonomy to sub-national governments in federations generally and 
Nigeria in particular. The first is the oft-repeated “danger” of secession allegedly posed 
by regional autonomy.
75
 The belief is that, with sufficient power and fiscal resources at 
its disposal, a state government, for instance, might become emboldened to go it alone 
and declare its secession from Nigeria at the slightest provocation.  
Persistent ethnic tensions amid threats of secession in Nigeria often help to reinforce this 
belief. In fact, I mentioned in Chapter four that one of the reasons for the aggressive drive 
to centralize power in Nigeria after the three year civil war (1967-1970) was the belief 
that Eastern Nigeria’s declaration of secession from Nigeria was made possible because 
under the 1963 constitution of Nigeria, which was the supreme law of the land at the time 
of the civil war, the regional governments wielded substantial powers and had access to 
substantial revenue.  
There is no doubt that the threat of secession or disintegration is still a major challenge in 
Nigeria. But this challenge is not peculiar to Nigeria. Secessionism is latent in many 
federations. In fact, the Ethiopian constitution contains a clause indicating the right of the 
constituent units of the Ethiopian federation to secede.
76
 Yet, despite the obvious threat or 
                                                          
74
 Ibid, section 41(1)(h). 
75
 As we saw in chapter four, this is an argument often used by proponents of centralization in Nigeria, 
especially the military politicians and their civilian collaborators. 
76
 See Article 39(1) of the 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia. 
199 
 
challenge of secession or secessionism, many of these federations have not disintegrated. 
It appears that the threat of secession in Nigeria is not so much a possible consequence of 
non-centralization of powers or regional autonomy as the inability of the country’s 
federal government to creatively and genuinely construct bridges of unity across ethnic 
divides in order to cement the federal bond.  As discussed in earlier in this thesis,
77
 the 
failure to construct such bridges of unity was one of the major factors that precipitated 
the ill-fated secession of Eastern Nigeria from Nigeria in 1967. 
In their book on self-government in autonomous regions, Yash Ghai and Sophia 
Woodman argue that autonomous regions can be kept within a country by a combination 
of institutional techniques that consistently encourage cooperation and bonding among 
the regions of the federation. Such techniques include the encouragement and facilitation 
of popular participation in the common institutions of the National Government, fostering 
a culture of consultation and negotiation among the regions as well as the entrenchment 
of these values in the constitution in order to imbue them with permanence and 
immutability.
78
  
I have already advocated the adoption of these values in our discussion in this chapter. 
They are further discussed below. What remains to be emphasized is that consistent 
adherence to these values in inter-ethnic and inter-governmental relations will foster a 
sense of loyalty to the federation as a whole and will help to significantly reduce 
secessionist sentiments and secessionist threats. It will also help to promote and enhance 
unity. The threat of secession should therefore not be used as an excuse for centralization. 
Rather, conscious efforts should be made to adopt measures that foster unity without 
centralizing power. 
What advocates of centralization fail to realize is that centralization is not the antidote to 
secessionism. Centralization has, in fact, failed to quell secessionist and separatist 
agitations in Nigeria. For instance, as we saw in chapter four, such agitations have been 
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ongoing in the Niger Delta
79
 and have become more strident in recent times as seen in the 
resurgence of the demand for the secession of Eastern Nigeria from the rest of the 
country.
80
 As discussed in chapter four, recent agitations are actually fuelled by a 
resentment of the centralist character of the Nigerian federal system. It is clear therefore 
that centralization will not settle the problem of secession. Since these secessionist 
agitations stem from a desire for political and fiscal autonomy, a combination of 
approaches that foster unity while guaranteeing the autonomy of state and local 
governments is more likely to help in extirpating the fire of secession and separatism. 
The federal framework proposed in this thesis and outlined in this chapter provides the 
required combination of approaches necessary to address the problem of secession.    
B. Financial Corruption 
 Apart from the threat of secession discussed above, a second argument that may be 
advanced against autonomy to sub-national governments is the alleged proneness of the 
lower level governments to corrupt practices, especially financial crimes.
81
 The belief 
underpinning this is that entrusting lower levels of government with greater powers and 
higher revenues would provide these governments with the opportunity to corruptly use 
increased powers and revenues to further the private interests of local leaders and 
politicians.  
No doubt, corruption is a major problem in Nigeria. But it is a general problem whose 
tentacles are spread across all levels of government. Corruption in Nigeria is not confined 
to the lower levels of government. And it is illogical to insinuate that the state and local 
governments are the only ones susceptible to corrupt practices. A careful survey of the 
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corruption cases prosecuted so far by the country’s anticorruption agencies, the Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices 
Commission (ICPC) show that officials and political office holders across the federal, 
state and local governments have been indicted and prosecuted for financial crimes since 
the inception of these two commissions.
82
 Any attempt to justify centralization of powers 
and fiscal resources on the ground that state and local government autonomy may foster 
corruption will thus be unreasonable, at least in the case of Nigeria. 
Perhaps what is needed is a more comprehensive, impartial, and robust approach to 
anticorruption initiatives across all levels of government in Nigeria. One way of doing 
this is to strengthen the country’s anticorruption agencies and reposition them for more 
effective service delivery. A way to do this is to genuinely secure the independence of 
these two agencies. The EFCC and the ICPC are often perceived to be instruments in the 
hands of the President of the federation to harass and intimidate his real and perceived 
political enemies across the country while corrupt persons who are close associates of the 
President are seldom indicted or investigated by the anticorruption agencies.
83
 Several 
incidents in Nigeria’s recent history appear to lend credence to this perception.84  Only a 
truly independent anticorruption agency, completely impervious to the undue influence of 
the President of the federation and the ruling political party, can genuinely fight 
corruption across all levels of government in Nigeria. One way of securing the 
independence of the two agencies is to divest the President of the unilateral power to 
appoint and remove members of these two Commissions and vest this power jointly in 
the Nigerian Senate and the President. Thus the President of Nigeria should only appoint 
or remove members of the two commissions with the consent and approval of the 
Nigerian Senate.  
                                                          
82
 For details, see” Economic and Financial Crimes Commission’ 
<https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/news?start=10> (accessed 2/12/2016). See also ‘Independent Corrupt Practices 
and Other Related Offences Commission’< http://icpc.gov.ng/cases/> (accessed 2/12/2016).   
83
 Preye Kuro Inokoba and Weleayam Tina Ibegu, “Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) 
and Political Corruption: Implication for the Consolidation of Democracy in Nigeria” 2011 13(4) 
Anthropologist pp 288-289  http://www.krepublishers.com/02-Journals/T-Anth/Anth-13-0-000-11-
Web/Anth-13-4-000-11-Abst-Pdf/Anth-13-4-283-11-647-Inokoba-P-K/Anth-13-4-283-11-647-Inokoba-P-
K-Tt.pdf (accessed 3/12/2016); Wale Odunsi, ‘Buhari is like Obasanjo, he using EFCC To Crush 
Opponents’ Daily Post (20 October 2015) http://dailypost.ng/2015/10/20/buhari-is-like-obasanjo-he-using-
efcc-to-crush-opponents-adebanjo/ (accessed  3/12/2016). 
84
 Preye Kuro Inokoba and Weleayam Tina Ibegu, Ibid.  
202 
 
The power to remove members of the two commissions before the completion of their 
tenure should only be exercised if it is absolutely necessary, such as, for instance, where a 
member of any of the commissions has been found guilty of verifiable gross misconduct. 
With their independence guaranteed and the tenures of office their members secure, the 
commissions will be better positioned to prosecute their anticorruption mandates without 
fear or favour. 
The recommendation made above for tackling corruption is certainly not water-tight. 
Corruption is a huge problem in Nigeria. It is a hydra-headed monster that has plagued 
the country for decades. Regrettably, there is no easy solution to it. There will always be 
a need to devise new and innovative ways to consistently tackle corruption. It is a 
challenge that the federation and its constituent units will need to take up and jointly 
address. It will need the constant cooperation of all levels of government and all 
Nigerians to address. It is a daunting task, but with sincerity of purpose, it can be done.             
5.3.3. Need for an Inclusive and Democratically Structured Fiscal Commission. 
As we saw in chapter four, the 1999 constitution establishes a permanent fiscal 
commission, the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC), to, 
among other things, undertake the very important task of periodically reviewing the 
principles and formula for vertical and horizontal allocation of centrally collected tax 
revenue among the levels of government. It is also saddled with the equally important 
task of “monitoring accruals to and disbursements of revenue from the Federation 
Account.”85  
While the idea of a permanent fiscal commission is indeed a welcome development, 
considering that previous fiscal commissions of this nature were ad-hoc, the nature of the 
commission and its modus operandi are very important in view of their potential impact 
on the fairness, transparency and efficiency of the commission. For our purposes in this 
chapter, the nature of the commission is defined by the mode of appointing its members, 
the nature of its membership and the spread of that membership. The modus operandi of 
the commission refers to the commission’s method of operation. As we shall see in the 
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next few paragraphs, there are a number of problems with the nature, structure and modus 
operandi of the Commission that make it unsuitable for a multi-ethnic federation like 
Nigeria. I now turn to these issues.  
 
5.3.3.1. Method of Appointing Members of the Commission    
A clear evidence of the commission’s susceptibility to the federal government’s 
overwhelming control is seen in the method of appointing the commission’s members, 
which has not much to commend it. It will be recalled from the discussion in chapter four 
that the power to appoint members of the commission is heavily skewed in favour of the 
federal government with the President of the federation exercising unlimited discretion in 
the matter.
86
  
The wide discretionary power exercisable by the President in the appointment of the 
commission’s members, is prone to nepotism, favouritism, cronyism, corruption and 
other forms of abuse. As a result, there is the danger of having this important commission 
peopled with the President’s relatives, cronies and party acolytes who may be amenable 
to manipulation and political pressure from him and the federal government. The nature 
of politics in Nigeria and the awesome unilateral powers vested in the President under the 
constitution make it difficult to rule this possibility out. Anyone who is familiar with 
Nigeria’s politics of patronage knows that the President’s power to unilaterally appoint 
members of the commission renders the commission prone to external manipulation and 
political pressure. 
How can this problem be addressed? How can the commission be made as genuinely 
inclusive as possible and shielded from external manipulation? There are examples of 
African countries where fiscal commissions established to perform functions similar to 
that of Nigeria are structured to avoid a concentration of power in the federal 
government. For instance, in South Africa, the constitution obliges the President to make 
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appointments to the fiscal commission only after due consultation with the Regional 
Premiers and Local Governments.
87
  
The Ethiopian example is even more remarkable. In Ethiopia, the principles and formula 
for the allocation of revenues that jointly belong to the levels of government is 
determined by the House of Federation, a body composed of the “representatives of 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples” of Ethiopia.88 This makes it difficult for the central 
government in that country to unilaterally appropriate the power to make fiscal policy for 
the promotion of its own interests. 
Nigeria needs an even more radical approach than the South African and Ethiopian 
approaches described above because of the ethnic tensions that are constantly threatening 
to dismember the country on account of revenue allocation. A genuinely inclusive fiscal 
commission will give people from all parts of the federation a sense of belonging and 
ensure that decisions on revenue allocation and the principles governing it are jointly 
owned by the federation and its peoples. It will also enhance cooperation and unity 
among the people as they cooperatively design fiscal policies that serve the interests of 
the federation and its constituent units. 
 Cheryl Saunders captured the point succinctly when she stated that “the participation of 
the federated regions, as regions, in central institutions is an element in the design of all 
federations. It helps to provide the glue for the federated State, balancing the dynamics of 
self-rule. In symbolic terms, it acknowledges the shared ownership of the state. For 
practical purposes, it enables the needs and perspectives of the constituent parts of the 
state to be fed into decisions made at the centre.”89  
In the case of Nigeria, the first step that should be taken in order to make the commission 
as inclusive and representative as possible is to make membership of the commission 
genuinely broad in order to ensure that every part of the federation is represented in the 
commission. A way to achieve this goal is to have a stipulation in the new constitution 
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requiring that membership of this commission should be drawn from all the thirty six 
states of Nigeria. In essence, in addition to a representative of the central government, 
each of the states should have a nominee in the Commission. And rather than the 
country’s President monopolizing the power of appointment to the commission, as is the 
case under the 1999 Constitution, the nominee of each state in the commission should be 
nominated by the state Governor after due consultation with the State’s House of 
Assembly.  
The House of Assembly of a state is the state’s legislative body, and it consists of the 
representatives of all the local government councils in the state. By stipulating that the 
representative of each state in the commission should be nominated by the state Governor 
after due consultation with the state’s House of Assembly, the constitution would ensure 
that such a person genuinely represents the state in the commission.  
The proposed method of appointing the members of the commission is unlike the existing 
arrangement that allows the President to select anyone that catches his fancy from each of 
the states- a condition that makes the commission susceptible to manipulation and 
pressure from the federal government, since “he who pays the piper dictates the tune.” A 
member of the commission who has been unilaterally appointed to that position by the 
President may feel beholden to the President. He may find himself under pressure to 
show ‘loyalty’ to the President, and he may be unable to resist any attempt by the federal 
government, whose head is the President, to manipulate the decisions of the 
commission.
90
 Such is the danger of assigning to a single person, the sole authority and 
discretion to appoint members of a commission that is considered very significant to an 
entire federation. Dicey warned us, in his Law of the Constitution, that “wherever there is 
discretion, there is room for arbitrariness.”91This is a point that should not be taken 
lightly.  
As earlier stated, In addition to the sense of belonging that the proposed mode of 
appointment to the fiscal commission would give to each state of the federation, it will 
afford every section of the federation the opportunity of participating in the formulation 
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of important fiscal policies of the federation, especially the determination of revenue 
allocation principles and the formula for revenue allocation. In addition to this, it will 
significantly curtail the vulnerability of the commission to pressure and manipulation 
from the federal government and ensure that the work of the commission is genuinely 
carried out in the interest of the entire federation. 
5.3.3.2. Consultation 
It would be recalled that a major problem identified in chapter four about the modus 
operandi of the existing commission is that nothing in the 1999 constitution makes public 
consultation with the people of Nigeria, a mandatory or significant part of the 
commission’s decision making process. Yet, the commission’s decisions, policies and 
recommendations on the federation’s fiscal architecture carry far-reaching and significant 
implications for economic development throughout Nigeria. 
In chapter three, I argued that a major cause of the age-long conflict over revenue 
allocation among the levels of government is the exclusionist character and exclusionist 
modus operandi of many of the fiscal commissions established by the federal government 
before 1999. These commissions were often solely made up of so called ‘financial 
experts’ who were solely appointed by the federal government and answerable to the 
federal government only. These “financial experts” often made very limited or no public 
consultation in the course of their work. The fiscal policies introduced by these “financial 
experts” were thus often out of sync with the wishes and aspirations of the Nigerian 
people. The exclusionist approach employed by these ad hoc fiscal commissions meant 
that fiscal policies affecting every part of Nigeria were exclusively determined by the 
federal government and then foisted on the state and local governments. Such an 
approach was bound to induce widespread disaffection. And, as we saw in chapter three, 
it, more often than not, did.  
Regrettably, RMAFC under the 1999 constitution is not radically different from the 
previous fiscal commissions in this regard. The Commission is not constitutionally 
mandated to carry out any form of public consultation in the process of performing its 
functions. The implication of this is that the commission can take far-reaching and 
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important decisions without interacting with the people who would be affected by its 
policies. Like its predecessors therefore the existing commission stands the risk of 
formulating policies that are out of sync with prevailing socio-economic realities and the 
wishes and expectations of the people. 
It would thus be necessary to have a provision in the new constitution mandating the 
commission to consult widely with the Nigerian people in the course of its work. This can 
be done through public hearings and debates as well as town hall meetings convened 
specially to obtain the views of the people on specific fiscal policies. Consulting with 
Nigerians in the various urban and rural communities is a useful way of obtaining their 
frank views on proposed fiscal policies or getting feedback on existing fiscal policies. 
This would help to ensure that the commission takes the views of the people into 
consideration when deciding on significant fiscal matters like revenue allocation, for 
instance. All of the foregoing will help to ensure that the federation’s fiscal system is 
genuinely and inclusively shaped by Nigerians from every part of the country and not just 
by an elite club of oligarchs. 
5.3.3.3. Broadening the Scope of the Commission’s Work 
In addition to all that has been discussed and proposed so far in respect of the fiscal 
commission, there is a need to broaden the commission’s constitutional mandate to bring 
within the scope of its work, the exercise of certain fiscal powers that have, over time, 
been unilaterally exercised and abused by the federal government. One of such fiscal 
powers is particularly important and its management should not be left solely in the hands 
of the federal government. This is the borrowing powers of the federation which is 
exclusively assigned to the federal government under the 1999 Constitution.
92
 
It would be recalled from the discussion in chapter four that many state governments 
have decried the federal government’s abuse of its exclusive control over the borrowing 
powers of the federation. In chapter four, I discussed the susceptibility of this power to 
abuse. In particular, i discussed how the exclusive exercise of this power by the federal 
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government can be manipulated to deliberately deprive state and local governments, 
especially those controlled by opposition parties, the opportunity to access financing for 
development. Yet loans are very important sources of development revenue for the 
constituent units of a federation. There is thus a need to ensure that lower levels of 
government are able to fairly access loan facilities to finance development projects in 
their domains. 
In order to promote transparency and fairness in the approval of requests by states and 
local governments for internal or external loan transactions, it is proposed that control 
over this matter should be taken over by the fiscal commission whose membership, as 
proposed above, is expected to be broad, and more likely to be impervious to the bias, 
partiality, political pressure, manipulation and fraud which the federal government is 
often prone to. This would help to curtail the arbitrariness often exhibited by the federal 
government in the exercise of this power and enable a much fairer and more transparent 
exercise of this power by the fiscal commission instead.  
5.4. A Commission on Federalism 
Having set out different proposals for the reform of Nigeria’s power distribution 
architecture above, it is important that the new constitution should also establish a 
Commission on Federalism to monitor, encourage and advocate compliance with the 
federal values advocated in this thesis. This commission should be mandated to conduct 
periodic appraisal of intergovernmental power relations and government-citizen relations 
to assess compliance with the federal values of covenant, cooperation, and non-
centralization of powers. The commission should also issue regular reports which will 
form the basis of its advocacy work to encourage compliance.  
The advocacy work of the commission should be conducted through bespoke seminars, 
conferences, and workshops aimed at enlightening government leaders, civil servants, 
and the general public on the need to adhere to the federal principles established by the 
constitution. 
This commission is urgently needed considering that public governance in Nigeria has for 
long been conducted along centralist lines. Sustained vigilance, re-orientation, and 
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advocacy is needed to ensure that the federal framework proposed in this thesis is 
consistently adhered to in the interest of the federation.         
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have outlined an alternative federal constitutional framework for the 
division of powers and fiscal resources among the levels of government in the Nigerian 
federation. The chapter itself is a follow up to chapter four which critically appraised the 
power distribution arrangements set out in the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. As shown in 
that chapter, a major problem associated with the existing constitutional framework for 
the division of powers and fiscal resources in Nigeria is the approach employed in 
devising and adopting it. Any discussion of this point must however be preceded by a 
consideration of the approach employed in framing, adopting and promulgating the 1999 
Constitution itself since this problematic division of powers and fiscal resources is 
contained in that Constitution.  
As discussed in chapter four, the 1999 constitution of Nigeria, like other Nigerian 
constitutions before it, is not a ‘people’s constitution’ in the true sense of that phrase.  
The Constitution was unilaterally framed, unilaterally adopted and unilaterally 
promulgated into law by military fiat on the eve of Nigeria’s return to civil rule in 1999. 
In making this Constitution, the people were not consulted, neither were their opinions 
sought. The Constitution was, in essence, centrally conceived, centrally designed and 
arbitrarily foisted on the Nigerian people.   
It stands to reason therefore that the division of powers and fiscal resources set out in this 
undemocratic constitution cannot be said to reflect the wishes and aspirations of the 
Nigerian people. A direct consequence of the unilateral formulation of the division of 
powers and resources set out in the 1999 Constitution is that this power distribution 
architecture is highly centralized and inordinately skewed in favour of the federal 
government to the detriment of the state and local governments.  
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The framers of the 1999 Constitution were clearly actuated by a determination to invest 
the federal government with monopoly of power despite the heterogeneous character of 
the Nigerian State. This power distribution arrangement was inspired by a centralist 
conception of federalism, characteristic of the military framers of the constitution. But, as 
I argued in chapter four, this perspective of federalism only serves to create and entrench 
the hegemony and dictatorship of the federal government and a simultaneous subjugation 
of the state and local governments, a situation that is clearly antithetical to the idea of 
federalism.  
Any attempt to address the problems associated with the centralist division of powers and 
fiscal resources contained in the 1999 constitution must therefore commence with a 
reconceptualization of Nigerian federalism.   
In constructing a new federal framework for Nigeria in this chapter, I argued for a radical 
departure from the undue centralism and unilateralism that hallmark the current federal 
arrangement. I proposed a federal system rooted in the will of the people, solicitous of 
their welfare and animated by their cooperation. Such a model of federalism finds 
expression in my symbio-democratic federal framework, anchored in covenant, 
cooperation, and non-centralization of powers. Covenant, as used in this framework, 
indicates genuine agreement among the people as to the character of the federation, the 
fundamental principles of government, and the nature of power relations among the 
levels of government. Cooperation indicates joint action among the people or the levels 
of government to facilitate public welfare and enhance the unity of the federation. And 
non-centralization of powers implies the curtailment of the federal government’s 
dominance of the polity by assigning power over matters that are primarily of local 
interest to the state and local governments. 
 So basic and essential are covenant, cooperation and non-centralization of powers to the 
idea of federalism in multi-ethnic societies that they must now be regarded as peremptory 
principles of federalism from which there should be no derogation, as  derogation from 
any of them will significantly defeat the very essence of federalism in such societies.  
This is the core idea underpinning the symbio-democratic federal framework proposed in 
this thesis. The symbio-democratic federal framework, as conceived in this thesis, is a 
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counter-hegemonic construct for limiting the powers of the federal government, halting 
its hegemony and curtailing its arbitrariness. It provides the best guaranty for forging 
unity in diversity in a multi-ethnic federation like Nigeria.    
A number of constitutional reforms are outlined in the chapter to reflect the proposed 
symbio-democratic federal arrangement. First, it is argued that any attempt to address the 
problems associated with division of powers and fiscal resources among the levels of 
government in Nigeria must commence with an abrogation of the existing 1999 
constitution and its replacement with a new one that genuinely reflects the wishes and 
aspirations of the Nigerian people on how legislative and fiscal powers should be 
allocated among the levels of government. 
In essence, whatever power distribution arrangement is finally entrenched in the 
constitution must reflect what the people have willingly and voluntarily covenanted 
among themselves. Achieving this would require a constitution making process that is 
inclusive. Popular participation of Nigerians from every section of the country must 
hallmark the process. As part of the constitution making process, the thesis advocates the 
setting up of a Constitution Drafting Committee consisting of constitutional experts, 
professionals, and traditional rulers to collate the views of Nigerians across the country 
and prepare a draft constitution on the basis of those views. The draft constitution should 
then be submitted to an elected Constituent Assembly consisting of representatives from 
every part of Nigeria. After extensive debates, negotiations, concessions and 
compromises on the draft, a final draft of the constitution prepared by the constituent 
assembly should be subjected to a referendum involving all Nigerians of voting age who 
will ratify the constitution as the document articulating the covenant of the Nigerian 
people on how they wish to be governed. This is the way to ensure that governance 
arrangements enshrined in the constitution, including division of powers and fiscal 
resources are an expression of what has been genuinely covenanted by the people. 
Second, division of powers and fiscal resources in the proposed constitution should 
radically depart from the centralism entrenched in the current 1999 constitution of 
Nigeria. I proposed that allocation of powers and fiscal resources under the new 
constitution should be guided by the need to have matters that are primarily of local 
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interest within the executive and legislative jurisdiction of the state and local 
governments while the federal government oversees matters that are of general interest to 
the federation and those that transcend state boundaries.  
Power over local matters will need to be assigned to the states and local governments to 
allow such matters to be more efficiently superintended. Each level of government should 
also be allowed to exercise autonomy in matters constitutionally assigned to it. However, 
the assignment of new powers to the states and local governments under the new 
constitution must be accompanied by a concomitant reallocation of revenue and fiscal 
resources to them to ensure that each level of government has access to financial 
resources reasonably sufficient to support its constitutionally assigned powers. 
To make the allocation of powers under the new constitution clear and unambiguous, and 
to prevent the federal government’s encroachment on the powers of the state government, 
as has been experienced under the 1999 constitution, I proposed the replacement of the 
existing technique of power sharing with one that clearly sets out the powers assigned to 
each level of government under the constitution while reserving residual powers to the 
state governments.  
Thus instead of having two legislative lists, namely the exclusive legislative list and the 
concurrent legislative list, as is the case under the existing 1999 constitution, I proposed 
the entrenchment of three legislative lists in the constitution, namely, “federal list”, “state 
list”, and “local government list.” Each legislative/administrative list should clearly and 
unambiguously set out the powers assigned to each level of government. This will ensure 
that each level of government operates only within the limits set for it by the constitution. 
It will prevent the encroachment of the federal government on the powers of the state and 
local governments. Residual powers in respect of matters not itemized in the three 
legislative lists should be exercised by the state governments. Each level of government 
should also exercise unfettered autonomy in respect of matters assigned to it in the 
relevant legislative list. 
Autonomy of the levels of government is however not a bar to cooperation among them. 
Cooperation can take place between the federal, state and Local Governments. For 
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instance, the federal government may provide grants or technical support to a state or 
local government to augment its finances or support the provision of specific social 
services. Cooperation can also take place between the states or local governments inter 
se. This can, for instance, happen when a group of states or local governments team up to 
jointly provide targeted social services to their constituents. It can also happen when 
wealthy states give up part of their wealth to augment the finances of fiscally weak states 
via the system of fiscal equalization. As the levels of government cooperatively work 
towards promoting the public welfare, unity within the federation is enhanced and 
strengthened. 
Third, I proposed that the constitution should establish a Fiscal Commission to, among 
other things, review, periodically, the criteria and formula for the allocation of those tax 
revenues that are centrally collected, among the levels of government in Nigeria. But 
unlike what obtains under the 1999 constitution, I argue for a more democratic and 
inclusive composition of the commission’s membership. Membership should be 
genuinely drawn from all the states of the federation to ensure that every state of the 
federation has a say in how centrally collected tax revenue is shared among the levels of 
government. And considering the importance and sensitivity of the commission’s 
mandate, members of the commission should be nominated, not by the President of the 
federation, as is the case under the 1999 constitution, but by the state Governors acting in 
concert with their respective Houses of Assembly.  
I also proposed that a clause be inserted in the Constitution to mandate the Commission 
to consult widely and directly with the Nigerian people before taking definite decisions 
on the criteria and formula for allocation of centrally collected tax revenue. The measures 
proposed above, namely, inclusive membership; nomination of members by the State 
Governors in concert with their respective Houses of Assembly, as against the current 
discretionary appointment of members by the President of the Federation; and wide 
public consultations in the commission’s decision making processes, will ensure that the 
very important decisions of the commission truly reflect the wishes and aspirations of the 
Nigerian people. In addition, the unity of the country will be enhanced, as members of the 
214 
 
commission and the general public cooperatively deliberate and agree on the very 
important issues associated with revenue allocation. 
Finally I proposed the establishment, by the constitution, of a Commission on Federalism 
to monitor, advocate and encourage consistent compliance with the federal principles 
advocated in this thesis, namely covenant, cooperation, and non-centralization of powers. 
I argued that this commission is urgently needed considering that the centralist 
perspective of federalism has, for long, taken root in Nigeria. And it would take sustained 
vigilance, and consistent advocacy to instill in the public psyche the federal values 
advocated in this thesis.    
The proposals for policy and constitutional reform made above show that covenant, 
cooperation and non-centralization of powers as conceived in this chapter are 
fundamental instruments for addressing the problems associated with Nigeria’s 
centralized “federal” system. They are important instruments for preventing 
centralization of powers and ensuring that the Nigerian people truly have a say in how the 
federal system is structured and how powers and fiscal resources are distributed among 
the levels of government. In short, they are important instruments for limiting the powers 
of the federal government and curtailing the arbitrariness and dictatorship that have 
hallmarked Nigeria’s federal system for decades.                     
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                                                CHAPTER   SIX 
CONCLUSION: A SYMBIO-DEMOCRATIC FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK  AND INSTITUTIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Thus far in this thesis, I have established that one of the most controversial constitutional 
issues in Nigeria today is the highly centralized nature of the country’s federalism as 
depicted by the centralist division of powers and fiscal resources among the levels of 
government in the federation. The power distribution framework entrenched in the extant 
1999 constitution of Nigeria is overwhelmingly skewed in favour of the federal (central) 
government, and significantly undermines the ability of the state and local governments 
to manage their internal affairs and determine how they wish to be governed. The 
discussions in chapters three and four show that this problematic and insensitive power 
distribution arrangement has, for several decades, been a major source of acrimonious 
ethnic unrests and secessionist agitations across Nigeria.  
Although questions of power distribution are notoriously thorny in most federations, they 
are particularly contentious and acrimonious in Nigeria due to the country’s multi-ethnic 
character and the constant struggle for power, survival and ascendancy among the ethnic 
nationalities that make up the Nigerian federation. Public debates on Nigeria’s federalism 
and the constitutional division of powers and fiscal resources often evoke passion and 
induce tension.
1
 As discussed in chapter four, such is the sensitivity of the power 
distribution problem in Nigeria, that it has frequently ignited separatist and secessionist 
agitations across the country.
2
 
                                                          
1
 For instance, during a political conference in 2005, delegates from the Niger Delta region of Nigeria 
staged a walk-out on the conference when their demand for the power to control the exploitation and 
exploration of mineral resources in their region was rejected at the conference. See E.K Clark, ‘The Niger 
Delta Question: The Imperatives for Peace and Progress’ in Augustine A. Ikein et al ed., Oil, Democracy, 
and the Promise of True Federalism in Nigeria (University Press of America, 2008) p.202. 
2
 See Chapters 3 and 4 for the discussion on the Eastern Region’s declaration of the ‘Sovereign Republic of 
Biafra’ in the late 1960s, as well as subsequent secessionist and separatist agitations since then. See also 
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A main argument emphasized in this thesis is that the extant constitutional division of 
powers and fiscal resources among the levels of government in Nigeria is absolutely 
unsuitable for an ethnically diverse federation like Nigeria. It fosters central government 
dictatorship and stifles genuine democratic governance. It also enhances the domination 
of smaller ethnic groups by the larger ones. The constitution’s problematic division of 
powers is however a reflection, and thus a symptom of a much bigger problem, to wit, the 
fundamentally flawed centralist conception of federalism long espoused and promoted by 
Nigeria’s ruling elite.  
To be precise, the power distribution problem is a direct result of the centralist political 
philosophy foisted on Nigeria, first by the colonialists shortly before independence, and 
subsequently by the country’s military rulers and their civilian collaborators in the post-
colonial era.
3
 In fact, a major argument advanced in chapter three of this thesis is that 
Nigeria’s ‘centralized federalism’ is a direct legacy of its colonial and military past. Any 
attempt to reform Nigeria’s extant constitutional framework for the division of powers 
and fiscal resources must therefore commence with a re-conceptualization and 
reconstruction of Nigeria’s federalism. This, amongst others, is what this thesis has 
sought to do. 
In this chapter, I elaborate on my earlier argument
4
 for a symbio-democratic federal 
arrangement which promotes a non-centralized, covenant-driven constitutional 
framework for the division of powers and fiscal resources among the levels of 
government in the Nigerian federation. I also make concrete proposals for institutional 
reform. Unlike the existing power distribution arrangement which clearly ignores 
Nigeria’s diversity, the framework proposed in this thesis takes into consideration the 
ethnically diverse character of Nigeria and the need for sub-national government 
autonomy. It thus serves as a more democratic alternative to the centralist political 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Blessing Admin, ‘Enough is Enough !!! I Will Spearhead Millions of Igbos, Yorubas, To Break Out and 
Shut Down Nigeria Before 2019’ Reportersng (April 2017) http://www.reportersng.com/2017/04/enough-
is-enough-i-will-spearhead.html (accessed 24/04/2017).    
3
 This is fully discussed in chapter three of this thesis. 
4
 See Chapter five for an earlier discussion of the Symbio-democratic federal framework proposed in this 
thesis. 
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arrangement espoused by the Nigerian elite and entrenched in the 1999 constitution of 
Nigeria. 
For the sake of clarity, I commence by briefly setting out the problems associated with 
the division of powers and fiscal resources entrenched in the 1999 constitution of Nigeria. 
As discussed in chapters four and five, these include the arbitrary approach employed in 
determining this power distribution structure, and the overwhelmingly centralized 
allocation of powers and fiscal resources among the levels of government in spite of 
Nigeria’s ethnic diversity and the age-long clamour for autonomy by the constituent units 
of the federation. Setting out the problems at the beginning aids a clearer understanding 
of the major issues addressed in this thesis. It also helps us to understand why an 
alternative constitutional framework for the division of powers is needed, and why this 
thesis is particularly important at this critical juncture in Nigeria’s political history. 
Next I set out and expatiate on the symbio-democratic federal framework proposed in this 
thesis and earlier discussed in chapter five as an alternative to the extant centralist federal 
framework in Nigeria. This framework is characterized by three key principles, namely 
covenant, cooperation and non-centralization of powers. I argue that to be meaningful, 
federal arrangements in ethnically diverse federal states must be covenanted. This implies 
that the basic principles of the federal system must be agreed by all the parties involved 
in the federal arrangement. The framing and promulgation of the federal constitution in 
such an ethnically diverse society cannot and must not be the exclusive preserve or 
prerogative of the elite or a privileged section of society. All parties to the federal 
arrangement must jointly frame the constitution. They must jointly decide the nature of 
power relations within the federation. And they must jointly decide how the federal 
system should be operated. In essence, the constitution must be an expression of their 
covenant. It must be an articulation of what they have jointly agreed or covenanted. 
In addition, the federal constitution must enhance cooperation among the constituent 
units of the multi-ethnic federation in order to foster unity. It must also emphasize non-
centralization of powers, which must be accompanied by autonomy for the lower levels 
of government. Power must not and should never be concentrated in the central 
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government. Rather, the constitution of an ethnically diverse federal state must, as far as 
is practicable, be structured to ensure that regional governments are significantly in 
control of their own internal affairs. I argue that the three principles outlined above, 
namely covenant, cooperation and non-centralization of powers are so basic and so 
essential to the idea of federalism in multi-ethnic societies that they must be regarded as 
peremptory principles from which there should be no derogation. This is the symbio-
democratic conception of federalism.  Federalism in this sense is used broadly to embrace 
its political and fiscal aspects. 
Having articulated a new federal perspective, different from the centralist political 
perspective that clearly underpins the division of powers and fiscal resources in the 1999 
constitution, I then proceed to propose concrete institutional reforms to reflect the  non-
centralized, covenant-driven symbio-democratic federal framework for the division of 
powers and fiscal resources proposed in this thesis. 
6.1. Problems of the Extant Power Distribution Arrangement. 
As emphasized in chapter four, the division of powers and fiscal resources in the 1999 
constitution is particularly problematic for two main reasons.
5
 First, as was the case with 
previous constitutions of Nigeria,
6
 it was centrally determined without any significant 
consultation with or active participation of the Nigerian people. In fact, the entire 1999 
constitution, in which this division of powers and resources is entrenched, was itself 
promulgated into law by military autocrats without the active participation of the people 
in its formulation.
7
 By implication therefore, the division of powers and fiscal resources 
in the 1999 constitution cannot be said to genuinely reflect the will of the Nigerian 
people. Rather, it is an arrangement apparently designed and structured to foster the 
hegemony and dictatorship of the federal (central) government.
8
 
                                                          
5
 See chapter four of this thesis for a full discussion of these problems. 
6
 These are the 1914, 1922, 1946, 1951, 1954, 1960, 1963 and 1979 constitutions. 
7
 The 1999 constitution was decreed into existence as a schedule to Decree 24 of the Federal Military 
Government in 1999.  
8
 In fact, the military framers of the 1999 constitution appear to have unilaterally formulated the 1999 
constitution with the deliberate aim of perpetuating their grip on the Nigerian state even under subsequent 
civilian administrations. Since the return to civil rule in 1999, the military elite has been able to “install” its 
members and surrogates as Presidents of Nigeria. For instance, retired General Olusegun Obasanjo ruled 
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Second, the division of powers and fiscal resources entrenched in the 1999 constitution is 
overwhelmingly, and perhaps immorally, skewed in favour of the federal government. So 
lopsided is this arrangement that legislative powers which should ordinarily be within the 
exclusive province of the state and local governments are invariably assigned to the 
federal government under the constitution.
9
 The effect of this insensitive and 
dysfunctional division of powers is the literal elevation of the federal (central) 
government to the status of an overlord, and the concomitant subjugation and 
pauperization of the state and local governments, a situation that has, for years, 
engendered ethnic unrests and regional instability.
10
    
Third, the Fiscal Commission established by the 1999 constitution to monitor accruals to 
the Federation Account and coordinate vertical and horizontal allocation of revenues 
among the levels of government is heavily centralized. Apart from the wide latitude and 
discretion conferred on the President of Nigeria in the appointment of members of the 
Commission, there is nothing in the constitution that obliges the Commission to consult 
with all sections of the country in the conduct of its constitutionally assigned 
responsibilities, despite the far reaching impact its decisions have throughout the 
federation. The implication of the above is that the President can, in fact, legally fill the 
Commission with his political acolytes, relatives and cronies, who would unflinchingly 
do his bidding. This potentially renders the Commission prone to the political influence 
and manipulation of the federal government. And, since the Commission is not 
                                                                                                                                                                             
from 1999-2007; Alhaji Umar Yaradua, a brother to retired General Yaradua succeded President Obasanjo 
and ruled from 2007-2010; Yaradua was succeeded by President Goodluck Jonathan, who was sponsored 
and installed by retired General Obasanjo. Jonathan ruled from 2010-2015. The incumbent President is 
retired General Muhammadu Buhari. President Buhari also ruled Nigeria as military head of state from 
1983 to 1985. Since its introduction, the 1999 constitution has facilitated the centralist vision of its military 
authors and has helped to consolidate their hold on the country.    
9
 See a more comprehensive discussion of this in chapter four of this thesis. The assignment of powers 
among the levels of government is contained in Parts 1 & II of the Second Schedule to the 1999 
constitution. It is also set out in figure 1 of the appendix in chapter four. 
10
 For instance, the recent resurgence of violent agitations for a breakaway of South-Eastern Nigeria to 
form the “sovereign state of Biafra” is an expression of discontent with the current power distribution 
structure in Nigeria. Similar manifestations of such discontent are evident in the militancy in the Niger 
Delta in South-South Nigeria, the boko-haram crisis in North Eastern Nigeria, and the agitations for the 
creation of Oduduwa Republic in South-Western Nigeria. These regional and ethnic conflicts are 
symptomatic of deep regional resentment of the centralist division of powers and fiscal resources in the 
1999 constitution. For more on this see J. Isawa Elaigwu, ‘The Challenges of Federalism in Nigeria: An 
Overview’ in J. Isawa Elaigwu ed., Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria- Facing the Challenges of the Future 
(Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd, 2008) pp 33-36.   
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constitutionally mandated to engage in public consultations in the execution of its duties, 
it can unilaterally take decisions on sensitive issues such as the criteria and formula for 
revenue allocation among the levels of government in the federation, both of which are 
touchy issues that have, for several years, consistently generated acrimonious controversy 
nationwide.
11
           
The three issues raised above collectively highlight the highly centralized character of the 
Nigerian federal system. In fact, chapters three and four of this thesis conclusively show 
that Nigeria’s federal system has, for several decades, been held down by a centralist 
conception of federal governance, as initially espoused by the colonial rulers of Nigeria 
in the early part of the twentieth century and subsequently reinforced by their military 
and civilian successors in later years. In other words, “federal’ governance in Nigeria has 
for several years been conducted within a framework that is highly centralist in character. 
This centralist ‘federal’ framework, as we have seen, is characterized by unilateralism, 
exclusionism, and hegemony. It favours the dictatorship of the federal government and 
subverts the democratic autonomy of the state and local governments. 
6.2. A Symbio-Democratic Federal Constitutional Framework 
In chapter five, I argued for an alternative framework for Nigeria’s federalism. This 
alternative framework must be one that takes into consideration the country’s diversity, 
and the need to secure significant self-government and autonomy for the constituent units 
of the federation. It must be one that views the relationship between levels of government 
as a partnership rather than a master-servant serfdom. And it must be one that prioritizes 
popular participation and adherence to the will of the people as fundamental elements of 
federal governance. 
This alternative federal framework is a symbio-democratic federal constitutional 
arrangement predicated on the principles of covenant, cooperation and non-centralization 
of powers. It is a non-centralized, covenant-driven framework anchored on the 
                                                          
11
 The existing revenue allocation principles are population, equality of states, internal revenue generation, 
land mass, terrain, population density. There is also a limited application of the principle of derivation in 
respect of allocation of revenues derived from the exploitation of natural resources. See Section 162(2) 
1999 constitution.  
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philosophy that covenant, cooperation and non-centralization of powers are so 
fundamentally essential to the idea of federalism in ethnically diverse societies that these 
three principles must be regarded as peremptory principles, from which there should be 
no derogation.  
6.2.1 Covenant. 
Covenant essentially indicates “agreement.” Covenant or agreement should be a 
cornerstone of federalism in ethnically diverse federations like Nigeria. As discussed in 
chapter two of this thesis, the term ‘federal’ is itself a derivative of the latin word 
“foedus” which literally implies “covenant” or “agreement of alliance.”12 “Foedera” was 
a term used colloquially to describe the ancient leagues and alliances of the Greek city-
states, most of which were the products of solemn covenant or agreement among the 
federating city-states.
13
 In the modern era, the federal system established by the 1789 
constitution of the United States, which is often held up as the progenitor of modern 
federalism,
14
 is a product of covenant secured through an inclusive and deliberative 
constitution making process involving the active participation of the original thirteen 
American states. The same goes for the federal arrangements established by the various 
Swiss constitutions since 1848.
15
 The above underscores the historical significance of 
covenant or agreement as an intrinsically basic component of federalism. It signifies the 
integrality of covenant to the very idea of federalism. 
In an ethnically diverse federal state, covenant is indeed very crucial in legitimizing the 
federal arrangement. The federating units and their people must covenant or agree to 
cohabit under the federal system. They must consciously and overwhelmingly subscribe 
                                                          
12
 See Daniel J Elazar, ‘The Themes of a Journal of Federalism,’ (1971) 1(1) Publius p.4.  See also Daniel 
J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States (Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1966) p.vi; S.Rufus 
Davis, The Federal Principle- A Journey Through Time in Quest of a Meaning (University of California 
Press, 1978) p.3. 
13
 S. Rufus Davis, Ibid, p.14; 23. 
14
 Sobei Mogi, The Problem of Federalism (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1931) p.21; Ronald L. 
Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008) p. 29; George Anderson, 
Federalism: An Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2008) p.8. 
15
 Rufus Davis gives an excellent description of this process in S. Rufus Davis (note 12 supra) pp 76-99. 
Also, in volume IV of his Covenant Tradition in Politics Daniel Elazar highlights the covenantal 
foundation of the American and Swiss Constitutions. See Daniel Elazar, The Covenant Tradition in 
Politics, Vol.4 (Transaction Publishers, 1995) pp.227-228; pp 202-203. 
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to the constitutional division of powers and fiscal resources in the federation. And they 
must agree to be bound by the law(s) setting up the federation. A federation cannot be 
decreed into existence, neither can its organizing principles be arbitrarily dictated. The 
legitimacy of the federal arrangement and its defining principles is inexorably and 
fundamentally hinged on the covenant or agreement of the people that constitute the 
federating units. Such is the significance of covenant as a basic principle of federalism in 
multi-ethnic federations. 
The covenant or agreement of the federating parties regarding the terms of the federal 
arrangement must be articulated in a constitution that bears the imprimatur of the people 
and carries their approval. Such was the case in the United States in 1787 when delegates 
from the American States exhaustively debated the form of government for their country 
and subsequently submitted a draft constitution reflecting what was agreed by the 
delegates, to the state assemblies for their ratification.
16
  
Such was the case also with the making of the 1996 constitution of South Africa. There, 
the constitution making process was elaborate and inclusive. It involved the active 
participation of all ethnic groups in South Africa. The draft of the constitution was 
extensively debated by a popularly elected constitutional assembly and was subsequently 
popularly ratified. Similar constitution making processes involving active popular 
participation and ratification preceded the promulgation of the 1995 constitution of 
Uganda, the 1997 constitution of Eritrea, and the 1995 constitution of Ethiopia.
17
 In each 
of these African states, the constitution making process was elaborate, inclusive, and 
animated by popular participation and ratification, thus ensuring that the ensuing 
constitution, in each case, was a comprehensive articulation of what had been 
painstakingly and solemnly agreed or covenanted by the people as the terms of their joint 
existence as a nation.      
As we have already seen in chapters three and four, the ‘federal’ arrangement in Nigeria 
has, for decades, been plagued by a marked absence of covenant or agreement as to the 
                                                          
16
 ‘History: The US Constitution’ <http://www.history.com/topics/constitution> (accessed 18/4/2017). 
17
 See Chapter 5 for the full discussion on the constitution making processes in South Africa, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, and Uganda. 
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terms and conditions governing this arrangement. We know, from our discussion in those 
two chapters, that no constitution in Nigeria’s history has ever truly reflected the will and 
aspirations of the generality of Nigerians. The country’s constitutions from 1914 to 1999 
have been arbitrarily formulated and imposed on the Nigerian people, first by the 
colonialists and subsequently by their military and civilian successors. The divisions of 
powers and fiscal resources entrenched in these constitutions have thus, never truly 
reflected the will of the people of Nigeria. 
According to Richard Simeon, “the necessity for broad involvement of citizens in 
constitutional processes is central to democratic politics…In a fundamental sense, the 
constitution belongs to them. Only if they are engaged in the process are they likely to 
feel committed to the values and objectives embedded in the constitution itself. In new 
and developing democracies, especially extensive processes of citizen engagement and 
public education are essential. Excluding citizens by negotiating the constitution among 
elites, behind closed doors, may well provoke a citizens’ revolt…Without public 
involvement, constitutional changes are likely to be regarded as illegitimate, and hence 
defeated, or to be ignored and subverted once they are in place.”18  
Simeon’s advocacy of genuine public engagement in the constitution making process is 
especially important for federations made up of different ethnic nationalities with 
different interests, cultures, needs and worldviews. In such federal climes, only a 
thoroughly popular constitution making process will engender public fidelity or loyalty to 
the constitution and its principles.  
The 1999 constitution of Nigeria has so far failed to command the support of a highly 
skeptical citizenry which views the constitution as an alien document foisted on it by a 
ruling class that is actuated by a maniacal obsession for power. Thus, an important 
starting point in the rectification of the dysfunctional and insensitive power distribution 
paradigm entrenched in the 1999 constitution is the complete abrogation of the existing 
constitution and its replacement with a people’s constitution, formulated and designed by 
                                                          
18
 Richard Simeon, ‘Constitutional Design and Change in Federal Systems: Issues and Questions,’ (2009) 
39(2) Publius  252 
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the people and bearing a true reflection of their collective aspirations. The people must be 
allowed to decide how powers and fiscal resources should be distributed among the levels 
of government. They must be allowed to decide how the federal arrangement should be 
structured. In short, the constitution and the division of powers and fiscal resources 
contained in it must be owned by the people. The letter and spirit of the constitution must 
reflect what has been covenanted by the people, and not the will of the ruling elite as has, 
for decades, been the case in Nigeria.   
For this to happen, the constitution making process must be popular. It must involve the 
active participation of the people, and the final text of the constitution must be popularly 
ratified. This does not in any way preclude the possibility of engaging professional 
experts to advise on technical provisions of the constitution. But the ultimate decision as 
to the content of the constitution should lie with the people that make up the constituent 
units of the federation. 
6.2.2. Non-Centralization of Powers. 
Apart from a covenanted division of powers and fiscal resources, a second attribute of the 
federal constitutional framework proposed in this thesis is non-centralization of powers. 
By this, I mean non-concentration of powers in the central government. In particular, 
powers which are of local interest, that is, those which pertain to the internal affairs of the 
state and local governments should be specifically assigned to these governments instead 
of allocating such powers to the central government. I argued in chapter four that the 
division of powers and fiscal resources in the 1999 constitution is overwhelmingly and 
inordinately tilted in favour of the federal (central) government. 
Such is the lopsidedness of this arrangement that the power to legislate in respect of 
matters of local interest like local policing, agriculture, primary education, primary 
health-care, local labour matters, state elections, local air, rail and water transportation, 
which should ordinarily be within the province of the state or local governments are 
either exclusively assigned to the central government or subject to its overriding 
authority. The same goes for fiscal powers and other forms of revenue raising powers 
which, as shown in chapter four, are overwhelmingly assigned to the federal government. 
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This power distribution paradigm, I argued, portends negative implications for 
democratic governance and regional development. It stifles the ability of the state and 
local governments to manage their own affairs and cater to their own socio-economic 
interests. Essentially, it undermines the ability of the state and local governments to 
experiment with and formulate policies to suit the peculiar needs of their people. In 
addition, it fosters the domination of ethnic minority groups by the larger ones since the 
larger ethnic groups are, by virtue of their population, better placed to win federal 
elections and thus more likely to be in control of the enormous powers of the federal 
government. It also creates room for conflict and political instability since dissatisfied 
and disaffected ethnic groups will often resort to violence to register their disapproval of 
the status quo, a problem that has been experienced in Nigeria since the promulgation of 
the 1999 constitution. 
 A major argument of this thesis therefore is that rather than the centralist power 
distribution arrangement entrenched in the 1999 constitution, powers over matters of 
local interest should be assigned to the states and local governments while the federal 
government should concentrate on external affairs and matters that are of general interest 
to the entire federation. This implies that the federation’s division of powers and fiscal 
resources should be restructured to ensure that state and local governments are 
significantly in charge of their own internal affairs. Not only does this enhance local 
autonomy, an important attribute of federalism, it also helps to ensure that government 
policies in respect of local matters are specially adapted to meet local needs and 
interests.
19
 Due to its proximity to the people in the townships and rural communities, a 
state or local government is more likely to be conversant with local needs and interests 
than a federal government that is far away.
20
 A state or local government is thus better 
able to prioritize and optimally allocate scarce resources to meet such local needs.
21
  
                                                          
19
 George Anderson, Fiscal Federalism: A Comparative Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2010) p.10. 
20
 Wallace E. Oates,‘An Essay on Fiscal Federalism’ (1999) 37(3) Journal of Economic Literature p.1123. 
See also Maria Escobar-Lemmon ‘Fiscal Decentralization and Federalism in Latin America’ Publius 
(2001) 31(4) 25. 
21
 Wallace E. Oates, ibid. See also Iwan Barankay and Ben Lockwood, ‘Decentralization and the 
Productive Effciency of Government: Evidence from Swiss Cantons’ in Etisham Ahmad and Girgio Brosio 
eds., Effective Federalism and Local Finance (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2011) p.470.  
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More importantly, the constitutional assignment of power in respect of matters of local 
interest to the state and local governments carries with it the potential to enhance the 
accountability of local leaders to their constituents, since the local people know who to 
hold responsible for lackluster local governance and maladministration. This enables the 
people to easily vote out incompetent or corrupt state or local governments during 
elections. The demands of political accountability induced by non-centralization of 
powers will help to spur state and local governments to effectively deliver on their 
campaign promises. 
Finally, non-centralization of powers has the potential to enhance healthy competition 
and experimentation among the state and local governments.
22
 With significant powers of 
self government in the hands of state and local governments, there is greater freedom to 
experiment with a variety of local policies, thus enabling each government and its people 
greater choice in the selection of suitable local policies.
23
 The late Justice Louis Brandeis 
of the US Supreme Court corroborated this view in New State Ice Co v. Liebmann when 
he said “it is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”24 It must be quickly added that, in 
this particular case, Brandeis was referring to the US “federal system” in which the states 
play a substantial role in their own internal governance. An inference that is decipherable 
from the above quoted pronouncement of Justice Brandeis in the Liebmann case is that 
with experimentation, what works in a particular state or local government may also be 
tried in other states or local governments with similar or even better results.  
Besides the benefits derivable from experimentation however, non-centralization of 
powers can also encourage healthy competition among states and local governments. It 
affords the electorate the opportunity to compare the performances of their own state or 
local government with that of cognate or contiguous state or local governments having 
similar powers and fiscal resources. The knowledge that its electorate can draw such 
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 George Anderson, (note 20 supra) p.7. 
23
 Wallace Oates calls this ‘laboratory federalism.’ See Wallace E. Oates, (note 20 supra) p. 1132.  
24
 285 US 262 (1932) <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/285/262/case.html> (accessed 3/8/2017). 
This case is also cited in Wallace E.Oates (note 20 supra) p.1132. 
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comparisons can serve as a performance incentive to a state or local government, 
compelling it to work hard to provide efficient and effective public goods and services to 
its own constituents in order to avoid their negative judgment. This also serves to impel 
government’s accountability to the electorate.25   
The arguments outlined above make a strong case for a radical departure from the 
centralist division of powers and fiscal resources entrenched in the 1999 constitution, and 
its replacement with a non-centralized division of powers and resources, such that 
substantial powers over matters of local interest are constitutionally assigned to the lower 
levels of government. However, the assignment of powers and fiscal resources to the 
levels of government should not be left to be exclusively and centrally determined by 
federal government appointed “technical” or “economic” experts, as has been done in the 
past.
26
 While the views of experts and scholars may be taken into consideration, the 
ultimate decision as to the powers and fiscal resources to be constitutionally assigned to 
each level of government should be made by the people of Nigeria themselves during the 
constitution making process, as earlier discussed. 
6.2.3. Cooperation. 
A question that was raised and addressed in chapter 5 regarding the power distribution 
framework proposed in this thesis is whether the assignment of specific functions to a 
level of government implies that power in respect of those functions are to be exclusively 
exercised by that level of government without any interaction with other levels of 
government? In other words, are levels of government expected to operate in water-tight 
compartments without any contact with other levels of government? Are the levels of 
government in a federation “independent” from each other in terms that essentially 
import self-sufficiency and hence non-interaction or non-engagement with other 
governments? This question is pertinent in light of some scholar’s blanket and 
indiscriminate use of the word “independent” to describe the levels of government in a 
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 Robin Boadway and Anwar Shah, Fiscal Federalism- Principles and Practice of Multi-Order 
Governance, (Cambridge University Press, 2009) pp 498-502. 
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 In Chapter 3, I discussed instances where ad hoc fiscal commissions were set up by the federal 
government to determine the assignment of powers and fiscal resources to the various levels of 
government.  
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federation.
27
 For instance, in defining his federal principle, K.C Wheare argues that it is 
the “method of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each, 
within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent.”28 Wheare’s characterization of federalism 
as a division of powers between “independent” governments creates the impression that 
these governments operate in isolation of each other. His definition, at first glance, 
appears to attribute some sort of omnipotence to the levels of government such that each 
is able to carry on without any need for the other. 
Wheare’s apparent portraiture of federalism as entailing a division of powers among 
‘independent’ governments appears to have found fertile ground in Nigeria, with scholars 
and politicians adopting his definition almost wholesale and without question.
29
 For 
instance, Professor Ben Nwabueze defines federalism as “an arrangement whereby 
powers of government within a country are shared between a national, country-wide 
government and a number of regionalized governments in such a way that each exists as 
a government separately and independently from the others…”30  
It is doubtful whether “independent” is the appropriate terminology to employ in 
depicting the nature of the levels of government in a federation. While I have indeed 
argued that the autonomy of the levels of government is crucially important for a genuine 
federation to exist in an ethnically diverse society, it must be emphasized that this 
autonomy does not connote independence in terms that import omnipotence, non-
interaction, exclusivity or non-engagement. Indeed, in a socio-economic milieu often 
beset by scarcity of human and fiscal resources, no federation can truly survive without 
some degree of interdependence or cooperation among the governments. Autonomy 
connotes discretion in the exercise of constitutionally assigned power, untrammeled by 
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 See for instance K.C Wheare, Federal Government, 4
th
 edition (Oxford University Press, 1963), p.10. 
See also B.O Nwabueze, Federalism in Nigeria Under the Presidential Constitution (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1983) p.1; Ben Nwabueze, Constitutional Democracy in Africa, Vol.1, (Ibadan: Spectrum Books 
Limited, 2003) p.59. 
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 K.C Wheare, Ibid 
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 Aaron T. Gana, ‘Federalism and the National Question in Nigeria: A Theoretical Exploration’ in Aaron 
T. Gana and Samuel G. Egwu, Federalism in Africa (Africa World Press Inc, 2003) p.18. 
30
B.O Nwabueze, The Presidential Constitution of Nigeria (London: C.Hurst & Company, 1982) p.37. See 
also B.O Nwabueze, (note 27 supra) p.1. 
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unnecessary and uninvited interference or intrusion from external quarters.
31
 It does not 
suggest independence in terms that import non-interaction or non-engagement with other 
levels of government. There is a need to always clarify and emphasize this especially in 
the literature on Nigerian federalism if we are not to unwittingly encourage or propagate 
separatism. 
In a multi-ethnic federation, the assignment of a function to a level of government does 
not preclude interaction with other levels of government in the performance of that 
function. In essence, the fact that a particular function is within the jurisdiction of a level 
of government does not foreclose the possibility of cooperation between that level of 
government and another government in the execution of that function. Although Wheare 
claims to have gotten the inspiration for his “coordinate and “independent” concept of 
federalism from the system of government established by the 1787 constitution of the 
United States, another scholar has rigorously shown that, in practice, the US system of 
government has, in fact, always been cooperative in character.
32
 
Cooperation among the levels of government in the performance of constitutionally 
assigned functions is an important element in contemporary federal practice. If anything, 
the reality of scarcity of resources, both human and fiscal, often make cooperation 
inevitable.  So important is cooperation in modern federalism that it is doubtful whether 
the federal system of government can be effectively practiced without some appreciable 
degree of intergovernmental cooperation.  
For instance, a state government that is constitutionally saddled with the provision of 
education within its jurisdiction may be unable to implement its education policies 
without the assistance of other governments due to its limited financial resources. Even 
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 Yash Ghai defines it as “the ability of a region or community to organize its affairs without interference 
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where financial resources are available, the state in question may lack the requisite 
personnel or technical expertise for effective delivery of some service(s) connected with 
the performance of that function. In such situations, assistance or cooperation from 
another government in the provision of the service(s) will be ultimately beneficial to the 
state concerned and its constituents. In executing its policies throughout the country, the 
central government may also need to rely on the lower levels of government to assist it in 
providing local personnel or facilities for its work across the country. 
A further instance of cooperation is when levels of government representing the 
constituent units of a federation jointly participate in running and managing common 
institutions, that is, institutions that are established to perform functions that benefit the 
entire federation. Cooperation, in this sense, gives the constituent units of the federation a 
say in how matters that jointly affect them are administered. It prevents arbitrariness and 
fosters cooperative synergy among the constituent units in the overall interest of the 
federation.  
In multi-ethnic federations, cooperation has the added utility of enhancing unity. When 
levels of government cooperate in the provision of services to their constituents or for the 
benefit of the entire federation, the solidarity or fellow-feeling fostered through such 
cooperative endeavours helps to promote and cement the unity of the multi-ethnic 
federation. Cooperation, then, is a fundamental and necessary catalyst of unity in an 
ethnically diverse federation. 
Cooperation must however be distinguished from undue and uninvited interference. In a 
federation, a level of government may not interfere in the affairs of another level of 
government without the latter’s consent or acquiescence. Cooperation must be based on 
consent. It cannot be forced, neither can it be imposed or foisted. It must be built on the 
active acquiescence of the cooperating governments. 
It is apposite, at this juncture, to briefly summarize our discussion thus far in this section 
of the thesis. Thus far, I have argued that in ethnically diverse federations like Nigeria, 
the very fact of diversity calls for a power distribution arrangement that is non-
centralized and covenant driven. It calls for a division of powers and fiscal resources that 
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is genuinely democratic, one that recognizes the constituent units of the federation as 
significant stakeholders in the federal political system. Essentially, it demands a division 
of powers and fiscal resources that is peremptorily anchored in covenant, cooperation and 
non-centralization of powers as defined in this thesis. Such a power distribution 
arrangement is non-negotiable if the federation is to be stable and shielded from ethnic 
insurgency, the type that is fast becoming commonplace in many parts of Africa, 
especially Nigeria. 
In the following sections of this thesis, I propose specific constitutional reforms to 
implement the power distribution framework proposed in this thesis.   
 
6.3. ACTUALIZING THE SYMBIO-DEMOCRATIC FEDERAL FRAMEWORK- 
       INSTITUIONAL AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.3.1. PROMULGATION OF A NEW CONSTITUTION 
A major argument that has so far been emphasized in this thesis is that the existing 
division of powers and fiscal resources among the levels of government in Nigeria suffers 
from a fundamental legitimacy deficit. This is so because the 1999 constitution in which 
this division of powers and resources is entrenched is itself not a people’s constitution, 
properly so called. As discussed in chapter four and reiterated above, the 1999 
constitution was promulgated as a schedule to Decree Number 24 of 5 May 1999. The 
constitution was prepared and promulgated into law without any genuine popular 
participation. The people of Nigeria were not consulted, neither were their opinions 
sought on the content of the constitution. In short, the constitution was arbitrarily framed 
and foisted on the Nigerian people. The content of the constitution, including the division 
of powers set out in it can therefore not be regarded as the will of the people of Nigeria. It 
is not an expression of what the people have jointly agreed or covenanted.  
The lack of legitimacy associated with the constitution’s division of powers has been a 
major source of conflict since 1999. To address this problem therefore, the legitimacy of 
the 1999 constitution itself must be fundamentally addressed. This calls for the 
abrogation of the 1999 constitution and the drafting and promulgation of a new 
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constitution that genuinely reflects the wishes and aspirations of the Nigerian people. The 
new constitution must be produced through a process entailing broad popular 
consultation and participation. In order to ensure this I propose the measures outlined and 
discussed below. 
6.3.1.1   CONSTITUTION DRAFTING COMMITTEE. 
The constitution making process should be kick-started with the setting up of a broad 
based and inclusive Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) to sensitize the people, 
collate public opinion, and prepare the draft of a new constitution based on the collated 
public opinion. The CDC should be set up by the President of Nigeria. Three things are 
particularly important with respect to this Committee, namely, its membership, its terms 
of reference, and its modus operandi.  
(A) Membership: considering the significance of its work, the nature of the CDC’s 
membership is important. The membership should be such as is capable of 
inspiring public confidence in the constitution making process. It should cut 
across the constituent units of the federation and it should include people who are 
knowledgeable in constitutional matters as well as those who can mobilize the 
people for active participation in the process. In light of this, I propose that the 
CDC should be made up of the following people: 
(i) A Chairman who should be a serving or retired Justice of the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria.
33
 
(ii) Thirty six constitutional law experts, one from each of the thirty six states 
of the federation, and nominated by the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA)
34
  
(iii) Traditional Rulers in each of the local government areas of the federation. 
The reason for proposing a Judge of the Supreme Court as the Chairman of the CDC is 
not far-fetched. A Judge of the Supreme Court is most likely to be knowledgeable and 
experienced in constitutional matters by virtue of his legal and judicial training, as well as 
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 The Supreme Court is Nigeria’s Apex Court. See Section 230 1999 Constitution. 
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 The Nigerian Bar Association is the Professional body of Lawyers qualified to practice in Nigeria. 
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by reason of having presided over the resolution of several constitutional disputes in the 
course of his career.
35
 In addition, by his or her training and experience, a Supreme Court 
Judge is most likely to possess the requisite temperament for leading and presiding over 
the important affairs and proceedings of a committee like the CDC. Appropriate 
temperament, knowledge and experience are important qualities that must be possessed 
by whoever will head the Constitution Drafting Committee. 
Apart from the Chairman of the CDC who shall be a Judge of the Supreme Court, the 
Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) should nominate to the CDC, thirty six persons, one 
from each state of the federation, who are experts in constitutional matters. The NBA is 
the professional body of legal practitioners in Nigeria. The body is in a position to know 
those who are sufficiently versed, knowledgeable and experienced in the field of 
constitutional law and associated matters to serve as members of the CDC. The 
nomination of a person from each of the thirty states of the federation by the NBA is to 
ensure that every state of the federation has a sense of belonging in the authorship of a 
draft constitution for Nigeria. This will ultimately help in giving every part of the country 
a sense of ownership in the constitution making process. 
Finally, membership of the CDC should also be extended to traditional rulers in every 
part of the country. The role of traditional rulers in the CDC would mainly be to help 
sensitize and mobilize their people to participate in the various debates and public 
consultations that would be organized by the CDC. All over Nigeria, and indeed in many 
parts of Africa, traditional rulers are highly revered and respected. And they often 
command the loyalty and support of their people in ways that government leaders and 
other politicians can only dream of. It is well known for instance that the Emirs in the 
northern part of Nigeria are several times more influential than the Politicians. The same 
goes for Kings in the southern part of Nigeria. The membership of traditional rulers in the 
CDC will thus help to galvanize and inspire public confidence in the constitution making 
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process. The traditional rulers will help to galvanize public support for the process and 
give people the confidence to publicly contribute to the debates and consultations 
arranged by the CDC in the course of its assignment. This will in turn ensure that the 
draft constitution prepared by the CDC reflects popular opinion. 
(B) Terms of Reference: Apart from the issue of membership of the CDC, another 
important matter is its terms of reference. The CDC should be mandated to 
perform the following functions: 
(i) Engage in wide public consultations to determine a suitable constitutional 
framework for Nigeria. 
(ii) Collate public opinion on a new constitution for Nigeria. 
(iii) Prepare a draft constitution on the basis of the collated public opinion. 
(iv) Perform such other functions as are incidental to and necessary for 
fulfilling the mandate of the CDC as outlined in (i) to (iii) above. 
(C) Modus Operandi: A third issue that is as important as the membership of the 
CDC and its terms of reference is its mode of operation. The Committee should 
be mandated to engage very widely with the public in the course of carrying out 
its assignment. As discussed in chapters three and four, a major problem with the 
1999 constitution and the constitutions before it is that those constitutions were 
made without adequate consultation with the people. The CDC should therefore 
make every effort to genuinely engage with the people through a combination of 
several public engagement and enlightenment mechanisms such as public debates, 
seminars, conferences, town hall meetings, community assemblies, and 
consultations with community leaders in order to stimulate the interest of the 
people in the political process and obtain their views on how the federal 
arrangement should be structured.  
The committee should travel round the country to consult with people in the 
townships, villages and rural communities on what should be contained in the 
proposed constitution, especially how power and fiscal resources should be 
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divided among the levels of government. The traditional rulers, being members of 
the CDC, should assist in mobilizing and sensitizing the people, especially those 
residing in the rural communities, to actively participate in the public meetings, 
debates and conferences.  
A broad based public sensitization and public engagement process conducted in 
the manner outlined above will help to ensure that the draft constitution 
eventually prepared by the CDC genuinely reflects public opinion on what shape 
the Nigerian federal system should take. In particular, it will ensure that the 
division of powers and fiscal resources outlined in the draft constitution 
represents the prevailing public sentiment on the subject. 
6.3.1.2. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 
 The second leg of the constitution making process should be the election of a Constituent 
Assembly (CA) with a membership that is representative of every part of the federation. 
The aim of convening the Constituent Assembly is to exhaustively consider and debate 
the draft constitution prepared by the CDC. This is the phase during which arguments and 
counter-arguments regarding the draft constitution would be thoroughly discussed and 
concessions and compromises made. The debates and proceedings of the Constituent 
Assembly will strengthen the democratic process and ultimately enhance the legitimacy 
of the proposed constitution. I propose that the following steps should be taken in setting 
up the Constituent Assembly. 
(A) Enactment of  the Constituent Assembly & Referendum Act 
The first step in setting up the Constituent Assembly should be the enactment of a law to 
legalize it and provide for a public referendum to ratify the final draft of the constitution 
debated and adopted by it. The law setting up the CA should provide for its composition, 
its duration, and the public ratification of the draft constitution through a referendum. The 
proposed law for setting up the Constituent Assembly and providing for a referendum 
should be introduced as a Bill in the two Houses of Parliament and passed into law. 
(i) Composition of the Constituent Assembly 
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Membership of the Constituent Assembly should be as broad based as possible. And it 
should be by election. Every part of the country should have elected representatives in the 
Assembly. The best way to do this is to base membership of the Assembly on local 
government areas. As we know there are thirty six states in the federation. But within 
each state, there are local government areas that are delineated according to tribal groups 
and ethnic communities.
36
 Basing membership of the Constituent Assembly on local 
government areas will thus ensure that every ethnic community or tribal group in the 
country is represented in the Assembly. And this will in turn ensure that the final draft of 
the constitution produced by the Constituent Assembly reflects what has been jointly or 
predominantly agreed upon by elected delegates from every part of Nigeria.  
The Chairman of the Constituent Assembly should be a retired Justice of the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria who is well versed in constitutional matters and whose comportment 
and temperament is well suited for leadership of this important body. By his training and 
experience, a retired Justice of the Supreme Court is well placed to moderate and direct 
the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly.  
A Secretary should also be appointed for the Constituent Assembly. He or she could be a 
legal practitioner of many years standing. Preferably, he should not be less than ten years 
at the Nigerian Bar. 
The Chairman and Secretary of the Constituent Assembly should be appointed by the 
President of the federation and these appointments should be subject to confirmation by 
the Nigerian Senate. This will ensure that the appointees truly merit the appointments and 
nepotism or cronyism is not allowed to corrupt the constitution making process. 
Apart from the Chairman and Secretary who should be appointed by the President as 
outlined above, all other members of the Constituent Assembly should be elected by their 
local constituencies via an electoral process conducted by the State Independent Electoral 
Commission (SIEC) in each state of the federation.
37
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(ii) Duration of the Constituent Assembly. 
The proceedings of the Constituent Assembly should not exceed six months from the day 
of its inauguration. This period would allow enough time for the Assembly to thoroughly 
debate the draft constitution submitted to it by the CDC, break out into sub-committees to 
discuss specific aspects of the constitution, receive advice from consultants and technical 
experts, prepare, and adopt the final version of the draft constitution. 
(iii)  Referendum. 
The final version of the draft constitution, as prepared by the Constituent Assembly 
should be submitted to the government of the federation who should cause it to be printed 
and widely circulated throughout the country in order to enable Nigerians in every nook 
and cranny of the country to assess the draft constitution and form their opinion on its 
contents in readiness for a nationwide referendum to either ratify or reject the draft 
constitution. 
The Independent National Electoral Commission which is the country’s apex electoral 
body should conduct the referendum which should take place not more than six months 
after the submission of the draft constitution to the President of Nigeria by the 
Constituent Assembly. A two third majority “yes” vote at the referendum should imply 
popular approval of the constitution. The referendum is aimed at ensuring that the 
constitution is popularly subscribed and endorsed by the overwhelming majority of 
Nigerians from every part of the federation.  
It is a broad democratic constitution making process like the one proposed above, 
undergirded by popular participation, and reinforced by popular affirmation through a 
referendum, that will give the ensuing constitution its covenantal character, and 
legitimacy. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
local government areas, and since the SIECs are already familiar with local government elections, the 
SIECs are better placed to conduct elections into the Constituent Assembly. 
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(iv)  Entry into Force of the New Constitution  
The approval of the people for the new constitution as conveyed through the referendum 
notwithstanding, the new constitution should not enter into force until the expiration of 
the tenure of the current public office holders. These include the President, Vice 
President, Legislators, Governors, Deputy Governors, etcetera. The reason for this is that 
the current set of public office holders were elected under and in accordance with the 
1999 constitution which is the existing constitution of Nigeria. Immediate entry into force 
of the new constitution with its new provisions, new power relations and new framework 
for distribution of powers, may thus create avoidable confusion. To stave off such 
confusion, the new constitution should not enter into force until the expiration of the 
tenure of the present public office holders. Considering that the tenures of the current 
public office holders ends in 2019, it is legally expedient that the new constitution 
adopted by the Constituent Assembly and approved by the people through the referendum 
should enter into force or become operative at the end of the current political dispensation 
in 2019. 
Thus far, I have discussed the processes that should be followed to establish a democratic 
constitution that reflects the popular will on how the Nigerian federation should be 
structured and how power and fiscal resources should be distributed among the levels of 
government. The establishment of a Constitution Drafting Committee, the convening of a 
Constituent Assembly, and the conduction of a referendum as canvassed above are 
mechanisms aimed at encouraging and fostering popular participation in the constitution 
making process, thus ensuring that the constitution that emerges through this process is 
the constitution of the Nigerian people, designed and wholly owned by them. 
Where a federal constitution is produced through a genuine democratic process like the 
one outlined above, it is safe to conclude that the content of the constitution, including 
the division of powers and resources, is a genuine reflection of the will of the people, an 
expression of what they have jointly covenanted, an articulation of their joint vision for 
the federation. Thus, a most fundamental step in the rectification of the anomaly and 
dysfunction of the existing division of powers and fiscal resources among the levels of 
government in Nigeria is the enactment and promulgation of a democratic constitution 
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which, among other things, entrenches a power distribution arrangement that has been 
covenanted by the people. This is a most important proposal for reform of the existing 
power distribution framework. Every other reform proposal must be predicated on this. 
6.3.1.3. Rotimi Suberu’s Gradualist Theory of “Incremental Constitutional Change” 
A question that may be raised in respect of the proposal made above for the enactment 
and promulgation of a new constitution is whether a simple legislative review of the 1999 
constitution is not to be preferred to the wholesale promulgation of an entirely new 
constitution for Nigeria. A related question is whether a piecemeal, minimalist or 
gradualist legislative review of the constitution is not to be preferred to this thesis’ 
advocacy of an entirely new constitution formulated and promulgated through a popular 
process.  
One scholar who appears to have recently raised these questions is Professor Rotimi 
Suberu. Suberu argues that only a piecemeal or “incremental” approach to constitutional 
change, as opposed to a “once and for all” wholesale abrogation and replacement of the 
existing constitution, can realistically produce the desired changes in the Nigerian federal 
system. According to him “incremental constitutional change and non-constitutional 
renewal, including benign constitutional transgressions and creative legislative and 
judicial interventions, offer the most feasible path to federal accommodation and 
development in Nigeria in the absence of national consensus on the desirability and 
modality of wholesale, mega-constitutional reform.”38  
Suberu’s method of implementing his “incremental” change includes, “incremental” 
amendment to the existing constitution by the country’s parliament; piecemeal 
amendments to existing legislation by the federal parliament; judicial interventions; and 
what he calls “constitutional infidelity” which, according to him, refers to occasional acts 
of defiance by “political elites or others” against the existing constitution.39    
In essence, Suberu’s theory of constitutional change is an advocacy of gradualism in 
constitutional engineering. The problem with Suberu’s approach is that it is, in reality, an 
                                                          
38Rotimi Suberu, “Managing Constitutional Change in the Nigerian Federation” (2015) 45(4) Publius 552.  
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 Ibid, pp. 566-571. 
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escapist approach that fails to squarely address the root cause of the current problematic 
and controversial federal arrangement in Nigeria. Although Professor Suberu 
acknowledges Nigeria’s “tradition of constitutional illegitimacy”40 as seen in its “history 
of undemocratic constitutional engineering….in which constitution-making processes 
were largely dominated by unelected colonial or military authorities, with very little 
popular participation”41 and the “hurried, exclusionary, and opaque manner in which the 
military Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) promulgated”42 the 1999 constitution, it is 
curious that he nevertheless recommends an elitist and largely undemocratic “incremental 
change” approach as the best means of rectifying this “tradition of constitutional 
illegitimacy.”43 
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 This is the same problem with Professor Jawad’s argument for a mere legislative “amendment” of the 
“American imposed” constitution in Iraq. Jawad acknowledges that a constitution “should not be imposed 
by an outside power..” but  “drafted, discussed and approved by the people concerned…and contain what 
they desire.” He also argues that the constitution making process initiated during the American occupation 
of Iraq was exclusionary and manipulated by the American occupiers. And the so called referendum that 
purportedly approved the imposed constitution in 2005 was flawed in many respects. It is therefore curious 
that inspite his acknowledgement of the largely flawed and arbitrary nature of the constitution making 
process in Iraq, including the evident lack of prior detailed and broad-based public discussion of the draft 
constitution before the ‘referendum,’  Professor Jawad nevertheless recommends a parliamentary 
“consensus”on constitutional amendment as the solution to Iraq’s constitutional crisis. Apart from the fact 
that his theory fails to elaborate on how such a “consensus” is to be achieved in a deeply divided Iraqi 
parliament dominated by certain ethnic groups, it must be pointed out that such “consensus,” if it could be 
achieved at all, will at best be elitist as long as detailed and elaborate public discussion of what should be 
contained in the constitution by every segment of the population, as recommended by me in this thesis, is 
jettisoned. See Saad N. Jawad “The Iraqi Constitution: Structural Flaws and Political Implications.” LSE 
Middle East Centre Paper Series/ 01 Novemeber 2013 pp 4-23. A related problem is seen in Andrew 
Arato’s so-called “post-sovereign” constitution making process, a process that may, in fact, be susceptible 
to elite manipulation. Arato’s post-sovereign constitution making process emphasizes a two-stage 
arrangement under which an interim constitution is prepared by an unelected body and a permanent 
constitution is subsequently drawn up by an “elected parliamentary assembly.” See Andrew Arato, 
Constitution Making Under Occupation: The Politics of Imposed Revolution in Iraq, (Columbia University 
Press, 2009) p.62. See also Andrew Arato, “Post-Sovereign Constitution Making and Its Pathology in Iraq” 
New York Law School Law Review Vol.51 2006/2007 p.540; Andrew Arato, Post-Sovereign Constitution 
Making: Learning and Legitimacy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) pp 300-301. The problem with 
Arato’s Constitution making paradigm is that the making of the permanent constitution is “constrained” by 
rules entrenched in the interim constitution, a condition that may limit the ability of the parliamentary 
assembly, even when it is truly representative, to freely design the permanent constitution without pre-
established encumbrances that may be inimical to the social wellbeing of the people and the country. it is 
my contention, in this thesis, that a truly democratic constitution making process must not be left solely in 
the hands of parliamentarians or other government functionaries. A democratic constitution making process 
must be broadly inclusive, involving the participation of every segment of society. And the constitution that 
ensues from this process must significantly reflect the wishes and aspirations of every part of the country.          
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The illegitimacy of the 1999 constitution cannot be wished away, neither can it be 
ignored. Suberu’s advocacy of mere legislative review of the constitution will not cure 
the constitution of its illegitimacy. The illegitimacy of the 1999 constitution is a 
fundamental defect that renders it absolutely unacceptable in an ethnically diverse 
federation like Nigeria. It is true that Section 9 of the 1999 constitution empowers the 
National Assembly
44
 to “alter” any of its provisions subject to certain conditions 
stipulated in that section of the constitution. However, what the Nigerian federation needs 
is not a gradualist and ‘incremental’ legislative amendment of the 1999 constitution, but 
an entirely new constitutional arrangement predicated on the will of the people and 
genuinely reflecting their aspirations. And nowhere in the 1999 constitution is the 
National Assembly empowered to draft and adopt an entirely new constitution.  
Amending a constitution and formulating a new constitution are two different things, and 
they entail two different processes. The former requires a legislative procedure carried 
out in accordance with the existing constitution. The latter is more fundamental in nature 
and far reaching in effect. It requires a complete abrogation of the existing constitution 
and the adoption of a novel framework. The significance of the process requires that the 
people who are the ultimate repository of the country’s sovereignty be directly involved. 
It is not a matter to be lightly esteemed. What is needed to address the illegitimacy of the 
1999 constitution is something more radical, something more profound in its effect than a 
mere legislative amendment. The 1999 constitution suffers from a fundamental and 
debilitating crisis of legitimacy that is cured only by its replacement with an entirely new 
constitutional arrangement covenanted by the people and founded on their will. Any 
other approach different from the outright formulation and promulgation of a new 
democratic constitution can only be cosmetic. Such an approach will turn out to be an 
exercise in futility as it will not suffice to assuage the widespread disenchantment with 
the illegitimacy of the 1999 constitution and the power distribution arrangement 
entrenched in it. 
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To be genuinely democratic in character, the drafting and adoption of a new constitution 
for Nigeria must be done through an inclusive and broad based process that involves 
public participation on a scale wide enough to include the engagement of every ethnic or 
tribal community in present day Nigeria. The National Assembly, as presently constituted 
does not directly represent all ethnic and tribal communities in Nigeria. To leave the 
formulation of a new federal framework or the drafting and adoption of a new 
constitution in the hands of the National Assembly therefore is to disenfranchise or 
marginalize remote minority communities and render them voiceless in the constitution 
making process.  
What is needed to birth a truly democratic constitution therefore is a process that involves 
a broadly inclusive Constituent Assembly made up of representatives of the various local 
government areas or municipalities that genuinely represent all shades of interest in the 
Nigerian federation. This implies that the Constituent Assembly must not only be broadly 
constituted, its members must be directly elected by the communities they represent. 
Considering the multi-ethnic character of the Nigerian federation, only a constitution 
produced by such a broadly constituted Constituent Assembly and ratified at a 
referendum specially convened for the purpose, can make any pretension to legitimacy. 
And by extension, only a division of powers and fiscal resources entrenched in such a 
democratic constitution can be said to truly reflect the public will. 
Apart from the above, many Nigerians view the present set of national legislators with 
utmost distrust, a fact which Professor Suberu himself acknowledges.
45
 Many of them are 
perceived to be part of the elitist club of corrupt power mongers that originally conspired 
to impose the 1999 constitution on the people. 
46
 It is thus doubtful if any constitution 
review or constitutional amendment process solely managed by these legislators will ever 
be acceptable to the Nigerian people, many of who are anxious to see a new 
constitutional order in the country. This buttresses the fact that only a constitution making 
process initiated by and genuinely owned by the ordinary people of Nigeria from every 
part of the country can produce a constitution that is popularly acceptable. That process, 
                                                          
45
 Rotimi Suberu, (note 38 supra) p.568 
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. The National Assembly consists of several of the erstwhile military administrators and their civilian 
acolytes that unilaterally formulated the 1999 constitution and imposed it on the people.   
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as discussed above, will entail the setting up of a broadly representative Constitution 
Drafting Committee to produce a draft constitution, a broadly constituted Constituent 
Assembly to debate and adopt the draft constitution, and a popular referendum to ratify it. 
Suberu’s other recommendations, to wit judicial intervention, and occasional defiance of 
the constitution, are equally unrealistic or unsuitable for the reason given above. They fail 
to address the legitimacy question. No amount of judicial activism or elite “constitutional 
infidelity” will produce a people’s constitution or a division of powers and resources that 
genuinely reflect the people’s will. It is the people themselves that can do this through a 
genuinely popular process, the type that is proposed in this thesis. 
Professor Suberu hinges his “incremental constitutional change” advocacy on an alleged 
“absence of national consensus on the desirability and modality of wholesale, mega-
constitutional reform.”47 He cites the inability of participants at the 2014 national 
conference to agree on a number of issues as evidence of his alleged “absence of national 
consensus.”48  
First, it must be stated that the so-called national conference organized by the federal 
government of Nigeria in 2014 cannot, by any standard, be described as a popular 
conference genuinely convened to discuss and address Nigeria’s political problems. As 
Suberu himself acknowledged, the participants at the conference were not elected by the 
Nigerian people.
49
 Rather they were carefully selected by the federal government and 
were accountable to the federal government alone.  
Besides, not every part of the country was represented at the conference. Most of the 
participants were people in the country’s elite upper class. Most of them had held public 
offices at the federal level, and a good number of them were actually complicit in the 
illegal and illegitimate imposition of the problematic 1999 constitution on the people of 
Nigeria.
50
 It is perhaps a fallacy of hasty generalization to regard whatever disagreements 
took place among these few members of Nigeria’s elite upper class as a definitive 
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 A quick scan of the delegates to the conference confirms this. 
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evidence of a lack of consensus among Nigerians on how to fix the problems of the 
federation. The 2014 national conference was an elite affair. It was organized by the elite, 
for the elite. The conference has, in fact, been publicly discredited as a jamboree 
designed to further the political interests of its organizers.
51
 The participants at the 
conference were certainly not representing the generality of Nigerians at the conference 
since they were neither elected nor selected by the communities that constitute the 
Nigerian federation. It is therefore incorrect to assert, as Professor Suberu did, that there 
is an absence of national consensus on the mode of constitutional change in Nigeria. To 
say that, at this stage, is highly speculative, for we cannot know this for sure until we take 
concrete democratic steps to actually prepare a new constitution.       
Another question that may be raised in relation to the proposal made in this thesis for a 
new constitution popularly ratified through a referendum is what happens if there is an 
overwhelming rejection of the constitution at the referendum? The answer to this 
question is that it is very unlikely that this would happen considering that every clause in 
the draft constitution would have been thoroughly debated at the sessions of the 
Constituent Assembly. And since each local government area in the country, and by 
extension, each tribal or ethnic group is expected to be represented in the Constituent 
Assembly, it is safe to conclude that the final draft constitution that would be presented to 
the public at the end of the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly would apparently 
reflect the views of every part of Nigeria. It is therefore unlikely that the draft 
constitution would be overwhelmingly rejected at the referendum. 
However, in the unlikely event that the draft constitution is actually rejected at the 
referendum, or the Constituent Assembly is even unable to agree on a draft constitution, 
the only way forward is to go back to the drawing board, intensify inter-group 
negotiations, concessions, and compromises, and go through the constitution making 
process all over again until a new federal constitution that is generally acceptable to the 
overwhelming majority of Nigerians emerges. The point being made in all of the above is 
that a genuinely popular constitution making process is non-negotiable in the quest for a 
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suitable constitutional division of powers and fiscal resources in Nigeria. Anything short 
of this is a recipe for further chaos and public discontent in Nigeria.                                       
Set out in Figure 1 below is a proposed model Bill for an Act to establish a Constituent 
Assembly and provide for a referendum to adopt and ratify the proposed new 
constitution. As already stated above, the Bill would have to be passed into law by the 
two Houses of the National Assembly and receive presidential assent. 
 
Figure 1 
(I) A BILL FOR AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 
TO ADOPT A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR NIGERIA AND PROVIDE 
FOR A PUBLIC REFERENDUM TO APPROVE THE NEW 
CONSTITUTION AND RELATED MATTERS 
       
 
WHEREAS           the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 is the 
                                existing supreme law of the Republic, having emerged as a schedule 
                                 to Decree 24  enacted by the Federal Military Government of 
                                Nigeria on 5 May 1999. 
 
 
AND WHEREAS   there have been persistent calls for a new constitution 
                                  made by the people of Nigeria themselves through a Constituent 
                                 Assembly specially elected for that purpose and a referendum to 
                                 stamp the constitution with public approval 
 
AND WHEREAS   the National Assembly of Nigeria considers it in the public 
                                  Interest to make a law providing for the establishment, composition 
                                 And conduct of the above mentioned Constituent Assembly and 
                                 Public referendum 
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BE IT THEREFORE ENACTED by the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria as follows:   
 
 
PART 1-   ESTABLISHMENT AND COMPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUENT 
ASSEMBLY 
 
 
Establishment of the     1.There is hereby established a Constituent Assembly to debate 
Constituent Assembly      And adopt a new constitution for Nigeria 
                                          
 Composition of the       2(1) The Constituent Assembly shall consist of members elected 
 Constituent Assembly-      from each of the existing local government areas in the 
                                             federation. 
                                           (2) Further to subsection 1 of this paragraph, one person shall 
                                                 Be elected to represent each local government area in the 
                                                Constituent Assembly. 
                                           (3) There shall be a Chairman for the Constituent Assembly 
                                                 Who shall be a serving or retired Justice of the Supreme 
                                                 Court of Nigeria. 
                                           (4) There shall be a Secretary for the Constituent Assembly 
                                                 Who shall be a legal practitioner qualified to practice in 
                                                 Nigeria and who has been so qualified for not less than ten 
                                                years. 
                                           (5) The Chairman and Secretary of the Constituent Assembly 
                                                 Shall be appointed by the President of the Federal 
                                                 Republic of Nigeria in consultation with the Nigerian 
                                                 Senate. 
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 Qualification for         3(1)    A person shall be eligible for election to the Constituent 
 membership of the               Assembly provided he is not less than twenty one years old 
 Constituent Assembly-         at the time of the election. 
                                          (2) The provision of subsection 1 of this paragraph 
                                                notwithstanding, a person shall not be eligible for election 
                                               to the Constituent Assembly if 
(a) He is a convicted felon 
(b) He is of unsound mind 
(c) A court of law has declared him unfit for public office 
(d) He is a member of the Police or armed forces. 
 
Official Procedure          3.   The procedure to be followed by the Constituent Assembly 
at deliberations of the           at its deliberations shall be decided by the members at its 
Constituent Assembly-         its first sitting. 
 
Duration                         4.   Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly shall not exceed 
                                               six months from the date of its inauguration.  
   
Publication and              5.  At the end of its proceedings the Constituent Assembly 
circulation of the                  shall submit to the President of the federation certified 
draft constitution                 copies of the draft constitution for publication and 
                                              circulation to members of the public. 
                                             
 
 
PART 2-      REFERENDUM. 
 
 
    Conduction of          6(1).The Independent National Electoral Commission shall 
    a referendum                   conduct a referendum to ratify the Draft Constitution already 
                                              debated by the Constituent Assembly at a date and time to be 
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                                              decided by the Commission, provided that the date shall not 
                                             exceed six months after the submission of the Draft 
                                             Constitution to the President of Nigeria by the Constituent 
                                             Assembly 
 
                                         (2) Every Nigerian shall be qualified to vote at the referendum 
                                               provided he/she is at least eighteen years old at the time of 
                                               the referendum. 
 
                                          (3) Upon a two third majority “Yes” vote at the referendum, 
                                                 the Draft Constitution shall, subject to subsection 4 below, 
                                                become the supreme law of the Federal Republic. 
                                           
                                         (4) Notwithstanding the provision of paragraph 3 above, the 
                                              Draft Constitution shall not enter into force before the 
                                              expiration of the tenure of existing public office holders on 
                                              29
th
 May 2019.      
 
 
Citation                          7.  This Act may be cited as the Constituent Assembly 
                                             and Referendum Act.  
6.3.2.   Non-centralization of Powers. 
As earlier discussed, a major problem with the division of powers and fiscal resources in 
the 1999 constitution, apart from its lack of legitimacy, is its overwhelming lopsidedness 
in favour of the federal government. I discussed this extensively in chapter four and I also 
expatiated on it in section 6.1 above. The kernel of my argument on this subject is that 
this division of powers and resources is antithetical to the idea of federalism, and 
absolutely unsuitable for an ethnically diverse society like Nigeria, a country made up of 
different peoples with different economic interests, different cultures, and different 
political orientations. 
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I proposed the restriction of the federal government’s powers to matters which are of 
general concern to the entire federation while states and local governments should be 
allowed to exercise power and autonomy in respect of their own internal affairs. In 
essence, the division of powers in the new constitution should be principally guided by 
the need to, as far as is practicable, guaranty the autonomy of the state and local 
governments in respect of their internal affairs. I also proposed greater clarity in the 
constitutional division of powers in order to ensure that the federal government does not 
take advantage of any ambiguity in the division of powers to arrogate more powers than 
necessary to itself, a problem that has repeatedly recurred with the use of the concurrent 
legislative list under the current constitution. Basically, the power distribution model that 
I propose in this thesis is one predicated on non-centralization, and it is marked by 
clarity.   
To facilitate this power distribution model, I proposed a change in the existing technique 
of power distribution. Specifically I proposed the abrogation of the use of exclusive and 
concurrent legislative lists for power distribution and their replacement with federal, state 
and local government legislative/administrative lists. Thus instead of distributing powers 
among the levels of government through the exclusive, and concurrent legislative lists as 
is currently the norm under the 1999 constitution, I make the novel proposition that, 
under the new constitution, power should be more clearly distributed through three 
distinct legislative lists namely federal, state and local government legislative lists, with 
the powers of the federal government restricted to matters that generally concern the 
entire federation, and residual powers assigned to the states.  
In accordance with the above, I modify the legislative lists set out in the 1999 constitution 
and propose that the constitutional division of powers among the levels of government 
should be restructured as follows and attached as a schedule to the new constitution; 
 
6.3.2. A.                  Division of Legislative and Administrative Powers 
                                                                  Part    I 
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                                            Federal Government Legislative List 
“Accounts of the federal government; Arms, ammunitions and related matters; federal 
aviation and matters connected therewith; Award of honours to deserving persons by the 
federal government; Bankruptcy and insolvency; Banking services, promissory notes and 
bills of exchange; Matters connected with citizenship, naturalization and aliens; Federal 
roads; Copyright; coinage and legal tender; currency; Customs and excise duties; Census 
in the federal capital territory; Defense of the entire federation; Diplomatic, consular and 
trade representation for the federation; Election to the offices of President, Vice President 
and members of the National Assembly; Inter-state electricity and establishment of 
electric power stations; Exchange control; Export duties; Foreign Affairs; Extradition; 
Immigration and emigration; Implementation of treaties concerning matters on the federal 
list; Incorporation, regulation and winding up of companies; Labour in respect of federal 
workers; meteorology and associated matters; matters relating to nuclear energy; 
Passports and visas; federal police; National Assembly matters; Federal Prisons; Public 
Relations of the federation; Public Service of the Federation; Inter-state Railways; 
External trade and inter-state trade and commerce; Traffic on federal roads; federal 
government owned wireless broadcasting and television; Any other matter which is 
within the legislative jurisdiction of the National Assembly under this constitution; Any 
matter arising from or connected with any matter in this list.”                                                        
 
                                                                    
 
 
                                                                Part II 
                                            State Government Legislative List 
 
“State aviation and matters connected therewith; Registration of state voters and election 
to the offices of the Governor, Deputy Governor, State Legislators, Local Government 
Chairman and Councilors; Insurance; Labour in respect of State Workers; Mines, 
Minerals and natural resources; State Police, Powers of the State Houses of Assembly, 
and the privileges and immunities of their members; State Prisons; Professional 
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occupations; State census; Public holidays; Public service of a State; Regulation of local 
political parties; Intra-state trade and commerce; Registration and regulation of business 
names; Censorship of films; Wireless broadcasting and television; State antiquities and 
monuments; Archives and records of a State; Construction and maintenance of state 
roads; Electricity and establishment of electric power stations within a State; Secondary 
and Tertiary health care and associated matters; Secondary and tertiary education; 
agricultural policy; Scientific and technological research; Matters concerning 
trigonometrical, cadastral and topographical surveys; Any other matter which is within 
the legislative jurisdiction of a House of Assembly under this Constitution; Matters 
arising from or connected with the matters mentioned in this legislative list; All other 
matters not listed under the federal, state or local government legislative lists.” 
 
                                                      Part III 
 
                                         Local Government List 
 
“Primary, adult and vocational education; Primary health; Agriculture; Radio and 
television licensing; Establishment, superintendence, and maintenance of cemeteries, 
burial grounds and homes for the destitute or infirm; Licensing of various modes of rural 
transportation including bicycles, canoes, wheel barrows, trucks, and carts; Labour in 
respect of local government workers; Establishment, superintendence and regulation of 
slaughter houses, slaughter slabs, markets, motor parks and public conveniences; 
Construction and maintenance of local roads, streets, street lightings, drains and other 
public highways, local parks, community gardens, open spaces, or other public facilities 
as may be prescribed from time to time by the local government council; roads and street 
naming and house numbering; public conveniences with regard to their provision and 
maintenance, disposal of sewage and refuse; births and deaths registration; tax on 
privately owned houses or tenements; Regulation and supervision of local Shops and 
Kiosks; Regulation and supervision of local Restaurants, bakeries and eateries; 
Regulation and supervision of  Laundries; Registration and regulation of marriages; 
Licensing, regulation and monitoring of the sale of alcohol.” 
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6.3.2. B.    Division of Fiscal Powers 
It is not enough to reassign functions among the levels of government as outlined above. 
Such reassignment of functions must be accompanied by a concomitant reassignment of 
fiscal powers and fiscal resources to ensure that each level of government is able to 
autonomously carry out its constitutionally assigned functions. Allocation of fiscal 
resources has always been very controversial and contentious in most federations.
52
 
Indeed one scholar has argued that “the problem of finance is the fundamental problem of 
federalism.”53 In Nigeria, it has, for decades, been a major source of ethnic conflict and 
secessionist agitation. As discussed in chapter four, virtually all the significant fiscal 
powers and resources of the Nigerian federation are concentrated in the federal 
government.
54
 
A frequently cited argument for the conservative and centralized allocation of fiscal 
resources in successive Nigerian constitutions is the often claimed need to guarantee 
unity, economic stability, and balanced economic development throughout the 
federation.
55
 Indeed this argument is as old as the Nigerian state itself. It would be 
recalled, from our discussion in chapter three, that Lord Lugard, Nigeria’s first colonial 
Governor General had latched on to the same “balanced economic development” and 
“unity” arguments in rationalizing his 1914 amalgamation of Northern and Southern 
Nigeria and the simultaneous centralization of their finances.
56
 
However, no one in Nigeria’s chequered history has championed the cause of centralized 
fiscal arrangements for the federation the way Professor Adebayo Adedeji, Nigeria’s 
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former Minister of Economic Planning, has. Adedeji contends that a high degree of fiscal 
centralization is required if Nigeria is to achieve the goals of public finance. These goals 
according to him include balanced economic development, and the promotion of 
economic stability, among others. He argues that the mentioned goals can only be 
effectively achieved if the central government is the undisputed custodian and manager of 
fiscal power.
57
  
In furtherance of his fiscal centralism thesis, Adedeji advocates the concentration of tax 
authority and borrowing powers in the federal government.
58
 Most importantly, Professor 
Adedeji advances two broad criteria for revenue allocation among the levels of 
government in the federation. These include the need to satisfy “(i) the fiscal needs of the 
federal (central) government, having regard to its resources and functions; and (ii) the 
need to ensure the financial integrity of Nigeria through the financial stability of the 
centre.”59  
In effect, what Adedeji’s thesis implies is that the allocation of fiscal powers and 
resources among the levels of government should be contingent on the paramount need to 
ensure the fiscal supremacy and security of the federal government which will in turn use 
the enormous fiscal resources at its disposal to ensure balanced economic development 
and unity throughout the country. 
Adedeji’s fiscal philosophy, which has been heavily relied on by the federal government 
for decades, is perhaps the most vocal and controversial advocacy for fiscal centralization 
ever made in the history of Nigeria. Its controversial character is marked by its bluntness 
and audacity considering the sensitive and tension-inducing nature of fiscal allocation in 
Nigeria. Yet his centralist theory, when viewed from the perspective of Nigeria as an 
ethnically diverse federal state, is fundamentally flawed and problematic. Indeed in 
advancing his theory, Adedeji seems to have ignored the reality of Nigeria’s diversity and 
its federal status. 
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The financial aspect of a federal system cannot be considered apart from its socio-
political realities. To do this is to stand reason on its head. Yet, this precisely is what 
Professor Adedeji appears to have done. In determining the appropriate fiscal architecture 
for a federation, it is impolitic to focus solely on economic correctness. The history of a 
people, their social and political orientation, and the extent of their diversity are as 
important, if not more important, than the obsessive need to conform to economic 
theories or standards.  
In propounding his fiscal centralism thesis, Professor Adedeji harps on the need to secure 
Nigeria’s unity and economic stability.60 But it is a truism that economic stability cannot 
be achieved or sustained without social and political stability. Unity and economic 
stability cannot be built on ethnic or tribal insurgency. In fact, as I have already shown in 
chapters four and five of this thesis, rather than facilitate unity and economic stability, 
political and fiscal centralism, the type which Professor Adedeji so vociferously 
advocates, has tended to promote instability, anger, acrimonious rivalry, and economic 
sabotage across Nigeria. We need not look too far to see the evidence of this. The Niger 
Delta insurgency, the renewed agitation for the secession of South-East Nigeria, and the 
virulent boko-haram crisis in North-Eastern Nigeria are pungent contemporary 
manifestations of national instability brought on by the angry resistance of different 
ethnic nationalities to Nigeria’s “centralist federalism”. They are undeniable pointers to a 
nation at war with itself.  
Adedeji’s fiscal centralism preachment appears to proceed on the flawed assumption that 
the federation will always be managed by a benevolent, humane, fair and transparent 
central government which would always distribute revenues fairly and spread 
development evenly. But experience has shown that this has, in fact, never been the case. 
Indeed, a cursory survey of Nigeria’s political history will reveal that the central 
government has almost always been hijacked by powerful political interests from the 
majority ethnic groups who use the enormous powers and fiscal resources available at the 
centre to entrench themselves and their cronies in power while feeding fat on the 
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country’s resources.61 The fiscal centralism approach has thus proved unworkable and 
impolitic in the Nigerian context. Its facilitation of a culture of corruption among federal 
politicians and its insensitivity to the socio-political reality of Nigeria as an ethnically 
diverse federal state made up of people with different economic interests, different 
economic needs, and different political orientation are fundamental flaws that render it 
untenable in the Nigerian context. 
Thus, while it is true that economic stability should be an important factor in the 
determination of fiscal arrangements in a federation, it must be pointed out that economic 
stability is not necessarily achieved by fiscal centralism as Professor Adedeji and other 
adherents of fiscal centralism would have us believe. In fact, fiscal autonomy for the state 
and local governments is much more likely to enhance the overall economic stability of a 
country like Nigeria if it is combined with appropriate safeguards.  
The advantages of state and local government fiscal autonomy for a federation like 
Nigeria are enormous. As discussed in chapter four, when states and local governments 
generate their own revenue, not only is federalism enhanced because their political 
autonomy is enhanced, they are also compelled to be accountable to their constituents and 
prudent with their finances. On the other hand, when states and local governments do not 
have to raise their own revenue but rather rely on monthly subventions from the federal 
government, as is the case in Nigeria, the incentive for wasteful expenditure, and 
financial corruption in the state and local governments is heightened. Fiscal autonomy for 
sub-national governments carries the potential to impose on these governments financial 
discipline that will discourage frivolous expenditure and constrict the space for financial 
corruption. 
A centralized fiscal architecture for a federation like Nigeria kills initiative at the state 
and local government levels. With fiscal centralization, the experimentation and 
innovation which would have been embraced by the state and local governments, as a 
result of the need to creatively raise their own revenues, are almost certainly jettisoned.  
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Most importantly, as already discussed in this thesis, the concentration of fiscal powers 
and resources in the central government has, over the years, encouraged or induced an 
unhealthy struggle among the constituent units of the federation for the power and wealth 
at the centre. For decades, the power and wealth of the federal government and the 
patronage which it is thereby enabled to dispense, have made the struggle to control it a 
‘matter of life and death’ among the federating units. Those who lose out in this struggle 
often resort to ethnic violence or secessionist agitation. Fiscal centralization has therefore 
tended to keep the federation and its constituent units perpetually glued to an endless 
cycle of inter-ethnic violence, rivalry, and mutual suspicion, all of which portend grave 
danger to the continued stability and viability of the federation.    
All of the issues outlined above make fiscal centralization unattractive for the Nigerian 
federation. It is a cardinal argument of this thesis that fiscal autonomy for the levels of 
government remains the best option for Nigeria in light of the country’s history, its 
ethnically diverse character, and the perennial demand for autonomy by the constituent 
units of the federation. 
However, while fiscal autonomy for the levels of government is desirable and should 
indeed be vigorously pursued, it is equally important to guard against fiscal instability by 
ensuring a reasonable degree of fiscal stability throughout the federation. This suggests 
the adoption of a combination of tax assignment and revenue sharing arrangements that 
will foster fiscal autonomy for the levels of government while shielding the federation 
from general fiscal instability.  
 I would therefore argue that in the determination of appropriate financial arrangements 
for the Nigerian federation, the need for national economic stability must be 
complemented by three other factors (i) the need for each level of government to have 
adequate financial resources to support its constitutionally assigned functions, (ii) the 
need for each level of government to, as far as is practicable, generate and manage its 
own fiscal resources, and (iii) the need for each level of government to derive significant 
benefits from revenues generated within its territory. By implication, in addition to the 
desirability of national economic stability, financial sufficiency and appreciable fiscal 
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autonomy for each level of government should, as far as is practicable, guide the 
determination of the appropriate fiscal arrangements for Nigeria. A way must be found to 
strike a balance between these criteria. 
In the next few paragraphs, I make specific recommendations for the fiscal autonomy 
proposed in this thesis for the levels of government, while recommending measures to 
preserve the stability of the federal fiscal system. To do this, I will start by considering 
each of the main taxes currently assigned to the federal government under the 1999 
constitution with a view to recommending its retention by the federal government or its 
reassignment to the state or local governments. I will then consider the use of appropriate 
fiscal equalization measures to address fiscal imbalances that may occur as a result of the 
reassignment of tax powers among the levels of government. 
6.3.2 B.1. Proposed Fiscal Arrangements 
It is my argument in this thesis that as against their wholesale assignment to the federal 
government under the 1999 constitution, the personal income tax and the petroleum 
profits or resource tax, should be specifically assigned to the state governments while the 
property tax should be clearly assigned to the local governments. This is without 
prejudice to other taxes which each of these governments may wish to levy and collect 
within its own jurisdiction, so long as such other taxes do not compromise the fiscal 
stability of the federation. 
Petroleum/Resource Tax: Tax on petroleum profits/natural resources should be levied 
and collected by the government in whose territory the petroleum or natural resource is 
located. The issue of resource tax has been a particularly contentious one in Nigeria since 
the 1960s. As shown in chapter four the insurgency, militancy and ethnic crisis in the 
Niger Delta region of Nigeria is principally due to the local population’s aversion for the 
federal government’s absolute control and appropriation of the tax on petroleum profits.  
Under the current arrangement, the federal government levies and collects the petroleum 
profits tax and gives 13 percent of the revenue derived from this tax to the Niger Delta 
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region in whose territory the hydrocarbon deposits are located while sharing the rest 
among itself and the other states of the federation.  
This arrangement has been roundly rejected by militant ethnic groups in the Niger Delta 
states which have continued to insist on absolute control over the exploration and 
exploitation of the hydrocarbon resources located within their territory.
62
 The plight and 
demand of the Niger Delta is understandable. The region bears the brunt of the 
environmental pollution that often accompanies oil exploration activities in the region. 
Fishing and farming, the major sources of livelihood of the people of the region have 
been deleteriously affected by frequent incidences of oil spillage, gas flaring and acid rain 
with the result that hunger and poverty is pronounced and widespread in the area.
63
  
Also pollution of the environment continues to compromise the health and wellbeing of 
the local residents. Most importantly, as a result of oil exploration activities in the Niger 
Delta and the relocation of high earning employees of the International Oil Companies to 
the area, the cost of accommodation, business activities, and social services in the area is 
often very high with attendant negative impact on the local indigenes most of who are 
poor and unemployed.
64
  
In addition to the above, reliance of the federal government and other states of the 
federation on the revenues derived from Niger Delta crude oil has fostered a culture of 
fiscal complacency throughout the federation. Despite the presence of other exploitable 
and potentially profitable natural/mineral resources in virtually every state of the 
federation,
65
 the federal government and the other states have relied almost solely on 
revenues generated from the petroleum profit tax in the Niger Delta,
66
 thus fueling the 
perception that money that should have been used for developing the Niger Delta and 
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improving the quality of life of its local residents, is arbitrarily siphoned away and used 
to fund development and luxurious living elsewhere. Apart from the 13 percent which is 
given to it in accordance with the so called principle of derivation, the Niger Delta which 
bears the brunt of oil exploration derives no other form of financial benefit from the 
exploitation of oil within its territory. 
More importantly, the country’s heavy reliance on revenues from oil exposes it to price 
fluctuations in the international oil market, and hence the failure or refusal to broaden 
income generation in the states through economic diversification (or the exploration of 
other sources of income) exposes the entire country (including all the states) to price 
fluctuations in the international oil market, thus giving room for economic uncertainty 
and instability. Indeed, the Nigerian economy went into recession in 2016 as a result of 
very low oil prices in the international market.
67
 This has severely affected the finances 
of many states and local governments, as seen in their inability to pay worker’s salaries 
for several months.
68
 The country’s sole focus on oil has not allowed for a diversification 
of the economy. Despite the enormous potentials in agriculture and the availability of 
commercially viable mineral/natural resources in virtually every state in Nigeria,
69
 the 
federal government and the states and local governments predominantly rely on revenues 
derived from oil in the Niger Delta for their sustenance.
70
     
In view of the above, and in accordance with some of the guidelines already proposed in 
this thesis for the assignment of fiscal resources among the levels of government, namely 
the need for regional governments to derive significant benefit from fiscal resources 
generated from their territory, and the need for regional governments to generate and 
manage their own resources, I propose that the petroleum/natural resource tax be 
assigned to the state governments. The states should have total control over the 
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exploration and exploitation of natural/mineral resources located within their territories. 
Such control will include how exploration and exploitation licenses are allocated and how 
profits derived from such natural/mineral resources are taxed. This, I believe, is the best 
way to put a permanent end to the perennial “resource control” crises that has plagued 
Nigeria for several decades. 
Apart from helping to end the seemingly intractable resource control crisis in the Niger 
Delta, empowering the states of the federation to levy and collect natural/mineral 
resources tax will help to obliterate the current culture of heavy reliance on oil revenue, a 
culture which has made many states fiscally lazy since they are guaranteed a fraction of 
the oil revenue derived from the Niger Delta every month. A culture of near total reliance 
on easy oil revenue from the Niger Delta also incentivizes fiscal irresponsibility and 
militates against fiscal accountability in the states and local governments, since it is easy 
to dissipate unearned money on wasteful expenditure. 
Attempts are often made to justify the current exclusive assignment of petroleum profit 
tax to the federal government by arguing that it is the only significant source of income 
for the country and its decentralization will engender fiscal inequality, in that, there 
would be a disproportionate concentration of wealth in the Niger Delta States compared 
to other states.
71
 This argument however fails to acknowledge the fact that Nigeria is 
enormously endowed with several other huge deposits of mineral/natural resources 
scattered all over the country. There is indeed no part of Nigeria that is not endowed with 
one potentially profitable natural/mineral resource or the other.
72
 These other mineral 
resources have remained untapped and unutilized because easy money comes from the oil 
in the Niger Delta. 
Apart from natural/mineral resources, agriculture is also a potential source of huge 
income for each of the state and local governments of the federation. In fact, prior to the 
discovery of crude petroleum oil in Nigeria, agriculture was the major source of income 
for every part of Nigeria. The regional governments made enormous income from the 
                                                          
71
 Nurudeen M. Abdallah, ‘Confab: Northern Delegates Explain Opposition to Resource Control’ Daily 
Trust (2 May 2014) https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/general/confab-northern-delegates-explain-
opposition-to-resource-control/45262.html (accessed 5/8/2017). 
72
 See Table 3 in Chapter four. 
261 
 
sale and export of cocoa, groundnut, palm oil and other cash crops in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s.
73
  
The abandonment of agriculture as a major source of income for the regions occurred 
following the discovery of crude oil in the Niger Delta,
74
 and the incursion of the military 
into the politics of Nigeria in the late 1960s. Realizing the enormous wealth derivable 
from the export of crude oil, the military jettisoned agriculture and focused on oil. They 
neglected the groundnut pyramids in Northern Nigeria, and abandoned the cultivation of 
cocoa and palm oil in Western and Eastern Nigeria respectively. They instead focused on 
the easy revenue derivable from the oil export in the Niger Delta. And in order to secure 
exclusive control over the oil in the Delta and the revenue derivable from it, they 
centralized control over oil exploration and oil exploitation activities throughout the 
country. 
The point being made above is that the oil in the Niger Delta is not the only potential 
source of income in Nigeria. As Table 3 in chapter four shows, apart from the enormous 
potentials of agriculture as a source of significant revenue for every part of Nigeria, every 
state in Nigeria has reserves of potentially profitable but unexploited mineral/natural 
resources that could generate substantial revenue for it. The parasitic reliance on oil 
revenue is no longer acceptable and must be eschewed. In essence, fiscal autonomy for 
the states, as proposed in this thesis, should suffice to push every state in Nigeria in the 
direction of fiscal self-reliance. Where fiscal imbalances occur as a result of some states’ 
inability to generate sufficient revenue to meet their constitutional responsibilities, such 
imbalances can be addressed through a carefully designed and bespoke fiscal equalization 
scheme.          
As already argued therefore the power to levy and collect mineral/natural resources tax 
should be assigned to the state governments. The current arrangement under which the 
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central government exercises full control over natural resources tax and gives just 13 
percent of the revenue from that tax to the state(s) in whose territory the mineral/natural 
resource is located in accordance with the so called principle of ‘derivation’ is 
fundamentally flawed. This arrangement is an instrument of exploitation and oppression. 
It is an arrangement designed to perpetually entrench the hegemony of the central 
government by making the states permanently dependent on it for their sustenance. 
The argument of some political leaders for a mere increase in the “derivation” percentage 
from the constitutionally established 13 percent to 25 percent or 50 percent
75
 is in 
principle not different from the status quo. The argument for a mere increase in the 
percentage of resource tax revenues payable to producing states by the federal 
government is an escapist proposal that fails to recognize and address the root cause of 
the violent agitations in the Niger Delta.  
The Niger Delta struggle is about control of resources. It is the struggle of a people to 
wrest control of their land and natural resources from the suffocating control of a distant 
and insensitive central government that is only interested in making money from their 
resources without any care for their welfare. It is about the desire of a people to control 
and regulate their own affairs without any intrusion from external parties. It is about their 
desire for self-government and autonomy, an autonomy they had enjoyed for several 
centuries before the advent of colonialism and its attendant merger of different ethnic 
groups under the same roof. The Niger Delta crisis involves the struggle of a people 
against an exploitative centralist arrangement that is seemingly designed to perpetually 
ensure their political and fiscal emasculation.   
To address the injustice of the current exploitative arrangement, there must be a radical 
departure from the status quo. Each state of the federation should be allowed to exercise 
unfettered and untrammeled control over its natural/mineral resources. The tax on 
revenues that accrue from the exploitation of these natural resources should be 
appropriated and managed by the producing state itself. There are precedents for regional 
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control of resource tax in other ethnically diverse federations. For instance, in Ethiopia, 
an ethnically diverse African country with a history similar to that of Nigeria, the states 
play a major role in levying and collecting taxes on “income derived from mining 
operations, and royalties and land rentals on such operations.”76 The same obtains in 
Canada where each province is constitutionally empowered to “exclusively” legislate in 
respect of “non-renewable natural resources” within its territory. The control which the 
Canadian provinces exercise over their natural resources includes the power to levy and 
collect taxes in respect of such resources.
77
   
An assignment of the power to levy and collect mineral/natural resources tax to the 
constituent states of the Nigerian federation will spur all the states into action and 
encourage each state to responsibly pursue the exploitation of its own resources, generate 
revenues from them, and manage these revenues responsibly. It will aid the 
diversification of the Nigerian economy. It will encourage healthy competition among the 
states, and the federation will be the better for it. Importantly, it will significantly reduce 
the suffocating and overbearing control wielded by the federal government in the federal 
system. And by extension, it will drastically reduce the inter-ethnic struggle for the 
control of the federal government. 
Personal Income Tax: Each state of the federation should collect and administer 
personal income tax from its workers and residents. A federal statute should set a uniform 
personal income tax rate for the entire country in order to prevent unnecessarily wide 
disparities in the tax rate across the country. But the collection of the tax and its 
administration should be vested in each state government who must then ensure that 
proceeds from the tax is shared between the state government and the local/municipal 
governments within the state according to a criteria clearly set down in a law of the 
concerned state. The Personal Income Tax is a high yield tax base that can provide a 
reliable source of revenue to finance development projects and provide public goods and 
services in the state and local governments. The federal government may also collect and 
administer its own personal income tax, but this should be directed at federal government 
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workers and residents of the federal capital territory. Regional control of the personal 
income tax is not uncommon in a number of other ethnically diverse federal states. For 
instance, provincial or regional governments are allowed to levy, collect and use the 
personal income tax in Ethiopia.
78
 In Brazil and Canada, the tax is concurrent, so 
provinces and regions are also allowed to levy and administer the income tax.
79
 
Property Tax: Being an immobile tax, the property tax is a natural candidate for local 
taxation.
80
 In fact the trend in most federations is to reserve this tax for the local 
governments. This is the trend in federations like Canada, Australia and the United 
States.
81
 It is also the practice in South Africa.
82
 The property tax, when properly 
managed and harnessed can be an excellent source of revenue for the local governments. 
For instance, the property tax has been known to account for approximately three-
quarters of the revenues of local governments in the United States.
83
 
Customs duties, Export Tax, and Company Income Tax: The administration of certain 
taxes is traditionally assigned to the federal government in most federations. For instance, 
in most federal countries, customs duties and export taxes are usually within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government.
84
 This is to enable the federal 
government secure “an effective internal customs and economic union”85 for the country. 
The federal government is in the best position to efficiently levy and administer these 
taxes in order to achieve this goal. The efficiency argument also supports the assignment 
of the company income tax to the federal government as companies often carry out their 
operations across state or regional boundaries within a federation and could fall victim of 
multiple taxation if state or local governments are allowed to levy the company income 
tax. On the ground of efficiency therefore, the above mentioned taxes should be assigned 
to the federal government as it is more likely to be able to efficiently levy and administer 
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them by setting uniform rates for them across the country and superintending their 
collection and management. 
However since the custom duty and export tax are levied on goods coming into or going 
out of Nigeria generally, and the company income tax is levied on companies whose 
transactions and trade activities often cut across regional boundaries, the revenues raised 
from these taxes belong to the entire country and should be vertically and horizontally 
shared among the federal, state and local governments using a carefully computed 
revenue allocation formula which will take into consideration the functions assigned to 
each level of government under the constitution and the estimated financial costs of 
performing those functions.  
The horizontal inter-state and inter-local government revenue sharing should be done 
using the criteria of “population” and “revenue raising capacity” of each state or local 
government. Apart from the fact that these two criteria are fair indicators of the financial 
need of each state, they are also easily ascertainable if diligence is employed in 
measuring them. For instance the population of each state can be ascertained by a census 
conducted by the state itself but independently witnessed and verified by external 
assessors. The revenue raising capacity of each state can be ascertained by a 
consideration of the range and volume of tax revenues and other internal and external 
sources of finance available to it. Using population and fiscal capacity as the major 
criteria in the sharing of revenue affords a much better guaranty of certainty, fairness, and 
transparency than the 1999 constitution’s additional use of such vague, opaque and 
controversial revenue sharing criteria as “terrain,” and “landmass”86  
The determination of the appropriate revenue allocation formula and the revenue 
allocation criteria should be done by the country’s Fiscal Commission. 
Borrowing Powers: Under the 1999 constitution, the borrowing power of the federation 
is exclusively vested in the federal government. But as discussed in chapter four, this 
power has been abused over time. The federal government could in fact use this power to 
intimidate and oppress minority states, or state and local governments controlled by 
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opposition political parties, as the experiences of some state governments have shown.
87
 
Yet, the ability of a government to raise loans and other instruments of financial support 
is very crucial to the success of that government in the performance of its constitutionally 
assigned responsibilities. It is therefore very important that this power is carefully 
managed to prevent its use as an instrument of political oppression, and ensure that all 
levels of government have a reasonable chance of utilizing it as an alternative means of 
raising financial capital. 
However, there is also the need to effectively control public borrowing in order to 
prevent economic instability which may occur if states or local governments are left on 
their own to borrow within and outside the country as they deem fit. Indeed some states 
may engage in indiscriminate borrowing and wasteful spending, and thus accumulate 
excessive or unmanageable debt. Heavy indebtedness by a state or local government may 
induce economic crisis in that state or local government and create ripple effects in other 
states. For instance, economic crisis in a particular state may precipitate mass migration 
across its borders into other states with the result that basic amenities and social services 
in these other states may become overstretched and inadequate to meet the demands of 
their own constituents. 
In the administration of public borrowing therefore, there is a need to strike a balance 
between the desirability of fair acess to financial instruments by the state and local 
governments and the need to forestall national economic instability. I will argue that 
instead of the current arrangement under which the federal government controls state and 
local governments’ acess to internal and external loans, the fiscal commission established 
by the new constitution, whose membership will consist of nominees of the states of the 
federation and the federal government, should be saddled with the responsibility of 
managing the access of the levels of government to internal and external loans. 
Two things will most likely be accomplished if the approval process for federal, state, 
and local government loan transactions is managed by the fiscal commission. First, the 
process of approving state and local government loan transactions will be rescued from 
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the stranglehold of the federal government and will thus become more transparent and 
fair. Second, the process will benefit from rigorous and transparent peer review which 
will ensure that approval for government borrowing is given only when truly necessary. It 
will also ensure that approval is given subject to transparent conditions that are designed 
to ensure that borrowing by the levels of government does not compromise the economic 
stability of the federation. Saddling the fiscal commission with this responsibility as 
proposed above will most likely inspire the confidence of the state and local governments 
in the approval process and thus put an end to the vicious cycle of bias, political 
manipulation, and opacity that has characterized the existing arrangement for several 
years. 
6.3.2. B.2.  Fiscal Equalization 
A major criticism that is often advanced against fiscal autonomy for sub-national 
governments in federations is its alleged tendency to induce regional fiscal inequality and 
instability.
88
 Where states and local governments are allowed to freely exercise autonomy 
in generating their own revenue, goes the argument, huge fiscal disparities among the 
states and local governments may inevitably occur and defeat the need for economic 
balance or fiscal equality/equity among the constituent units of the federation
89
. This is an 
argument often used by protagonists of fiscal centralization to justify their ideological 
position.
90
 
Yet the demand by various ethnic groups in the Nigerian federation for political and 
fiscal autonomy for the federating units remains loud and urgent. This demand cannot be 
ignored. A way must therefore be found to mitigate any difficulties that may arise as a 
result of financial disparities induced by the non-centralization of fiscal resources/fiscal 
autonomy. One tested way of doing this is to design an effective system of fiscal 
equalization to ensure that fiscal disparities are not so pronounced as to distort or 
compromise the country’s fiscal equilibrium, and constituent units of the federation are 
able to provide comparable levels of public goods and services for their constituents 
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regardless of their financial strength.
91
 Fiscal equalization is redistributive in character 
and may thus help to prevent equity problems that may arise in a non-centralized 
federation. 
Equalization has, for decades, been used to address vertical and horizontal fiscal 
imbalances among levels of government, though the exact form of equalization varies 
from federation to federation.
92
 Indeed there is no standard model of equalization. Federal 
states which utilize equalization arrangements have had to adapt such arrangements to 
suit their peculiar needs.
93
  
In view of this thesis’ proposal of fiscal autonomy for the levels of government in 
Nigeria, I propose that Nigeria should adopt an equalization system that constitutionally 
requires a percentage of centrally collected tax revenues to be set aside for equalization 
purposes. Thus, a constitutionally specified percentage of tax revenues collected by the 
federal government from customs duties, export tax, and company income tax should be 
deposited in an equalization fund set up and maintained by the country’s Fiscal 
Commission. From this fund, the Commission can periodically make fiscal transfers to 
state and local governments with weak revenue raising capacity in order to augment their 
finances. Management of the equalization scheme by the Fiscal Commission will make it 
relatively transparent and open, while giving every fiscally weak state and local 
government a fair chance of accessing the fund regardless of its political affiliation or 
leaning.  
The details of the equalization arrangement should be set out in a National Equalization 
Act, but the basic principles as proposed above should be enshrined in the constitution.  
The division of powers and fiscal resources advocated thus far in this thesis will ensure 
that states and local governments are indeed autonomous and fully in control of their 
internal affairs. It will help to curb the dictatorship and hegemony of the federal 
government. It will also enhance the participation of the people of each state and local 
government in their own government. Finally, it will provide a better opportunity to have 
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local policies adapted to meet local aspirations, and also compel local leaders to be 
politically and fiscally accountable to their constituents. In short, the division of powers 
and fiscal resources proposed above offers a bespoke solution to Nigeria’s infamous 
power allocation problem. 
6.3.2.1. Common Arguments against Non-Centralization of Powers and Autonomy 
for State and Local Governments. 
A. Corrupt Practices by Officials of Sub-National Governments  
An argument that may be raised against autonomy for state and local governments is its 
alleged tendency to encourage and facilitate financial crimes at the state and local 
government levels since the non-centralization of powers and fiscal resources will 
translate to an increased availability of revenue to these lower levels of government. The 
idea is that with increased revenues, state and local government officials will have 
enhanced opportunities to engage in financial crimes and corruption.
94
  
This assertion is problematic in the sense that it impliedly assumes that centralized 
governance is immune to and shielded from corrupt practices. Available evidence, in the 
case of Nigeria, however points to the contrary. In chapter five, I pointed out that 
statistics from the two anticorruption agencies in Nigeria, the EFCC and the ICPC, 
demonstrate that financial corruption has been a major problem in Nigeria for several 
years, and its occurrence is not restricted to the state and local governments alone. Public 
office holders and officials at all levels of government have been complicit in corrupt 
practices since the return to civil rule in 1999.
95
 
It is thus pointless to embrace centralization of powers and fiscal resources in a bid to 
prevent corruption at the sub-national levels of government. In fact Nigeria’s recent 
history shows that corrupt practices have been more prevalent among officials of the 
federal government.
96
 This implies that corruption in Nigeria is not a regional problem. 
Rather it is a systemic problem that is best tackled by the adoption and deployment of 
innovative anti-corruption and monitoring strategies that facilitate early detection of 
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corrupt practices, discourage corruption, and make it unattractive. In addition, it is also 
important to muster the right political will to genuinely confront this social malaise. A 
way to do this is to reposition and strengthen the country’s existing anticorruption 
agencies by guaranteeing their independence from political actors. When the 
anticorruption agencies are able to do their work without fear or favour, incidences of 
impunity that have characterized the system for decades will drastically reduce or even 
fade into oblivion. 
As discussed in chapter five, the appointment and removal of the leadership of the two 
anticorruption agencies, the EFCC and the ICPC, should be made by the President of 
Nigeria only with the approval of the country’s National Assembly. Even then, removal 
of the leaders of the two agencies should only be contemplated on grounds of gross 
misconduct or physical inability to carry out the responsibilities of the office. With their 
independence and security of tenure guaranteed, the leaders of these agencies will be 
encouraged to take the bull by the horn and boldly investigate and prosecute corrupt 
public office holders and politicians, no matter how highly placed they are. The current 
system under which the President of the federation is empowered to discretionarily 
dismiss or remove leaders of the anticorruption agencies is itself a recipe for corruption 
as the President may, for political reasons, use his position to influence the anti-
corruption campaign of the two agencies whose leaders will be under pressure to comply 
in order to save their jobs. This has in fact been the case in Nigeria since 2003.
97
 
Apart from guaranteeing the independence of the two anticorruption agencies as 
discussed above, the office of the Auditor General at the federal and state levels should 
be detached from the Presidency and Governors’ offices respectively and made 
completely independent and autonomous in order to allow the Auditor General to carry 
out his/her audit responsibilities without fear or favour. As with the case of the leadership 
of the anticorruption agencies, the appointment or removal of the Auditor General should 
be made by the President or Governor, as the case may be, only with the approval of the 
federal or state parliament.  
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The Auditor General should be constitutionally mandated to submit yearly audit reports 
to the federal or state parliament, as the case may be, for its information or action. Where 
the President, Vice President, State Governor or Deputy Governor is found culpable of 
financial crime, this should be a ground for his impeachment by the concerned 
Parliament, and subsequent prosecution by the Police. Where any other federal or state 
government official is found culpable, this should be a ground for his or her prosecution 
by the Police.  
In the case of the local governments, the Auditor’s appointment or removal should be 
made by the Local Government Chairman in conjunction with the Local Government 
Councillorship which is the legislative arm of the local government. The Auditor should 
be constitutionally mandated to submit to the Councilors, annual audit reports on the 
account of the local government for their attention and action. Where the Local 
Government Chairman is found culpable of financial crime, this should be a ground for 
his impeachment by the Councilors, and subsequent prosecution by the Police. Where 
any other local government official is deemed culpable, this should be a ground for his 
prosecution by the Police. 
While the anticorruption measures discussed above are not meant to be exhaustive, they 
will certainly go a long way in checking the menace of official corruption throughout the 
country. The important point to note is that no political arrangement will automatically 
curb corruption. Whether the favoured political arrangement is centralization or non-
centralization, corruption can only be addressed if effective institutional measures as well 
as adequate checks and balances, and the right political will, are in place to tackle the 
menace.           
B. Secession or Political Instability 
A second argument that may be raised against sub-national government autonomy is its 
alleged tendency to facilitate or encourage political instability or secession.
98
 Indeed, as 
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discussed in chapter four, the fear of secession was a major driving force behind the 
adoption of centralization as a frame of government by the military authorities in the 
aftermath of the Nigerian civil war in the late 1960s. It was thought that the only way to 
prevent a recurrence of Biafra’s attempted secession was to centralize power as much as 
possible. This fear of secession is a major factor responsible for the culture of 
centralization that has persisted in Nigeria till date. 
From all indications however, centralization has, in fact, fuelled the desire for secession 
among Nigeria’s ethnic groups over the years. This is evident in the resurgent agitation 
for the breakaway of the Igbo ethnic group in South-Eastern Nigeria to form the so called 
sovereign state of Biafra. It is also evident in the violent agitation of militant groups in 
the Niger Delta for secession or self government.
99
 Centralization has therefore not 
solved the secession imbroglio. If anything, it has exacerbated it. The problem of 
secession is, in fact, better addressed by conceding significant political and fiscal 
autonomy, as proposed in this thesis, to the state and local governments in Nigeria. As we 
saw in chapter four, militant ethnic groups in the Niger-Delta have, for instance, insisted 
that unless the region is allowed substantial powers of self government, they would resort 
to a violent secession from the Nigerian federation. It is the argument of this thesis 
therefore that the way to forestall the much feared secession is to ensure that substantial 
powers of self government and autonomy are assigned to the state and local governments 
while putting in place measures that will encourage cooperation and unity in the 
federation. Such measures, for instance, should include the democratic and joint 
participation of all levels of government in the common institutions of the federation. 
In any case, secession is a potential reality in any federation. In recent times, there have 
been secessionist agitations in California, United States.
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seeking a second independence referendum,
101
 and Britain itself is set to exit the 
European Union.
102
 Secession is indeed provided for in the federal constitution of 
Ethiopia.
103
 There is thus nothing strange about the possibility of secession in a 
federation. In an ethnically diverse federation like Nigeria, the antidote to that possibility 
is not centralization. Rather what is required is a dexterous balancing of regional/local 
autonomy with measures that will foster cooperation and unity among the constieunt 
units of the federation, as proposed in this thesis. With such an arrangement, secession 
will gradually become unattractive and unnecessary. 
C. Absence of Capacity at the State and Local Government Levels. 
A third argument that may be raised against non-centralization of powers, and autonomy 
for state and local governments is that these sub-national governments may not possess 
the requisite administrative or infrastructural capacity to adequately provide certain 
public goods and services or discharge certain responsibilities even when such are of 
regional or local interest, that is, even when such functions pertain to the internal affairs 
of the state or local governments.  
This reasoning is essentially defeatist. It impliedly seeks to advocate or justify 
centralization by hiding behind a supposed lack of administrative or infrastructural 
capacity at the sub-national levels of government. If centralization is adopted as a frame 
of government for this reason, the state and local levels of government may never be able 
to provide public goods and services on their own. They will remain permanently 
incapacitated and dependent on the federal government for their sustenance. 
On the other hand, with more powers and fiscal resources assigned to the state and local 
governments, these levels of government will be forced to acquire the appropriate 
infrastructure and secure the appropriate administrative and managerial competence to 
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perform the functions assigned to them under the new constitution. A “learning by 
doing’’104 approach will, over time, secure to the state and local governments, the 
administrative and managerial experience and competence required to perform their 
functions effectively and meet the needs of their constituents. The state and local 
governments should therefore be allowed to “learn by doing” until they are able to 
competently carry out new constitutional responsibilities assigned to them.
105
 This 
approach is much better than centralization which will only perpetually weaken the state 
and local governments and render them perpetually reliant on the federal government, a 
condition that significantly undermines their autonomy. 
6.3.2.2. The National Fiscal Commission                        
A third point discussed in chapter four about the division of powers and resources in the 
existing constitution is the centralized nature of the Fiscal Commission established by the 
constitution to oversee, among other things, the allocation of revenues raised from 
centrally collected taxes among the levels of government. The Commission is also 
saddled with the task of determining from time to time, the criteria and formula to be 
used in allocating such revenues. But as discussed in chapter four, this commission is 
prone to undue political influence due to the wide discretionary powers constitutionally 
conferred on the President to appoint its members. The commission is also not 
constitutionally obliged to consult with the constituent units of the federation in the 
execution of its duties, despite the fact that its decisions have far reaching implications 
for every part of the country. 
In chapter five, I argued that provisions should be inserted in the proposed new 
constitution to truly guarantee the inclusivity of the country’s Fiscal Commission. First, I 
argued that instead of the current arrangement that allows the President to solely appoint 
the members of the Commission, this power should be shared between the federal 
government and the states. Each state of the federation should be allowed to nominate its 
representative to the Commission. The federal government should also nominate a 
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representative. This would ensure that every state of the federation is genuinely 
represented in the Commission. The Chairman of the Commission should be jointly 
elected by the members of the Commission. 
The foregoing apart, the Commission should also be constitutionally mandated to 
consistently engage in wide public consultations throughout the country especially when 
preparing new revenue allocation formula or when deciding on new criteria to be used in 
allocating revenue among the levels of government in the federation. The criteria and 
formula for revenue allocation among the levels of government are sensitive issues that 
have proved to be controversial and acrimonious over time. It is undemocratic and 
counter-productive to leave the power to decide these issues solely in the hands of the 
Commission. Public consultations with citizens, traditional institutions, and civil society 
organizations will enrich the legitimacy of decisions ultimately reached by the 
Commission on these issues. 
Apart from the commission’s duty to determine the criteria and formula for revenue 
allocation however, the commission should also be constitutionally empowered to 
manage government borrowing, as well as the federation’s fiscal equalization 
arrangement as proposed earlier in this chapter. As already discussed, the main reason for 
proposing the assignment of these functions to the fiscal commission is to ensure fairness 
and transparency in their management. Since all the levels of government are represented 
in the commission, decisions taken by the commission will be deemed to bear their joint 
imprimatur and endorsement. This eliminates the possibility of opacity, bias, and 
cronyism that may result if these processes are left solely in the hands of the federal 
government as is the case under the 1999 constitution.  
Restructuring the Fiscal Commission, as proposed above, will no doubt strengthen the 
democratic process in Nigeria. Not only will it ensure that every part of Nigeria is 
genuinely represented in the fiscal commission that decides the important and sensitive 
issues of revenue allocation, fiscal equalization, and government borrowing, it will also 
ensure that decisions of the commission truly reflect the wishes of the constituent units of 
the federation, thus enhancing the legitimacy of such decisions. In addition, it will 
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enhance cooperation among the constituent units of the federation and among the levels 
of government.  
One of the major causes of national unrest in Nigeria’s recent history is the perceived 
imposition of fiscal policies that are completely at variance with the wishes and 
aspirations of the constituent units of the federation. An inclusive and democratically 
structured fiscal commission will however help in defusing tension and stemming the tide 
of these unrests. 
In view of the foregoing, I propose that the provisions of the new constitution regarding 
the fiscal commission should be structured as follows: 
 
National Fiscal Commission (NFC) 
1. There shall be established for the federation a National Fiscal Commission.  
2. The National Fiscal Commission shall consist of the following members: 
(a) A Chairman, and  
(b) One member representing each State of the Federation and nominated by the 
Governor of that State in conjunction with the House of Assembly of the State 
and 
(c) One member representing the Federal Capital Territory and nominated by the 
President of the Federation in conjunction with the Senate of the federation. 
3. The Commission shall have power to – 
(a) Monitor the accruals to and disbursement of revenue from the Federation 
Account. 
(b) Design appropriate formula and principles for revenue allocation among the 
levels of government in the federation.   
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(c) Review revenue allocation formula and principles at five year intervals in order 
to ensure their conformity with changing realities, provided that in carrying out 
such reviews, the Commission shall consult widely with State and local 
governments, traditional rulers, community leaders, and other civil society 
organizations. 
(d) Manage the federation’s fiscal equalization arrangement. 
(e) Manage internal and external borrowing by the levels of government in the 
federation.  
(f) Perform such other functions as are necessary to give effect to sections 2(a), (b), 
(c), (d) and (e) above. 
6.4. Commission on Federalism. 
Having set out different proposals for the reform of Nigeria’s power distribution 
architecture above, it is important that the new constitution establish a Commission on 
Federalism to monitor, encourage and advocate compliance with the federal principles of 
covenant, cooperation and non-centralization of powers as defined in this thesis. This 
Commission will conduct periodic appraisal of compliance with these three tenets in the 
country’s intergovernmental relations and produce regular reports which will form the 
basis of its advocacy work.  
The main focus of the Commission’s advocacy work is to encourage compliance with the 
three cardinal principles of the symbio-democratic federal framework proposed in this 
thesis, that is, covenant, cooperation and non-centralization. The advocacy work of the 
Commission will be conducted through bespoke seminars, conferences, and workshops 
aimed at enlightening government leaders, civil servants, and the general public on the 
need to adhere to these federal tenets. 
This Commission is urgently needed considering that public governance in Nigeria has 
for long been conducted along centralist lines. Sustained vigilance and re-orientation is 
needed to ensure that the symbio-democratic federal framework and the constitutional 
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reforms proposed in this thesis are consistently adhered to in the interest of the 
federation. 
The provisions of the Constitution establishing the Commission should be structured as 
follows; 
 
Commission on Federalism 
1. There shall be established for the federation, a Commission on Federalism which 
shall 
Comprise the following members 
(a) A Chairman  
(b) Six other members representing the six geo-political zones of Nigeria 
(c) Members of the Commission shall be appointed by the President in 
conjunction with the Senate.  
2. The Commission shall perform the following functions 
(a) Monitor, encourage and advocate compliance with federal principles in 
Nigeria 
(b) Issue periodic reports on public compliance with federal principles in Nigeria. 
3. The advocacy work of the Commission shall be carried out through seminars, 
conferences and lectures. 
The aim of the federal constitutional framework proposed in this thesis and outlined thus 
far in this chapter is to abolish centralization of powers in Nigeria by curtailing the 
powers of the federal government, and imbuing the component parts of the federation 
with the power to manage their own internal affairs and determine their own destinies. It 
is in essence aimed at entrenching a division of powers and fiscal resources that 
facilitates genuine democratic governance throughout the federation. Only a framework 
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such as the one so far advocated in this thesis will conduce to unity, peace and stability in 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
6.5. Alternative Political Arrangements and their Workability   
At this juncture, it is important to examine other political arrangements that have been 
suggested as alternatives to the existing centralist political arrangement in Nigeria. The 
first is an argument for a breakup of Nigeria into smaller independent countries.
106
 The 
second is an argument for a confederation instead of a federation.
107
  
The first alternative is as problematic as it is dangerous for the peace and stability of 
Nigeria and the West African sub-region. Breaking up or dismembering Nigeria at this 
stage of her checkered history, as Bayo Oluwasanmi,
108
 has advocated, carries with it 
ominous challenges that may be extremely difficult to resolve or grapple with. These 
challenges may ultimately throw the entire West African sub region into chaos and war. 
It may indeed trigger a chain reaction, the end of which no one can conclusively predict. 
First, with a break up, as being advocated, there will be border disputes which may prove 
very difficult to resolve. Africa itself has a long history of bitter and acrimonious border 
disputes. A break up of Nigeria into different countries may immediately trigger an 
unhealthy and long-drawn scramble among the ‘newly independent countries’ for 
territory, a condition that may lead to protracted war and inter-ethnic clashes.  
Second, a breakup will create intractable problems about ownership, retention and 
disposition of properties. There are Nigerians that have businesses and properties in parts 
of Nigeria where they are not indigenes. Retaining their interests in and claim to such 
properties may well turn out to be challenging, just as issues of citizenship, immigration, 
and residency are bound to create their own peculiar problems. All of these may create 
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intractable crisis that will perpetually keep the entire West African sub-region in a state 
of war. A break up of Nigeria into smaller countries may thus not augur well for the 
people of present day Nigeria. The uncertainties associated with such a project make it 
unappealing and unattractive. 
The same goes for a confederation. A confederation arrangement will most likely throw 
up the same issues which a breakup of the country might induce. This is because in a 
confederation, the confederating parties are individually sovereign with total control over 
all matters except perhaps some aspects of foreign relations which are delegated to a 
weak central agency that acts on their behalf. The same issues of border ownership, 
citizenship, immigration, economic protectionism, proprietary interests in real estate, and 
separatism are bound to show up. These are issues that are capable of creating inter-group 
tension and unending regional conflict. Under a confederation, the tendency for secession 
is greater for there is little binding the confederating parties together. The uncertainties 
associated with a confederation arrangement in a country like Nigeria are thus too real to 
ignore. 
What Nigeria needs at this stage of her history is not confederation or a breakup of the 
country. Nigeria has come a long way since the advent of colonialism brought several 
different groups together under one roof. Over the years, there have been inter-ethnic 
marriages, individuals have set up businesses in parts of Nigeria where they are not 
indigenes, individuals have bought properties in parts of Nigeria where they are not 
indigenes, and people have taken up residence in parts of Nigeria where they are not 
indigenes. There is so much that binds Nigeria and Nigerians together as a nation. At this 
stage of the country’s history, it is absolutely impolitic to leave the relative safety of “one 
Nigeria” for the grave uncertainties associated with confederation or disintegration. 
It is true that the present structure of the Nigerian federation is problematic. It is true that 
the constituent units of the federation are disenchanted with the division of powers and 
fiscal resources entrenched in the 1999 constitution. But the answer is not centralism, 
unitarism, confederation or disintegration. The solution is a better structured federation 
under which all ethnic groups in Nigeria can cooperatively cohabit without sacrificing the 
autonomy, identity, uniqueness or aspirations of each. That structure is found in the non-
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centralized, covenant driven symbio-democratic federal framework proposed in this 
thesis. It is a federal system in which the citizens have a say in how the federal system is 
structured, and the state and local governments have significant powers of self 
government without compromising the unity and stability of the federation. 
6.6. ADVOCACY FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. Detailed Revenue Sharing Formula 
Although this thesis has proposed that revenues raised from the centrally collected taxes, 
that is, customs duties, export tax, and the company income tax, should be vertically and 
horizontally shared among the levels of government, the percentage of the centrally 
pooled revenue to be allocated to each level of government will need to be determined. 
The procedure and methodology for computing the exact percentages that should go to 
each level of government, is for financial experts and economists working with the 
National Fiscal Commission to unravel. Such research will however effectively 
complement this thesis. 
B. The Symbio-democratic Federal Framework as an Instrument of Conflict 
Resolution on the African Continent?  
The Symbio-democratic federal constitutional framework for the division of powers and 
fiscal resources as devised in this thesis may prove very useful in addressing inter-ethnic 
and intergovernmental conflicts in other parts of Africa. As is very well known, many 
African States are ethnically diverse, and many are beset with problems similar to those 
found in Nigeria. Centralization and privatization of State power, both of which are 
colonial legacies, have been endemic in Africa for several decades despite the continent’s 
very pronounced diversity. Inter-ethnic and fratricidal conflicts which today litter the 
African continent are, in many cases, directly linked to the struggle for power. Ethnic 
groups take up arms against each other in a bid to further ethnic or regional quests for 
power, dignity and relevance. A political framework that guarantees to each ethnic group 
significant control over its own affairs may prove to be very instrumental in achieving 
peace and stability on the African continent. The symbio-democratic federal framework, 
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as defined in this thesis, carries the potential to help in addressing some of the age-long 
power struggles and conflicts that have held Africa hostage since the advent of 
colonialism.  
The challenge however is determining whether and how the symbio-democratic federal 
constitutional framework proposed in this thesis is applicable to the political milieu in 
other parts of Africa. Within each African country there are different cultures and 
traditional practices. The degree of political and cultural sophistication of sub-national 
units varies from country to country. Similarly there are differences in the degree of 
power struggle, and the extent of linguistic, cultural, economic and religious diversity 
within each African country. These factors are all very important in determining the 
suitability of symbio-democratic federalism, as defined in this thesis, for each African 
country and the extent to which it can be applied. They are also important in determining 
the degree of non-centralization that is appropriate within each country. Further research 
is needed to make these determinations in the context of other multi-ethnic countries on 
the African continent. 
Further research in this regard will be very useful in guiding policy makers, public office 
holders, and civil society on the suitability of the framework proposed in this thesis for 
their countries. It will also help to clarify the relevance of federalism as a framework for 
political governance on the African continent as a whole. Hopefully, research on these 
issues will commence and proceed expeditiously in the nearest future. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Chapter, I have made specific proposals for concretizing the symbio-democratic 
federal constitutional framework proposed in this thesis for the division of powers and 
fiscal resources in Nigeria. This framework is especially suited for an ethnically diverse 
society like Nigeria. It is peremptorily predicated on covenant, cooperation and non-
centralization of powers. Essentially, this implies that the division of powers and fiscal 
resources among the levels of government must be covenanted or agreed by the people. It 
must imbue the component parts of the federation with powers to manage their own 
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affairs. And it must engender cooperation among the levels of government. In other 
words, it must genuinely facilitate non-centralization of powers. 
What this implies for Nigeria is that rather than the existing constitutional arrangement 
which was centrally determined and foisted on the people of Nigeria, Nigerians must be 
allowed to democratically determine how powers and fiscal resources should be 
distributed among the levels of government. This should be done through a constitution 
making process that has the production of a democratic constitution as its ultimate aim. I 
outlined a number of steps that should be taken to achieve this. First is the setting up of a 
Constitution Drafting Committee whose duty shall be the collation of public views and 
opinion, and the preparation of a draft constitution. Next is the convening of a 
Constituent Assembly to debate and adopt the draft constitution prepared by the 
Constitution Drafting Committee. The last stage of the constitution making process is the 
subjection of the draft constitution already adopted by the Constituent Assembly to a 
referendum at which the people shall either endorse or reject the constitution. If adopted, 
the new constitution becomes the people’s constitution articulating, among other things, 
the division of powers and resources jointly favoured by them. Only then can the 
constitution be regarded as an expression of the people’s covenant. 
A constitution that is formulated, adopted, and promulgated by the government without 
public participation cannot lay any claim to being a people’s constitution. To be worthy 
of that appellation, not only must the people be involved in its making, it must genuinely 
reflect their wishes and aspiration. The division of powers and fiscal resources in the 
extant 1999 constitution of Nigeria does not genuinely reflect the public will. It is tainted 
by a legitimacy deficit that can only be cured by a new power distribution structure 
entrenched in a new federal democratic constitution.  
Suggestions that the legitimacy deficit of the power distribution architecture entrenched 
in the existing 1999 constitution can be remedied by embarking on an incremental, 
piecemeal legislative amendment of the constitution fail to fundamentally address the 
problem. The point is that the entire 1999 constitution itself suffers from a legitimacy 
deficit that cannot be cured by a mere legislative amendment by the nation’s Parliament. 
No amount of legislative amendment can change the status of the 1999 constitution as an 
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illegitimate framework foisted on the Nigerian State by the military in 1999.  Only a new 
constitution, formulated by the people themselves through an open democratic process, 
and genuinely articulating their wishes and aspirations, including their favoured power 
distribution model, will suffice. 
In addition to formulating the new constitution through a genuine democratic process, the 
ethnically diverse character of the Nigerian federation, as well as the age-long demand 
for local autonomy by the constituent units of the federation, make it imperative for the 
division of powers and fiscal resources among the levels of government to be 
characterized by non-centralization, accompanied by appropriate autonomy. Nigeria 
cannot afford the centralist political arrangement foisted on it by a section of the Nigerian 
elite under the 1999 constitution. As we have seen in this thesis, the 1999 constitution 
entrenches a highly centralized power distribution arrangement that fosters the hegemony 
of the central government and establishes its dictatorship in relation to the other levels of 
government. This centralist power distribution model is not a recent phenomenon. In fact 
most Nigerian constitutions, since the colonial era, have been characterized by 
centralized allocation of powers and resources to the detriment of the federation’s 
constituent units.  
The colonial authorities and their military and civilian successors who institutionalized 
this centralized power distribution model predicated their stance mainly on the need to 
foster national unity and balanced economic development throughout the federation. It 
was thought that centralization would engender national cohesion and prevent 
disintegration. Rather than foster unity however, the centralized division of powers and 
fiscal resources has, over the years, induced an unhealthy struggle for the power and 
fiscal resources at the centre. Those who lose out in the power struggle often resort to 
violence and secessionist agitations. Thus instead of preventing disintegration, 
centralization has in fact done more to provoke it over the years. And unless the existing 
power distribution arrangement is urgently restructured, the federation itself may unravel 
in the nearest future. 
In this chapter, I have proposed a new division of powers and fiscal resources that is 
different from that set out in the 1999 constitution and previous constitutions before it in 
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two different ways. First, in place of the existing technique of distributing powers and 
fiscal resources among the levels of government through the exclusive and concurrent 
legislative lists, I propose the adoption of a clearer division of powers and fiscal 
resources through the instrumentality of three distinct legislative and administrative lists, 
to wit, the federal, state, and local government lists. 
This technique of distributing powers and fiscal resources through the instrumentality of 
the federal, state and local government legislative lists obliterates the possibility of 
centralization which the use of the “concurrent legislative list” under the existing 
arrangement may advertently or inadvertently facilitate. The concurrent legislative list in 
the 1999 constitution sets out the powers which both the federal and state governments 
may concurrently exercise. However the constitution adds a caveat- the state 
governments cannot legislate in respect of a matter on the concurrent legislative list if the 
central government has comprehensively legislated in respect of that matter. In effect, in 
addition to the federal government’s exclusive superintendence over matters itemized 
under the already over-bloated exclusive legislative list, the federal government can 
potentially exclude the legislative competence of state governments in respect of matters 
itemized in the concurrent legislative list by comprehensively legislating in respect of 
those matters. It does not seem to matter if such legislation does not conform to the 
wishes and aspirations of the states of the federation on those matters. Once the federal 
government comprehensively legislates in respect of such matters, the state governments 
may no longer legislate in that regard. This potentially empowers the federal government 
to arrogate more powers to itself and further establish its dictatorship over other levels of 
government. In short, it potentially facilitates centralization through the backdoor.  
It is thus my argument in this thesis that a delineation of governmental functions using 
three distinct legislative lists, that is the federal, state and local government lists will 
effectively engender clarity and certainty in the division of powers and fiscal resources, 
while preventing federal encroachment on the powers of the other levels of government. 
Second, I proposed a re-distribution of legislative powers among the levels of 
government such that rather than the highly centralized allocation of powers under the 
existing constitution, the state and local governments should, as far as is practicable, be 
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imbued with autonomous powers over their internal affairs while leaving the federal 
government with powers in respect of matters that are of general concern to the 
federation. Residual powers in respect of matters not listed in any of the three lists should 
be reserved for the state governments.  
I also advocated a restructuring of the federation’s fiscal arrangements such that rather 
than the concentration of fiscal powers and resources in the federal government, as is the 
case under the extant 1999 constitution, significant fiscal powers and resources should be 
assigned to the state and local governments to enable them perform their constitutionally 
assigned responsibilities unhindered. In essence, non-centralization of fiscal powers, 
along with requisite fiscal autonomy for the levels of government should be a principal 
factor in the allocation of fiscal powers and resources. Apart from customs duties, export 
tax, and company income tax, which, for reasons of efficiency, may have to be 
mandatorily collected by the federal government and shared among the levels of 
government, the power to raise and administer a significant number of other taxes should 
be assigned to the state and local governments. In particular, each state should be 
constitutionally empowered to raise and administer its own personal income tax, and 
natural resources tax, while the collection and administration of the property tax should 
be left to the local governments.  
With this arrangement, each level of government will be enabled to autonomously 
generate and manage its own fiscal resources. This will help to reduce state and local 
governments’ reliance on the central government for sustenance and survival, and thus 
greatly curtail the excessive dominance and dictatorship of the central government in the 
federation. It will also help to transform Nigeria from an oil-dependent economy to a 
diversified economy as the states and local governments device ways of generating 
revenue from agriculture and other natural/mineral resources located in their territories. 
Finally, the proposed arrangement will help to enhance fiscal discipline and prudence in 
the state and local governments. 
The thesis also proposes that horizontal fiscal imbalances and equity issues that may arise 
as a result of the fiscal arrangements proposed in this thesis should be remedied through a 
system of fiscal equalization that utilizes a constitutionally stipulated percentage of 
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centrally collected tax revenues to augment the finances of fiscally disadvantaged states 
and local governments.  
In addition to all of the foregoing I also proposed the establishment, by the proposed new 
constitution, of a National Fiscal Commission (NFC) consisting of representatives of the 
federal and state governments, and with a structure, scope of work, and modus operandi 
different from the existing fiscal commission established by the 1999 constitution.  
This thesis proposes that the NFC should be saddled with the responsibility of 
periodically reviewing the federation’s criteria for allocating revenue among the levels of 
government. It should also be saddled with the responsibility of allocating revenues 
centrally raised from customs duties, export tax, and company income tax, among the 
levels of government in the federation. In addition, it should be responsible for managing 
government borrowing, and administering the equalization scheme proposed above for 
augmenting the finances of fiscally weak state and local governments.  
As argued in the thesis, the existing Commission is prone to the federal government’s 
influence and control in that the President of the federation possesses wide discretionary 
powers, under the constitution, to unilaterally appoint members of the Commission. The 
Commission is also prone to unilateral decision making in that despite the potential 
impact of its decisions on all states of the federation, there is nothing in the constitution 
that makes public consultation an important aspect of its decision making processes. 
In proposing the establishment of the NFC under the proposed new constitution therefore, 
I recommended a different mode of appointing members of the Commission. Under the 
new arrangement, this thesis proposes that each state of the federation should be 
represented in the Commission by a person nominated by the Governor of the state acting 
in concert with the House of Assembly of that state, while the Federal Capital Territory 
should be represented by a person nominated by the President acting in concert with the 
Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.  
In addition, I proposed that in taking its decisions regarding the appropriate formula and 
criteria for the allocation of centrally collected tax revenues among the levels of 
government, the Commission should be constitutionally mandated to consult widely with 
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members of the public, including state and local government officials, traditional rulers 
and civil society organizations. I also proposed that the Commission should be mandated 
to review the revenue allocation formula and criteria at five year intervals.  
All of the foregoing will ensure that all the states of the federation are genuinely involved 
in the work of the commission and its decisions truly reflect the wishes and aspirations of 
the people of Nigeria. This is very important in view of the significance of the 
Commission’s work.  
The proposed structure of the Commission will also encourage and facilitate cooperation 
between the states of the federation on the one hand, and between the states and the 
federal government on the other. Participation of the levels of government in common 
institutions of the federation facilitates cooperation. And it is this sort of cooperation that 
in turn facilitates and engenders unity. 
Critics of non-centralization, as defined in this thesis, are often quick to point to its 
potential to facilitate or encourage secession. They often attempt to justify their 
preference for centralization on the ground that it fosters unity and cohesion while 
forestalling disintegration. However, as noted in this thesis, rather than facilitate 
cohesion, centralization in Nigeria has done more to provoke secessionist agitations since 
the country got her independence from Britain in 1960. Till date, ethnic agitations for 
secession are ongoing in various parts of the country because of the concentration of 
powers and fiscal resources in the federal government. The demands of the various 
militant and ethnic groups in the country show that only genuine non-centralization of 
powers, accompanied by appropriate autonomy for state and local governments, can stem 
the tide of secessionism that is currently threatening to overwhelm the federation. A 
federal constitutional framework that prioritizes non-centralization of powers along with 
state and local government autonomy is thus a sine qua non for Nigeria’s stability. 
Another criticism that may be leveled against regional political and fiscal autonomy is its 
alleged potential to facilitate financial corruption at the lower levels of government. As 
argued in this chapter however, there is nothing in the corruption statics so far published 
by Nigeria’s anticorruption agencies, the EFCC and the ICPC to suggest that corrupt 
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practices have been restricted to the lower levels of government. In fact, since the advent 
of civil rule in 1999, federal government officials and federal public office holders have 
been more complicit in corrupt practices than officials of the state and local governments.  
Centralization is thus not the solution to the problem of corruption. Corruption in Nigeria 
is not a regional malaise. It is a national problem that requires concerted effort to combat. 
In Nigeria, one way of combating the corruption scourge is to reposition the existing 
anticorruption agencies in order to make them more effective. This can be done by 
genuinely guaranteeing the independence of the agencies and granting their officials, 
security of tenure in order to enable them perform their functions without fear or favour. 
In addition to this, greater political will to tackle corruption must be demonstrated by 
parliamentarians, anti-corruption agencies, and the police to ensure that corrupt public 
office holders are not only removed from office but diligently prosecuted in order to 
serve as a deterrent to potential perpetrators of financial crimes. 
Finally the thesis proposes that a Commission on Federalism be established by the 
constitution to monitor, encourage and advocate compliance with the federal tenets of 
covenant, cooperation and non-centralization of powers proposed in this thesis. The need 
for such a Commission is urgent in light of the long years of centralist political 
governance in Nigeria and the perverse political culture it has established. It will take 
consistent monitoring, encouragement and advocacy to get the federal values advocated 
in this thesis well entrenched in the public psyche and the political system. The proposed 
Commission on Federalism will hopefully help to achieve this objective.  
Further research is particularly needed to examine how the symbio-democratic federal 
constitutional framework proposed in this thesis can be applied in the context of other 
multi-ethnic African States. Africa is plagued by civil wars and other forms of intra-state 
conflict, most of which are caused by ethnic struggles for power and autonomy. The 
constitutional framework for the division of powers and fiscal resources proposed in this 
thesis potentially offers a means of addressing these conflicts. The suitability and 
applicability of this framework to specific African countries will however depend on 
several factors including the political and cultural sophistication of sub-national units, the 
degree of power struggle, and the extent of linguistic, cultural, economic and religious 
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diversity in each country. These are issues that will need to be investigated in the specific 
context of each country. But non-centralization which is the central theme of this 
framework is certain to be very key in addressing conflict in most of the multi-ethnic 
states of Africa. Ascertaining the appropriate degree of non-centralization for each 
country, using the factors mentioned above, should form the subject of further research in 
this field. 
The non-centralized, covenant-driven federal framework proposed in this thesis provides 
the best political option for an ethnically diverse and complex country like Nigeria. It is 
certainly much better than the centralist political framework entrenched in the existing 
constitution of Nigeria. It is also preferable to the confederation arrangement or 
dissolution of the federation that have been suggested by others as alternatives to the 
extant political arrangement in Nigeria. As argued in the thesis, at this advanced stage of 
Nigeria’s history, confederation, or dissolution of the federation will most certainly 
plunge the entire West African sub-region into an endless cycle of war, chaos, confusion, 
and untold hardship, all of which can be avoided if the non-centralized, covenant driven 
symbio-democratic federal framework proposed in this thesis is accepted and adopted.   
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